We study the multiagent unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) routing problem where a set of UAVs needs to collect information via surveillance of an area of operation. Each UAV is autonomous and does not rely on a reliable communication medium to coordinate with other UAVs. We formulate the problem as a game where UAVs are players and their strategies are the different routes they can take. Our model also incorporates the useful concept of information fusion. This results in a new variant of weighted congestion-type games. We show that the price of anarchy (PoA) of the game is at most 2, irrespective of the number of UAVs and their sensor capabilities. This also validates the empirical results of earlier works. Furthermore, we identify classes of games for the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first such theoretical results in the related literature. Finally, we conduct experimental studies using randomly generated instances with several multiagent UAV routing policies. Our insights are that PoA increases with the congestion level when the same number of UAVs search a smaller area or more UAVs search the same area, and on an average, our proposed policies are less than 10% worse than the centralized optimal for the problem scenarios attempted.Note to Practitioners-UAVs are becoming increasingly popular for information collection tasks in defense and civilian applications alike. When the collection area is large, it is not unusual that a fleet of UAVs is deployed. Routing of a fleet can be performed in a centralized or decentralized manner. Decentralized routing might be the only possibility when centralized situational awareness is not possible due to bandwidth limitations and centralized optimal routes for each UAV in the fleet are too complex to compute. Autonomous solutions have several other advantages, let alone simplicity. For managers of UAV systems, our work provides the first theoretical characterization of how bad could decentralized routing be. Under various scenarios of information fusion, specifically weak and strong, and the attribution of information collected to each UAV of a team, we prove that the
The rapid increase in cybercrime, causing a reported annual economic loss of $600 billion (Lewis 2018), has prompted a critical need for effective cyber defense. Strategic criminals conduct network reconnaissance prior to executing attacks to avoid detection and establish situational awareness via scanning and fingerprinting tools. Cyber deception attempts to foil these reconnaissance efforts by camouflaging network and system attributes to disguise valuable information. Game-theoretic models can identify decisions about strategically deceiving attackers, subject to domain constraints. For effectively deploying an optimal deceptive strategy, modeling the objectives and the abilities of the attackers, is a key challenge. To address this challenge, we present Cyber Camouflage Games (CCG), a general-sum game model that captures attackers which can be diversely equipped and motivated. We show that computing the optimal defender strategy is NP-hard even in the special case of unconstrained CCGs, and present an efficient approximate solution for it. We further provide an MILP formulation accelerated with cut-augmentation for the general constrained problem. Finally, we provide experimental evidence that our solution methods are efficient and effective.
During the network reconnaissance process, attackers scan the network to gather information before launching an attack. This is a good chance for defenders to use deception and disrupt the attacker’s learning process. In this paper, we present an exploratory experiment to test the effectiveness of a masking strategy (compared to a random masking strategy) to reduce the utility of attackers. A total of 30 human participants (in the role of attackers) are randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions: Optimal or Random (15 in each condition). Attackers appeared to be more successful in launching attacks in the optimal condition compared to the random condition but the total score of attackers was not different from the random masking strategy. Most importantly, we found a generalized tendency to act according to the certainty bias (or risk aversion). These observations will help to improve the current state-of-the-art masking algorithms of cyberdefense.
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