In 1960, Britain bequeathed to Nigeria an imperfect federation, consisting of three uneven regions. This lopsided arrangement, paved the way for the domination of the federation by the biggest region -the Northern region. This paper adopts the instrumentalist view of federalism. It interrogates the impact of ethnicity on allocation of federal finance in Nigeria between 1960 and 1966. The paper explores the constitutional basis for revenue distribution and the process of subversion by the ruling party. It examines the various mechanisms employed by the North to appropriate federal patronage for its region at the expense of other regions in the period. The paper contends that the unequal access to and competition for scarce resources at the Centre made politics become a dangerous enterprise. The ruling elite (Northerners) seized this opportunity to institutionalise iniquitous fiscal policies which snowballed into political tribulations in the first republic. Till date the ethnic factor continues to play a pivotal role in the political economy of resource sharing in Nigeria. The paper concludes that Nigeria has not been able to manage the challenge of revenue allocation well because the ruling class has been sectional and corrupt. Much more importantly the ability of the North through the instrumentality of the Central government to dominate its competitors engendered serious crisis in the Nigerian federation which eventually led to the political instability that engulfed the first republic and led to its demise in 1966. It suggests the adoption of key pillars of fiscal federalism such as equality and partnership between the centre and the federating units, state ownership of natural resources, funds transfer and scientific equalisation, all of which have made developed federations' intergovernmental relations adaptive and innovative. These measures could help evoke equity, douse tension and make the Nigerian federation very viable.
This article explores the complex dynamics and underpinnings of the contested sectional cabal not only saw to the annulment of these elections, but has relentlessly engaged the machinery of the state to foist collective amnesia on the citizenry by memorialising May 29 as 'Democracy Day', instead of June 12. We argue that these actions became necessary as the remembrance and memorialisation of June 12 could have dire implications for the survival and reputation of the cabal. Using the Obasanjo administration (1999 2007) as a case, this article analyses certain critical events to illustrate and buttress its points. We conclude that until there is a national commitment to memorialising June 12, as well as the institutionalisation of the fundamental tenets of democracy embodied in those elections, a civic and democratic ethos among Nigerian civil society will remain elusive.
Between 1960 and 1999, the Nigerian ‘federal ’ state had had twenty eight years of military leadership. Thus rather than being ruled as a federal state, the military ruled it as a unitary state with total disregardfor the fine tenets of federalism. However, the post 1999 military period provided a conducive climate for robust debates and discourses in the political and legal climes on issues of allocation of tax powers and expenditure responsibilities and the custody of the federation’s funds. Here the state governments contested the overbearing influence and jurisdictional competence of the centre in matters of the “commonwealth”. These contests have had serious implications for intergovernmental relations in contemporary Nigeria. Using the longitudinal approach, the paper examines the various contours of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.The study relied essentially on primary sources from the national archives for the reconstruction of the historical background of this piece. The paper also analyses the post 1999 contestation between the centre and federating units on revenue sharing. Secondly it evaluates the role of the Judiciary in adjudicating between the centre and component units particularly on the issues of apportionment of oil revenue in the fourth republic. The central problem of this paper is that why has the contest over revenue allocation been so intense? Much more importantly, why did the central leadership in that dispensation (personified by the President) have so much challenges with intergovernmental relations? Also why did the regime engage in acts which undermined the ethos of federalism and reinforce the unitary traditions of the preceding military regime? This article contends that given long years of military rule, the administrators and politicians in Nigeria have not internalized the sacred ethos offederalism and the federation has to all intents and purposes remained a unitary state in the garb of a federal state. The paper affirms that the challenge is first andforemost a constitutional problem. It suggests ways by which the dominance of the centre can be diluted towards a coordinated relationship fostered between the centre and the federating units.
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