Federalism, intergovernmental relations and the headmaster complex in Nigerian federalism 1999-2007

Abstract

Between 1960 and 1999, the Nigerian ‘federal ’ state had had twenty eight years of military leadership. Thus rather than being ruled as a federal state, the military ruled it as a unitary state with total disregardfor the fine tenets of federalism. However, the post 1999 military period provided a conducive climate for robust debates and discourses in the political and legal climes on issues of allocation of tax powers and expenditure responsibilities and the custody of the federation’s funds. Here the state governments contested the overbearing influence and jurisdictional competence of the centre in matters of the “commonwealth”. These contests have had serious implications for intergovernmental relations in contemporary Nigeria. Using the longitudinal approach, the paper examines the various contours of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.The study relied essentially on primary sources from the national archives for the reconstruction of the historical background of this piece. The paper also analyses the post 1999 contestation between the centre and federating units on revenue sharing. Secondly it evaluates the role of the Judiciary in adjudicating between the centre and component units particularly on the issues of apportionment of oil revenue in the fourth republic. The central problem of this paper is that why has the contest over revenue allocation been so intense? Much more importantly, why did the central leadership in that dispensation (personified by the President) have so much challenges with intergovernmental relations? Also why did the regime engage in acts which undermined the ethos of federalism and reinforce the unitary traditions of the preceding military regime? This article contends that given long years of military rule, the administrators and politicians in Nigeria have not internalized the sacred ethos offederalism and the federation has to all intents and purposes remained a unitary state in the garb of a federal state. The paper affirms that the challenge is first andforemost a constitutional problem. It suggests ways by which the dominance of the centre can be diluted towards a coordinated relationship fostered between the centre and the federating units.