The mainstream scholarship assessing EU external action frames the subject in terms of success or failure to achieve the intended effects, the latter generally defined against the EU's own stated objectives. Resting on a tacit assumption that EU engagement in third states is a good thing, these analyses are framed as ‘positive impact or no impact’ and tend to neglect the wider effects of EU policies. This article maintains that EU external action may and often does have unintended consequences, thus expanding the study of EU impact beyond the sheer study of EU effectiveness. Drawing on broader literature on unintended consequences, the article proposes a framework for analyzing unintended consequences of EU external action. It synthesizes and adapts to the EU context a classification of unintended consequences and, in order to illustrate its utility, applies the proposed framework to three empirical examples derived from EU neighbourhood, migration and trade policies.

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Inspired by the emerging literature on unintended consequences of EU external action, this article studies how the anticipation of negative unintended consequences factors into EU policy-making. Using policy learning analytical lens, case study research strategy and process-tracing method, this article examines EU policy-making on conflict minerals: when respective EU policy was drafted, the negative unintended consequences of the earlier US conflict minerals legislation figured prominently in the debate. The analysis shows why and how major differences between US and EU conflict minerals legislation have resulted from bounded lessons-drawing driven by two opposing transatlantic advocacy coalitions. Eventually, the EU designed its conflict minerals policy so as to mitigate perceived negative unintended consequences of the earlier US law. The article contributes to literatures on unintended consequences of EU external action, policy learning and specifically bounded lessons-drawing in EU context, and conflict minerals legislation.

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The idea of this Special Issue appeared in early 2014, when the heat of the fire on Kyiv's Independence Square had not fully cooled down and when many civic activists and newborn volunteers had turned their ceaseless energy to yet another fire first in Crimea and then in Eastern Ukraine. The events that seemingly put the state of Ukraine on the brink of its very existence were evolving too fast, but civil society's response to them was no less prompt and adaptive. Volunteers and activists were trying on new roles each day as they were helping those escaping persecution, repression and hostilities, equipping and maintaining those who fought with weapons or joining their ranks, developing reform agenda and drafting legislative proposals. What seemed astounding back then, and still does today, was how those thousands of volunteers and millions of "ordinary citizens" who mobilized to support new civic initiatives took over the functions of the weak and nearly collapsed state eroded by corruption, nepotism, the neglect of its citizens and of the country's national interests. Challenging a post-Soviet monster disguised behind the mask of electoral democracy and market economy, citizens were bringing in a new social contract based on trust and solidarity on which a new state could be built. The speed of events and the scale of civil society engagement precluded any long-term comprehensive analysis, yet researchers' zeal to reflect upon what looked as a tectonic move in Ukraine's political and social development took over. At first, our idea was to co-author an article examining civil society's role in a post-Euromaidan Ukraine, but soon enough the task became too big. The initial 1 In the title of this Special Issue and introduction article, as well as throughout the contributions, we speak of "Euromaidan" to refer to the popular protests that took place in Ukraine in November 2013-February 2014. We use this trope as the most recognizable to the reader and for consistency across the articles only. We are aware that the term "Euromaidan" narrows down the understanding of the events to only one narrative. It is not our intention to automatically or collectively sign up to it.

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This article examines how the Maidan protests of 2013–2014 were a space for the collision of conflicting narratives on what Ukraine is and what it should be, and how past, present, and future were used to imagine contemporary Ukraine. Making use of speech acts by local and international actors and politicians on the Ukraine crisis, historical narratives on Ukraine, Maidan protest slogans, and field work data gathered throughout 2013–2016 in Ukraine, we identify four meta-narratives that enable us to unravel such an imagining: (1) Ukraine as a liminal category between East and West; (2) Ukraine as Russia, Ukraine as non-Russia; (3) Ukraine as Europe, Ukraine as non-Europe; and (4) Ukraine as Ukraine. We trace and contextualize these narratives in four separate sections. Positing all narratives in a discursive battleground and problematizing them as a struggle between stories, the article demonstrates that the imagining of contemporary Ukraine is deeply conditioned by the conflict between all four narratives. Ukraine is simultaneously all and none of them.