This paper examines the EU's external power through the prism of perceptions by non-EU countries of the aims of EU foreign policies, as shown in the Western Balkans. The paper argues that the EU's policy in the Western Balkans lacks a strong normative justification, which affects the degree of compliance with the EU's demands in areas related to state sovereignty. The perceived lack of legitimacy opens up political space for domestic actors to contest the positions taken by the EU on normative grounds. The Western Balkan countries have responded by giving preference to internal sources of legitimacy and asserting domestic reasons for fake compliance, partial compliance or non-compliance with the EU's conditions, with the latter provoking imposed compliance. The EU's transformative leverage in the region has been much weaker to date in comparison with that in Central and Eastern Europe prior to EU accession. The paper also makes the case for widening the debate about EU foreign policy to include contributions that focus on the external impact of the EU's actions. It links the study of EU foreign policy to the literature on Europeanisation that developed in the context of the EU's enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.

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The article examines the power as well as the limits of the EU's leverage on domestic governance in candidate countries from Eastern Europe through the cases of Bulgaria and Romania. It argues that the reasons for Bulgaria and Romania's lagging behind in meeting the EU accession criteria have to do with a set of domestic factors. Powerful veto players and institutional structures embedded in the domestic sociopolitical context have obstructed reform in the sectors most susceptible to political influence and least likely to be reformed without external pressure. The EU's leverage helps explain why the two laggards did succeed in breaking the vicious circle of semireforms and in ultimately qualifying for EU membership. The EU conditionality has tilted the political balance in favour of a consensus on pro-EU reforms, but before these reforms can take root, they need to generate further demand `from below.'

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