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The use of hate speech for political mobilisation and its overall impact on democratisation have generated debate and controversy in both post-colonial formations and more advanced democracies. This is because hate speech tends to promote hatred between different ethnic groups. In Nigeria, it is usually deployed in the build up to elections. Using mixed methods approach, this study interrogates the consequences of hate speech as a political campaign strategy on electioneering and democratisation in Nigeria. The study argues that the use of hate speech in political campaign entrenches hatred and discriminatory voting pattern among citizens. It grossly affects democratisation, the quality of party programmes and candidates chosen by voters. Despite its appeal to extreme right populism based on ethnic voting and other forms of exclusionary politics, the use of hate speech as a political campaign strategy neither promotes the principles of majoritarian democracy nor protects minority rights.

This paper examines the conceptual contradiction between a nationally uniform local government system as constitutionally provided in Nigeria, and, the principles of governance model that is presently believed to advance the course of service delivery in government. The paper argues that the straitjacketed constitutional provisions that require every state government to establish a patterned, uniform local government system, is conflict-generating, opposed to effective management and harnessing of local differences in a highly differentiated country like Nigeria, and averse to the multi-jurisdictional principle advocated by the proponents of the governance model. The focus of the paper therefore, is to investigate the extent the prescribed uniform system of local government hinders the application of the governance model that could advance the course of service delivery at the local level. The author suggests that contrary to the constitutional provisions on the nature of local government, which autonomy is not strongly protected by the constitution, the state governments should be allowed to determine the nature and structure of local governments in their domain to reduce the abuse of the local government system and entrench competitive local government practice. This will advance the greater use of local networks in local governance.

Summary Poor bureaucratization in prismatic (transitional) societies is attributed to malintegration of the ideal bureaucratic principles with subsisting traditional sociocultural features by Fred Riggs. Riggs has been severely criticized on many fronts, yet aspects of his theory remain relevant towards explaining persistent poor administrative behaviour in most African countries. This article applies Riggs' notion of poly‐communalism and poly‐normativism to explain the contribution of low state identity to persistent poor administrative behaviour in Africa. Historical institutionalism theory is also used to attempt at resolving the challenge of equilibrium for which Riggs' theory is commonly criticized. The author avers that communalism, a value that supports group interest in a traditional society, subsists in most poly‐communal transitional African countries, leading to distortions in administrative behaviour. A good number of African countries were mobilized through colonialism but poorly assimilated, thus lacking strong common state identity, which leads to ineffective public administration. The article suggests that resolving the trapping of the administrative system in Africa requires resolving the challenge of poly‐communalism and lack of common identity among a state population.

Nigeria struggles to establish and sustain cooperative, interdependent state-local intergovernmental relations (IGR) by providing for the powers and rights of local governments in the federal constitution. Despite the provisions, the practice of state-local IGR has remained inclusive, hierarchical, dependent and competitive. This paper investigates the extent to which constitutional provisions determine state-local relations as against the macrostructure of intergovernmental relations between the federal government and states. The authors argue that it is difficult to expect a cooperative, interdependent, state-local IGR through constitutional provisions of the powers and rights of local governments, if the federal-state relations, which should be the determining framework of IGR is inclusive, hierarchical and dependent. The paper suggests that the lower forms of IGR in a federation (e.g. the state-local IGR), largely depend on the super-structure, which is that between the federal government and the lower tiers. The implication is that the level of autonomy enjoyed by local governments largely depends on the level of autonomy the states themselves enjoy.

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