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After having invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), the U.S. Supreme Court “dropped the other shoe” inObergefell v. Hodgesby declaring the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage at the state level unconstitutional. Written by Justice Kennedy, the majority opinion heavily relied on the dignity-bestowing character of marriage to show why this exclusion is so harmful. But this strategy comes with a cost: it inflicts a stigma even as it conveys recognition—a drawback that an equality analysis can avoid. Respondents had argued that opening marriage dangerously disconnected marriage from procreation, both the historical reason for and the essence of marriage. In finding that they had failed to provide evidence for the harmful outcomes they described, the majority not only provided the rational basis test with a new kind of “bite.” It also asserted that tradition or religious beliefs were not enough to justify exclusion. Once secular purposes define marriage and rational reasons are required to regulate access, the road to marriage equality opens wide. As the line of cases leading up toObergefellsuggests, and developments in Germany, Austria, and other jurisdictions confirm, equality works as a one-way ratchet—albeit without necessarily including polygamy and incest. Crucially, equality changes the focus: From an equality perspective, the harm lies not in the exclusion from a dignity-conferring institution, but in the suggestion that the excluded group is not worthy of participating in it and does not deserve the recognition and benefits associated with it. Instead of aspiring to achieve dignity through marriage, in this view same-sex couples claim recognition as free and equal citizens. Discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation subsumes an individual under a group category whose purported characteristics are systematically devalued, thus refusing to appreciate a person as an individual. It is this denial of recognition that conveys harm to the dignity of the individual above and beyond the respective disadvantage suffered. Thus taken with equality, dignity does not have the exclusive effect it has in isolation, as struggling against degrading exclusion stresses common traits.

Migration law between acceleration and efficiency Efficiency and speed of decision making have been a recurrent theme of German administrative law reform since the 1970 s. Although migration law has long been the subject of acceleration efforts, this occurred largely outside the general efficiency discourse. In an effort to connect these two strands, this article first retraces the trends that the administrative efficiency discourse has undergone since the 1970 s and points out how the sectors of law driving it – environmental law, emission control, and economic regulation – as well as an economic paradigm have promoted an truncated understanding of efficiency as mere acceleration. In a second step, it shows that while the devaluation of procedure in the interest of speed does align with a German focus on subsequent judicial review, it neither does justice to the relevance of the procedure to the realization of fundamental rights, not to its specific performances: the development of substantive requirements, transparency, participation, legitimacy. Asylum law in particular has experienced a surge of acceleration measures since 2015, pushed by the consulting firm McKinsey. But its existential relevance for protection seekers and the particular dependency of the right to asylum on the asylum procedure require an especially rigorous examination. An efficiency concept geared merely toward acceleration cannot do justice to these specific challenges, as the McKinsey measures have demonstrated; the burden has simply been shifted on the courts. In its last part, this article therefore proposes a qualitative efficiency concept that bears in mind the entirety of the functions of the administrative procedure, takes into account the different requirements of the procedure in different sectors of law, and does not lose sight of the reciprocity between administrative and judicial procedure. Meanwhile, pilot studies from the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany show that a qualitatively efficient asylum procedure is not necessarily a slower or more costly procedure.