This article presents an ontological proof that God is impossible. I define an ‘impossibility’ as a condition which is inconceivable due to its a priori characteristics (e.g. a ‘square circle’). Accordingly, said conditions will not ever become conceivable, as they could in instances of a posteriori inconceivability (e.g. the notion that someone could touch a star without being burned). As the basis of this argument, I refer to an a priori observation (Primus, 2019) regarding our inability to imagine inconsistency (difference) within any point of space. This observation renders the notion of absolute power to be inconceivable, a priori. I briefly discuss the moral implications of religious faith in the context of Purism: a moral rationalist paradigm. I conclude that whilst belief in God can be aesthetically expressed it should not be possessed as a material purpose, due to the illogicality of the latter category of belief and/or expression. With this article I provide conceptual delineation between harmless religious belief and expression—which, I argue, should be protected from persecution, as per any other artistic expression—and religious belief and expression which is materially harmful to society. Whilst I aim to protect religious freedom of expression on one hand, I duly aim to reduce instances of material faith in God(s) on the other. Finally, I aim to bring hope in the possibility for human salvation via technology—such that they should exist indefinitely as ‘demi-gods,’ defined by conditional, relative power over their environment.

This article introduces an a priori paradigm of beings and morality which distinguishes entities that are sought as ends from those that are sought as means to an end. The former entities, I offer, are the essence of personhood and are considered precious by observers possessing a logical system of valuation. The latter entitiesthose sought only as a means to an end -I term 'materials'. Materials are sought for their conditional value: important for achieving sought ends, they are not considered precious in and of themselves. A normative system for how this dichotomy of entities should interact is consequently derived and introduced. This paradigm has applicability for modern humanism and beyond. Assuming societal technological progression whereby human bodies and their surrounding infrastructures continue to evolve and integrate, the distinction between beings and their supporting materials, and a moral code for their interactions, will become ever more relevant.

This article aims to demonstrate that a special category of desirea state which is sought unconditionally, as an end (sought in and of itself)is the only ultimate value that logical observers can conceive upon consideration of sufficient conceptual depth. This demonstration appeals to logical reasoning, and ultimately, the reader's inability to conceive alternate conclusions which are logically consistent.

This article introduces an a priori paradigm of beings and morality which distinguishes entities that are sought as ends from those that are sought as means to an end. The former entities, I offer, are the essence of personhood and are considered precious by observers possessing a logical system of valuation. The latter entitiesthose sought only as a means to an end -I term 'materials'. Materials are sought for their conditional value: important for achieving sought ends, they are not considered precious in and of themselves. A normative system for how this dichotomy of entities should interact is consequently derived and introduced. This paradigm has applicability for modern humanism and beyond. Assuming societal technological progression whereby human bodies and their surrounding infrastructures continue to evolve and integrate, the distinction between beings and their supporting materials, and a moral code for their interactions, will become ever more relevant.