Purism: Desire as the Ultimate Value, Part One An Appeal to Logical Reason

Abstract

This article aims to demonstrate that a special category of desirea state which is sought unconditionally, as an end (sought in and of itself)is the only ultimate value that logical observers can conceive upon consideration of sufficient conceptual depth. This demonstration appeals to logical reasoning, and ultimately, the reader's inability to conceive alternate conclusions which are logically consistent.

Purism: Desire as the Ultimate Value, Part Two An Appeal to Intuition

“…Moore"s (1903) notion that morality is "the right" in pursuit of "the good," where "the right" is what we should do, and "the good" is what we should bring about (Moore, 1903). Rather, I assert (Primus, 2021(Primus, , 2023 that the notion of morality is confined to the objective appraisal of the suitability of any and all potential means of bringing about our sought ends, and that the (various natures of) said ends possess no moral value themselves (i.e., endsour desiresare neither moral nor immoral, neither good nor bad). On the basis that means exclusively and exhaustively possess moral value, Moore"s (1903) Naturalistic Fallacy is overcome: The question concerning whether (figuratively and literally) consistent 6 entities 7those materials that, due to possessing logical properties (void of arbitrariness) in relation to their purpose, will probably most efficiently maximize the realization of the states that we ultimately value (desires)are good (for bringing about what we ultimately value) is closed.…”

“…In part one of this article (Primus, 2023), I appeal to the logical reason of readers to demonstrate thatfrom the perspective of logical observers (i.e., observers with a consistent system of valuation, as defined in part one)the value of desire 2 is universally (i.e., generalizably, across times and space) and objectively (i.e., impartially) greater than, and fundamentally (i.e., categorically;…”

“…Through virtue of being sought as ends, in and of themselves, and never merely as a means to an end, states of desire are the most ultimately-or distally-valued states that we can conceive. The status of desire as an end is true and exclusive, by definition: Logically, all states other than those which are desired are either sought instrumentallybecause they are (perceived to be) needed as a logical means of achieving other endsor unsought (Primus, 2023). As such, I posit thatfrom the perspective of observers with a logical (i.e., consistent) system of valuationwe cannot conceive of any category or nature of state which could be considered to be more valuable.…”

“…States that are perceived to be of greater (or ultimate) value shouldby virtue of being more valuablebe prioritized above states which are perceived to be of lesser (or nil) value 4 . I further offer (Primus, 2021(Primus, , 2023) that all true normative frameworks, by definition, invoke an objective (i.e., impartial) and universal (i.e., across all times and space) conception of should (i.e., prescription) 5 . In doing so, I depart from G.E.…”

“…However, each of these distinctions is conceivably not fundamental (i.e., irreducible) in the context of morality (i.e., impartial, universal laws prescribing the prioritization of some states of value above others). The exclusivity and exhaustivity of Purism"s arbitrarily-logically sought dichotomy conceivably underlies all fundamental (i.e., kind, rather than degree) distinctions of value (Primus, 2023). In unifying some of these concepts, readers should note the following: The concept of sought implies valued.…”