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This paper presents a review of empirical research on the impact of acquisitions on firm performance. The evidence suggests that, in the short run, acquisitions have at best an insignificant impact on shareholder wealth. Long-run performance analysis reveals overwhelmingly negative returns, while the evidence using accounting performance measures is mixed. The review also examines the impact of bid characteristics on performance. The acquisition of hostile targets, transactions that are paid for with cash and acquisitions of larger targets are associated with superior (or at least less negative) performance, while there is mixed evidence on the benefits of related acquisitions. A number of recent studies find that acquirers with superior pre-bid performance tend to experience significant underperformance in the post-bid period.

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Even though audit committees have traditionally been a key component of corporate governance regulation, the last decade has witnessed a greater emphasis on audit committee regulation and a parallel intensification of academic research on the subject. This review synthesizes recent empirical research seeking to investigate various aspects of audit committees’ governance role. The review is structured around current regulatory expectations of audit committees seeking to document the extent to which specific characteristics of good practice influence various components of audit committee effectiveness. It is found that larger and more independent audit committees as well as those with financial expertise are more likely to seek a higher level of external audit coverage and assurance. There is also evidence that more independent audit committees are associated with the purchase of lower levels of non‐audit services from auditors, thereby seeking to preserve the independence of the external audit process. There seems a consensus that more independent audit committees and those with greater accounting/financial expertise have a positive impact on the quality of financial statements. Evidence on the stock market reaction to audit committee issues suggests that investors both welcome the presence of audit committees and react positively when members are appointed with relevant expertise. It is also found that internal auditors view certain audit committee characteristics, specifically independence, expertise and frequency of meetings, as leading to more effective audit committee performance. In summary, therefore, this review documents a significant amount of evidence offering support to current regulations concerning the desired characteristics of audit committees.

Although researchers in business and management are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of endogeneity affecting regression analysis, they frequently do not have the right methodological toolkit to adjust for this issue. In this paper we discuss such a toolkit. There are also areas in business and management research which to date seem to be mostly oblivious about the endogeneity issue. We highlight such an area, which studies the question of whether firms that are cross‐listed on a foreign stock exchange are charged premium fees by their auditors. When the same methodology (pooled ordinary least squares) as in the existing literature is used, the existence of an audit fee premium for cross‐listed firms seems to be confirmed. However, once methodologies are used which adjust for the various types of endogeneity (i.e. omitted variable bias, simultaneous and dynamic endogeneity) there is no longer support for the existence of such a generalized premium. Hence, not only do we illustrate that failure to adjust for endogeneity has severe consequences such as drawing the wrong inferences, but we also review various ways to control for the different types of endogeneity.