Acute total sleep deprivation decreases brain activation in the fronto-parietal attention network (prefrontal cortex and intraparietal sulcus) and in the salience network (insula and medial frontal cortex). Increased thalamic activation after sleep deprivation may reflect a complex interaction between the de-arousing effects of sleep loss and the arousing effects of task performance on thalamic activity.

Recent studies suggest that a brain network mainly associated with episodic memory has a more general function in imagining oneself in another time, place or perspective (e.g. episodic future thought, theory of mind, default mode). If this is true, counterfactual thinking (e.g. 'If I had left the office earlier, I wouldn't have missed my train.') should also activate this network. Present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study explores the common and distinct neural activity of counterfactual and episodic thinking by directly comparing the imagining of upward counterfactuals (creating better outcomes for negative past events) with the re-experiencing of negative past events and the imagining of positive future events. Results confirm that episodic and counterfactual thinking share a common brain network, involving a core memory network (hippocampal area, temporal lobes, midline, and lateral parietal lobes) and prefrontal areas that might be related to mentalizing (medial prefrontal cortex) and performance monitoring (right prefrontal cortex). In contrast to episodic past and future thinking, counterfactual thinking recruits some of these areas more strongly and extensively, and additionally activates the bilateral inferior parietal lobe and posterior medial frontal cortex. We discuss these findings in view of recent fMRI evidence on the working of episodic memory and theory of mind.

This study explores the fMRI correlates of observers making trait inferences about other people under conflicting social cues. Participants were presented with several behavioral descriptions involving an agent that implied a particular trait. The last behavior was either consistent or inconsistent with the previously implied trait. This was done under instructions that elicited either spontaneous trait inferences ('read carefully') or intentional trait inferences ('infer a trait'). The results revealed that when the behavioral descriptions violated earlier trait implications, regardless of instruction, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) was more strongly recruited as well as the domain-general conflict network including the posterior medial frontal cortex (pmFC) and the right prefrontal cortex (rPFC). These latter two areas were more strongly activated under intentional than spontaneous instructions. These findings suggest that when trait-relevant behavioral information is inconsistent, not only is activity increased in the mentalizing network responsible for trait processing, but control is also passed to a higher level conflict monitoring network in order to detect and resolve the contradiction.

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is consistently involved in tasks requiring the processing of mental states, and much rarer so by tasks that do not involve mental state inferences. We hypothesized that the dmPFC might be more generally involved in high construal of stimuli, defined as the formation of concepts or ideas by omitting non-essential features of stimuli, irrespective of their social or non-social nature. In an fMRI study, we presented pictures of a person engaged in everyday activities (social stimuli) or of objects (non-social stimuli) and induced a higher level of construal by instructing participants to generate personality traits of the person or categories to which the objects belonged. This was contrasted against a lower level task where participants had to describe these same pictures visually. As predicted, we found strong involvement of the dmPFC in high construal, with substantial overlap across social and non-social stimuli, including shared activation in the vmPFC/OFC, parahippocampal, fusiform and angular gyrus, precuneus, posterior cingulate and right cerebellum.

This fMRI study analyzes inferences on other persons' traits, whereby half of the participants were given spontaneous ("read") instructions while the other half were given intentional ("infer the person's trait") instructions. Several sentences described the behavior of a target person from which a strong trait could be inferred (trait diagnostic) or not (trait nondiagnostic). A direct contrast between spontaneous and intentional instructions revealed no significant differences, indicating that the same social mentalizing network was recruited. There was, however, a difference with respect to different brain areas that passed the significance threshold, suggesting that this common network was recruited to a different degree. Specifically, spontaneous inferences significantly recruited only core mentalizing areas, including the temporo-parietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, whereas intentional inferences additionally recruited other brain areas, including the (pre)cuneus, superior temporal sulcus, temporal poles, and parts of the premotor and parietal cortex. These results suggest that intentional instructions invite observers to think more about the material they read, and consider it in many ways besides its social impact. Future research on the neurological underpinnings of trait inference might profit from the use of spontaneous instructions to get purer results that involve only the core brain areas in social judgment.

Neuroimaging studies on trait inference about the self and others have found a network of brain areas, the critical part of which appears to be medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). We investigated whether the mPFC plays an essential role in the neural representation of a trait code. To localize the trait code, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) adaptation, which is a rapid suppression of neuronal responses upon repeated presentation of the same underlying stimulus, in this case, the implied trait. Participants had to infer an agent's (social) trait from brief trait-implying behavioral descriptions. In each trial, the critical (target) sentence was preceded by a sentence (prime) that implied the same trait, the opposite trait, or no trait at all. The results revealed robust adaptation from prime to target in the ventral mPFC only during trait conditions, as expected. Adaptation was strongest after being primed with a similar trait, moderately strong after an opposite trait and much weaker after a trait-irrelevant prime. This adaptation pattern was found nowhere else in the brain. In line with previous research on fMRI adaptation, we interpret these findings as indicating that a trait code is represented in the ventral mPFC.

Although insufficient sleep is a well-recognized risk factor for overeating and weight gain, the neural mechanisms underlying increased caloric (particularly fat) intake after sleep deprivation remain unclear. Here we used resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging and examined brain connectivity changes associated with macronutrient intake after one night of total sleep deprivation (TSD). Compared to the day following baseline sleep, healthy adults consumed a greater percentage of calories from fat and a lower percentage of calories from carbohydrates during the day following TSD. Subjects also exhibited increased brain connectivity in the salience network from the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) to bilateral putamen and bilateral anterior insula (aINS) after TSD. Moreover, dACC-putamen and dACC-aINS connectivity correlated with increased fat and decreased carbohydrate intake during the day following TSD, but not during the day following baseline sleep. These findings provide a potential neural mechanism by which sleep loss leads to increased fat intake.

This study investigated the impact of indoor illuminance and correlated color temperature (CCT) on healthy adults' cognitive performance, subjective mood, and alertness during daytime office hours and differences in time-of-day effects. A 2(illuminance) × 2(CCT) × 2(morning vs. afternoon) mixed design (N = 60) was employed. Participants felt less sleepy in the bright light exposure. The low "cool" lighting induced the least positive mood. The effects of illuminance and CCT on subjective feelings were not time-of-day dependent. The results demonstrated the slowest responses in inhibition, working memory, and recognition of facial expression tasks in the low "warm" lighting. The effect on long-term memory was most