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According to the facial feedback hypothesis, people's affective responses can be influenced by their own facial expression (e.g., smiling, pouting), even when their expression did not result from their emotional experiences. For example, Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) instructed participants to rate the funniness of cartoons using a pen that they held in their mouth. In line with the facial feedback hypothesis, when participants held the pen with their teeth (inducing a "smile"), they rated the cartoons as funnier than when they held the pen with their lips (inducing a "pout"). This seminal study of the facial feedback hypothesis has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the results of 17 independent direct replications of Study 1 from Strack et al. (1988), all of which followed the same vetted protocol. A meta-analysis of these studies examined the difference in funniness ratings between the "smile" and "pout" conditions. The original Strack et al. (1988) study reported a rating difference of 0.82 units on a 10-point Likert scale. Our meta-analysis revealed a rating difference of 0.03 units with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.11 to 0.16.

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Recent studies suggest that a brain network mainly associated with episodic memory has a more general function in imagining oneself in another time, place or perspective (e.g. episodic future thought, theory of mind, default mode). If this is true, counterfactual thinking (e.g. 'If I had left the office earlier, I wouldn't have missed my train.') should also activate this network. Present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study explores the common and distinct neural activity of counterfactual and episodic thinking by directly comparing the imagining of upward counterfactuals (creating better outcomes for negative past events) with the re-experiencing of negative past events and the imagining of positive future events. Results confirm that episodic and counterfactual thinking share a common brain network, involving a core memory network (hippocampal area, temporal lobes, midline, and lateral parietal lobes) and prefrontal areas that might be related to mentalizing (medial prefrontal cortex) and performance monitoring (right prefrontal cortex). In contrast to episodic past and future thinking, counterfactual thinking recruits some of these areas more strongly and extensively, and additionally activates the bilateral inferior parietal lobe and posterior medial frontal cortex. We discuss these findings in view of recent fMRI evidence on the working of episodic memory and theory of mind.

This study explores the fMRI correlates of observers making trait inferences about other people under conflicting social cues. Participants were presented with several behavioral descriptions involving an agent that implied a particular trait. The last behavior was either consistent or inconsistent with the previously implied trait. This was done under instructions that elicited either spontaneous trait inferences ('read carefully') or intentional trait inferences ('infer a trait'). The results revealed that when the behavioral descriptions violated earlier trait implications, regardless of instruction, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) was more strongly recruited as well as the domain-general conflict network including the posterior medial frontal cortex (pmFC) and the right prefrontal cortex (rPFC). These latter two areas were more strongly activated under intentional than spontaneous instructions. These findings suggest that when trait-relevant behavioral information is inconsistent, not only is activity increased in the mentalizing network responsible for trait processing, but control is also passed to a higher level conflict monitoring network in order to detect and resolve the contradiction.

This fMRI study analyzes inferences on other persons' traits, whereby half of the participants were given spontaneous ("read") instructions while the other half were given intentional ("infer the person's trait") instructions. Several sentences described the behavior of a target person from which a strong trait could be inferred (trait diagnostic) or not (trait nondiagnostic). A direct contrast between spontaneous and intentional instructions revealed no significant differences, indicating that the same social mentalizing network was recruited. There was, however, a difference with respect to different brain areas that passed the significance threshold, suggesting that this common network was recruited to a different degree. Specifically, spontaneous inferences significantly recruited only core mentalizing areas, including the temporo-parietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, whereas intentional inferences additionally recruited other brain areas, including the (pre)cuneus, superior temporal sulcus, temporal poles, and parts of the premotor and parietal cortex. These results suggest that intentional instructions invite observers to think more about the material they read, and consider it in many ways besides its social impact. Future research on the neurological underpinnings of trait inference might profit from the use of spontaneous instructions to get purer results that involve only the core brain areas in social judgment.