This article details the changes in Norwegian strategic culture, comprising grand strategy and practice, following the end of the Cold War. Throughout the Cold War, Norwegian security and defence policy was characterized by broad, non-politicized consensus. Basic elements of this grand strategic perspective were the smallness of Norway, the people defence and allegiance to the UN. Doctrines focused on survival, with the army as the lead service. Close ties were maintained between the military and societal elites, and the military was seen just as much in societal terms, namely as an employer in scarcely populated areas, as it was in defensive terms. The changes in strategic culture over the past 10–15 years have been uneven, partly driven by internal and external changes in discourse, but over recent years probably as much by changes in practice. The first post-Cold War years witnessed the emergence of an alternative grand strategic representation, focusing on international operations rather than on invasion defence. Mindful of the impact on local communities of a reduced military presence, politicians long resisted any change, but after years of resistance the alternative grand strategy was embraced by the armed forces, leading to the creation of a rapid reaction force and increased emphasis on special task forces. International experience is now considered positive, even necessary, for a military career. Furthermore, whereas general conscription was gradually undermined because of the way in which it is practised, new civil–military ties were forged through the practice of providing military personnel training that was interchangeable with regular education. It now seems that military practice, as well as the specialized military discourse, has outpaced the broader Norwegian discourse on the use of military means. Nevertheless, the tension between global and local concerns remains unresolved.
European security is at a critical juncture and many have called for a more coherent and efficient response, involving both the EU and NATO. However, the primary tool for EU-NATO cooperation, "Berlin Plus", has been stuck in a political quagmire since the mid2000s, making a lot of scholars to conclude that this cooperation is obsolete and outdated. This article is challenging this view by analysing a range of informal but regular interaction patterns that have emerged. Using practice theory, it sheds new light on and explores how EU and NATO staff at all levels engage in informal practices on various sites in headquarters in Brussels and in field operations. A study of EU-NATO cooperation as practice focuses on the everyday, patterned production of security as well as what makes action possible, such as (tacit) practical knowledge and shared "background" knowledge (education, training, and experience). The article also discusses the extent to which shared repertoires of practice may evolve into loose communities of practice that cut across organisational and professional boundaries.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Summary
This article analyses the state’s duty of care (DoC) for citizens who fall victim to unforeseen catastrophic or violent events abroad. The DoC highlights the challenges, dynamics and relations involved in diplomatic practice that is aimed at protecting citizens outside of state borders and where traditional security concepts have little relevance. How has a globalized, more insecure world — with shifting relations and responsibilities among states, their subordinates and other carers — affected the provision of DoC? How do governments and private actors act on the DoC during and after crises? To illustrate, the article draws on the terrorist attack at a gas facility in Algeria in 2013 and the nuclear disaster in Japan in 2011, focusing particularly on the Norwegian framework and approach to protecting citizens abroad. In both crises, implementing the DoC required practical skills and measures beyond traditional diplomacy and institutionalized crisis mechanisms.
Most NATO countries reformed their defence systems during the 1990s in response to the end of the Cold War. Although Norway adjusted to new external framework conditions and participated in the new international operations, territorial defence dominated the defence discourse and military practices at home into the next millennium. This article argues that the continuity in the discourse and the pace with which defence reform has been implemented during the period 1990-2005 is a result of social factors and relations at the national level. First, the nation-building role of the Norwegian defence system has shaped central national concepts, values and military practices, rendering it resistant to change. Second, reform has been counteracted by the weight of the military institution -in terms of size, geographical extent and deep-rooted practices related to training and education. Third, Norwegian defence policy is deeply intertwined with other domestic policy areas, so when changes in the defence establishment have negative consequences, especially for district policy, opposition is provoked. In contrast, the Norwegian defence discourse and practices seem to have rapidly co-opted the changes invoked by the emerging multi-polar system. This underscores the claim made here, that the Norwegian defence discourse is largely about national, territorial defence.
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