Highlights: We analyze deforestation outcomes and equity implications of a two-year interruption in forest PES in Ecuador’s Amazon. Quasi-exp. tests show that without payment, deforestation resumed on enrolled properties situated near high defor pressure. Where deforestation pressures were low, enrolled properties continued to conserve more than non-enrolled properties. Focus groups and interviews revealed enrolled landowners lacked information and their contract terms were imbalanced. Equity, transparency, funding, and trust are essential for the long-term viability of incentive-based conservation.

We study the impact of Ecuador's national forest conservation incentives program on reported land conflicts. Data come from a survey of >900 households located within 49 indigenous and Afro‐Ecuadorian communities holding communal conservation contracts. We use quasi‐experimental methods to test for relationships between program participation and changes in land conflicts. Respondents reported that the program reduced land conflicts when households resided in communities with de facto communal tenure arrangements (vs. de facto semiprivate arrangements). We find no evidence that the conservation incentive program increased land conflicts. These results counter concerns that conservation payments undermine land tenure security; in some cases perceived tenure security is improved.