What happens when the money runs out? Forest outcomes and equity concerns following Ecuador’s suspension of conservation payments

Abstract

Highlights: We analyze deforestation outcomes and equity implications of a two-year interruption in forest PES in Ecuador’s Amazon. Quasi-exp. tests show that without payment, deforestation resumed on enrolled properties situated near high defor pressure. Where deforestation pressures were low, enrolled properties continued to conserve more than non-enrolled properties. Focus groups and interviews revealed enrolled landowners lacked information and their contract terms were imbalanced. Equity, transparency, funding, and trust are essential for the long-term viability of incentive-based conservation.

Land‐based measures to mitigate climate change: Potential and feasibility by country

“…The program also led to a decrease in land conflicts in areas with ambiguous land titles (Jones et al, 2020) and generated both socioeconomic and ecological benefits. However, the program depends on continued government funding to incentivize persistent conservation behavior (Etchart et al, 2020).…”

Ecosystem Services Auctions: The Last Decade of Research

“…The neoclassical paradigm underpinning much of the mechanism design literature is focused on "getting the price right" and avoiding overpayment; as such, it is focalized through the principal. This echoes a tendency in the broader PES literature, where the compliance of land stewards with contracts has received immense attention but that of buyers (i.e., by providing funding continuity) has been largely overlooked [138]. If the Rather than interactions between discrete components, intersecting subthemes sometimes reveal descriptions of the same component from different vantage points: it is not uncommon to attack the same problem from different disciplinary perspectives and using different language in such a multidisciplinary body of literature.…”

“…The neoclassical paradigm underpinning much of the mechanism design literature is focused on "getting the price right" and avoiding overpayment; as such, it is focalized through the principal. This echoes a tendency in the broader PES literature, where the compliance of land stewards with contracts has received immense attention but that of buyers (i.e., by providing funding continuity) has been largely overlooked [138]. If the design discussion is focalized through the principal and bidders are simplified as profitmaximizers, then reverse auctions are a set of stratagems making it difficult for them to rent-seek or shirk their obligations: implicitly, bidders are not to be trusted.…”

“…See Blackmore et al [109] for agency-landholder relationships, perceived fairness, and participation. See Etchart et al [138] for a novel, equity-conscious exploration of the consequences of buyer non-compliance with PES contracts. )…”

Effects of Ending Payments for Ecosystem Services: Removal Does not Crowd Prior Conservation Out

“…Armed conflict has also affected implementation of PES program in Colombia, causing interruption in payments. In Ecuador, the SocioBosque PES program paused for two years due to financial limitations (Etchart, Freire, Holland, Jones and Naughton-Treves, 2020).…”