Abstract:In this paper, I present Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of reason, drawing on the notions of “hinges” he developed in On Certainty. I then outline some of the unpalatable relativistic consequences that can be extracted by Wittgenstein’s epistemological views. Then, developing the similarities between Wittgenstein’s treatment of “hinges” and his views on metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show that his remarks on the structure of reason, once correctly understood and developed, can help us to block rather than license relativistic conclusions. I argue that following Wittgenstein’s views on epistemology, we should be able to dismiss all the cases of apparent unsolvable disagreement between communities committed to radically different worldviews; this is so because, once seen in the light of his conception of the structure of reason, these disagreements are either solvable, as they are based on lack of knowledge and can thus be solved through education and training, or are mere pseudo-problems that stem from misguided comparisons between constitutively different language games and are thus the result of a misleading way of representing the nature and aim of our epistemic practices.
Parole chiave: carpi estranei, occhio, TC, ecografia, radiologia RIASSUNTO -Sono stati descritti 3 casi di corpo estraneo di natura metallica localizzati in sede intraorbitaria, due in sede intrabulbare ed uno iuxtabulbare. Abbiamo descritto quello che secondo noi dovrebbe essere l'iter diagnostico nella gestione di questa non frequente parte dela traumatologia orbitaria.Con la TC si possono ottenere informazioni aggiuntive rispetto alla radiologia tradizionale ed all'ecografia sui rapporti del corpo estraneo con le parti molli intraorbitarie e sulle eventuali patologie associate al trauma. Limiti della TC, nei casi di carpi estranei metallici, ed in generale dell'ecografia, possono essere la sovrastima delle dimensioni ed errori nella localizzazione.SUMMARY -Pinpointing the exact location of a foreign body within the orbital cavity is essential for successful surgery. This paper describes 3 cases of intraocular metallic foreign bodies two located within and one near the eyeball.Patients underwent traditional X-ray examination, ultrasound and CT scanning. In most cases radiograms will display the exact intra or extrabulbar location of the foreign body. In doubtful cases recourse can be made to ultrasound or CT.CT will also offer additional information on the relations between the foreign body and the soft intraorbital parts of the eye and possible disease associated with trauma to the globe.CT may overestimate the size of metal foreign bodies causing location errors, but this drawback can be overcome in part using windows for bone imaging. IntroduzioneLa presenza di un corpo estraneo intraorbitario e un'evenienza non molto frequente in radio-oftalmologia. Classicamente si distinguono in radiopachi e radiotrasparenti; in realta e piu corretto definire questi ultimi scarsamente radiopachi essendo formati da materiale a basso peso atomico.La natura del corpo estraneo si desume soprattutto dall'accurata anamnesi, essa influenza la prognosi specie perche i frammenti di ferro o di rame possono provocare fenomeni reattivi (siderosi o cuprosi) con complicazioni anche a distanza di tempo. Fattore determinante sotto il profilo clinico-terapeutico ( estrazione chirurgica o con elettrocalamita) e non solo la conoscenza della composizione 637
This book symposium features three critical pieces dealing with Duncan Pritchard's book, 'Epistemic Angst'; the symposium also contains Pritchard's replies to his critics. Manuscrito -Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 41, n. 1, pp. 115-165, jan.-mar. 2018. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Duncan Duncan PritchardI have struggled with the problem of radical skepticism for many years. Epistemic Angst (Princeton University Press, 2015) opens by saying that this problem is both my first love, philosophically speaking, and my true love. It was certainly this puzzle that got me hooked into philosophy, and it was this puzzle that I found myself returning to at regular intervals. In earlier workespecially Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005)I tried to meet the difficulty head-on, by offering a form of neo-Mooreanism that was motivated by epistemic externalism and situated within a research program I referred to as anti-luck epistemology. 1 The careful reader of this book will have spotted, however, that I was not fully persuaded, in that the anti-skeptical proposal on offer starts to look very much like a "skeptical solution" once the details are unpacked. Indeed, I found myself arguing in effect that a form of radical skepticism that is aimed specifically at the rational standing of our beliefs was pretty much correct.Over the years, my response to radical skepticism became increasingly bifurcated. On the one hand, I developed an anti-skeptical theory (the essentials of which were already present in Epistemic Luck) that was inspired by Wittgenstein's (1969) remarks on the structure of rational evaluation in On Certainty. 2 Simultaneously, I also advanced a separate proposal, inspired by John McDowell's (e.g., 1995) work, which was cast along epistemological disjunctivist lines. On the face of it, these two proposals are radically different. Nonetheless, I was convinced that they belonged together, though at the outset I couldn't quite see how to connect them. Fortunately, since each of these 1 I submit that anti-luck epistemology is still going strong, even though I now realize that it doesn't contain the materials to deal with radical scepticism. That is, I now realize that the philosophical task of offering a theory of knowledge is orthogonal to the philosophical challenge of showing whether, contra the radical skeptic, we have any knowledge. In any case, I claim that anti-luck epistemology is adequate to the former task, as part of a wider view I call anti-luck virtue epistemology (or, more recently, anti-risk virtue epistemology). For more on anti-luck epistemology in general, see Pritchard (2005a;2007;2015a). For more on anti-luck virtue epistemology, see Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4) and Pritchard (2012a). For more on anti-risk virtue epistemology, see Pritchard (2016; forthcoming).
According to The Evidentialist problem of Evil, the existence of disproportionate, prima facie gratuitous evil and suffering in the world is enough evidence against the existence of the Omnipotent, Perfectly Loving, Omniscient God of Classical Theism. A contemporary way of dealing with this argument is Skeptical Theism , for which the very fact that there is an huge amount of evil that looks gratuitous to us does not mean that we can reasonably believe whether this evil is indeed gratuitous or not . In this paper, I present and discuss a number of influential criticisms against this view according to which a proponent of Skeptical Theism will be forced to accept a number of unpalatable skeptical conclusions. I argue that this is not the case.
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