No abstract

We investigate the effect of CFO narcissism, as measured by signature size, on financial reporting quality. Experimentally, we validate that narcissism predicts misreporting behavior, and that signature size predicts misreporting through its association with narcissism. Empirically, we examine notarized CFO signatures and find CFO narcissism is associated with more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, weaker internal control quality, and a higher probability of restatements. The results are consistent for within‐firm comparisons focusing on CFO changes and are robust to controlling for CFO overconfidence and CEO narcissism. The results highlight the importance of CFO characteristics in the domain of financial reporting decisions.

We examine whether analysts' incentives to maintain good relationships with management contribute to the optimistic/pessimistic within-period time trend in analysts' forecasts. In our experiments, 81 experienced sell-side analysts from two brokerage firms predict earnings based on historical information and management guidance. Analysts' forecasts exhibit an optimistic/pessimistic pattern across the two timing conditions (early and late in the quarter), and the effect is significantly stronger when the analysts have a good relationship with management than when their only incentive is to be accurate. Debriefing results indicate that analysts are aware of this pattern of forecasts, and believe that this benefits their future relationships with management and with brokerage clients. The analysts most frequently cite favored conference call participation and information access when describing benefits from maintaining good relationships with management. Our results suggest the following: The optimistic/pessimistic pattern in forecasts is in part a conscious response to relationship incentives, information access is perceived to be a major benefit of management relationships, and recent regulatory changes may have lessened but have not eliminated this conflict of interest source.

This paper shows that an important link between investor sentiment and firm overvaluation is optimistic earnings expectations, and that management earnings guidance helps resolve sentiment-driven overvaluation. Using previously identified firm characteristics, we find that most of the negative returns to uncertain firms in months following high-sentiment periods fall within the three-day window around the issuance of management earnings guidance. Comparisons of guidance months to nonguidance months show that guidance issuance affects the magnitude and not just the daily distribution of negative returns. There is also some evidence of negative returns around earnings announcements for firms that previously issued guidance, suggesting that guidance does not entirely correct optimistic earnings expectations. To provide additional insight into the strength of the guidance effect, we show that the market reacts more strongly to surprises, particularly negative surprises, following high-sentiment periods. Finally, firms with higher transient institutional ownership are less likely to guide, and their guidance is less likely to contain bad news following high-sentiment periods, indicating that managers with a short-term focus are hesitant to correct optimistic market expectations. THE PARTY'S OVER: THE ROLE OF EARNINGS GUIDANCE IN RESOLVING SENTIMENT-DRIVEN OVERVALUATION AbstractThis paper shows that an important link between investor sentiment and firm overvaluation is optimistic earnings expectations, and that management earnings guidance aids in resolving sentimentdriven overvaluation. Using the firm characteristics identified by Baker and Wurgler (2006), we find that most of the negative returns to uncertain firms in months following high sentiment periods fall within the three-day window around management earnings guidance issuance. Comparisons of guidance months to non-guidance months show that guidance issuance affects the magnitude and not just the daily distribution of negative returns. There is also some evidence of negative returns around earnings announcements for firms that previously issued guidance, suggesting that guidance does not entirely correct optimistic earnings expectations. To provide additional insight into the strength of the guidance effect, we show that the market reacts more strongly to surprises and particularly negative surprises following high sentiment periods. Finally, firms with higher transient institutional ownership are less likely to guide and their guidance is less likely to contain bad news following high sentiment periods, indicating that managers with a short-term focus are hesitant to correct optimistic market expectations.

No abstract

This paper shows that an important link between investor sentiment and firm overvaluation is optimistic earnings expectations, and that management earnings guidance helps resolve sentiment-driven overvaluation. Using previously identified firm characteristics, we find that most of the negative returns to uncertain firms in months following high-sentiment periods fall within the three-day window around the issuance of management earnings guidance. Comparisons of guidance months to nonguidance months show that guidance issuance affects the magnitude and not just the daily distribution of negative returns. There is also some evidence of negative returns around earnings announcements for firms that previously issued guidance, suggesting that guidance does not entirely correct optimistic earnings expectations. To provide additional insight into the strength of the guidance effect, we show that the market reacts more strongly to surprises, particularly negative surprises, following high-sentiment periods. Finally, firms with higher transient institutional ownership are less likely to guide, and their guidance is less likely to contain bad news following high-sentiment periods, indicating that managers with a short-term focus are hesitant to correct optimistic market expectations. THE PARTY'S OVER: THE ROLE OF EARNINGS GUIDANCE IN RESOLVING SENTIMENT-DRIVEN OVERVALUATION AbstractThis paper shows that an important link between investor sentiment and firm overvaluation is optimistic earnings expectations, and that management earnings guidance aids in resolving sentimentdriven overvaluation. Using the firm characteristics identified by Baker and Wurgler (2006), we find that most of the negative returns to uncertain firms in months following high sentiment periods fall within the three-day window around management earnings guidance issuance. Comparisons of guidance months to non-guidance months show that guidance issuance affects the magnitude and not just the daily distribution of negative returns. There is also some evidence of negative returns around earnings announcements for firms that previously issued guidance, suggesting that guidance does not entirely correct optimistic earnings expectations. To provide additional insight into the strength of the guidance effect, we show that the market reacts more strongly to surprises and particularly negative surprises following high sentiment periods. Finally, firms with higher transient institutional ownership are less likely to guide and their guidance is less likely to contain bad news following high sentiment periods, indicating that managers with a short-term focus are hesitant to correct optimistic market expectations.

Prior research provides only weak and controversial evidence that people overestimate the likelihood of desirable events (wishful thinking), but strong evidence that people bet more heavily on those events (wishful betting). Two experiments show that wishful betting contaminates beliefs in laboratory financial markets because wishful betters appear to possess more favorable information than they actually do. As a consequence, market interaction exacerbates rather than mitigates wishful thinking. This phenomenon, "contagion of wishful thinking," could be problematic in many settings where people infer others' beliefs from their behavior.wishful thinking, betting, desirability bias, unrealistic optimism, motivated reasoning, contagion, markets, investors, investing, gambling, information aggregation

This paper examines how the reversibility of the accounting effect of asset impairments affects managers' investment decisions. We conduct two experiments in which participants act as CEO of a multi-division electronics company that suffers a large asset impairment at one of the divisions. Drawing on prior psychology research involving cognitive dissonance and decision reversibility, we predict and find that managers who are responsible for the decision to record the asset impairment invest more in the impaired division when the accounting effect of the impairment is reversible than when it is irreversible. This is consistent with the idea that reversible accounting effects encourage behavioral attempts to alter the cash flow outcome, while irreversible accounting effects encourage belief revision to rationalize the cash flow outcome. Also in line with cognitive dissonance theory, we show that managers who are not responsible for the decision to impair the asset, or managers who are given the opportunity to deny responsibility for the asset impairment, do not differ in their investment in the impaired division, regardless of impairment reversibility.