Populism continues to gain traction in politics but there has been relatively little research on how it plays out on the Internet. The special issue at hand aims at narrowing this gap of research by focusing on the close relation between populism and online communication. This introduction presents an integrative definition of populism, as well as a theoretical analysis of the interplay between populist communication logic and online opportunity structures. The individual contributions discuss how populist actors may benefit from the Internet. They analyze how political leaders and extreme parties use populist online communication. The authors also shed light on how populist movements may relate to various political parties. They finally demonstrate which groups of social media users are more susceptible to populism than others and what effects populist online communication may have on citizens. We hope that this special issue will contribute to the discussion on what is arguably one of the largest political challenges currently faced by a series of nations around the globe.

This study examines the bystander effect in cyberbullying. On the basis of two experiments, we test whether individuals who witness cyberbullying are less willing to intervene when the number of others who have already observed the incident is increased. In addition, we inquire how differently severe cyberbullying incidents affect bystanders' intention to intervene. Our results show that a very severe cyberbullying incident boosts individuals' intention to intervene, mediated by the assessment of the situation as emergency and, in turn, by an increased feeling of responsibility. However, if there is a larger number of bystanders in a cyberbullying incident, rather than just a few, participants feel less responsible to help, and thus, they are less willing to intervene. Keywords Bystander effect, bystander intervention, cyberbullying, diffusion of responsibility, experimentsImagine a user observes that someone is being bullied in an online social networking site and that two others have witnessed the incident. How likely is it that this user will intervene? And now picture that more than a thousand others have already witnessed the

A common feature among populist parties and movements is their negative perspective on the media’s role in society. This paper analyzes whether citizens with a populist worldview also hold negative attitudes toward the media. From a theoretical point of view, the paper shows that both the anti-elite, anti-outgroup and people centrism dimension of populism contradicts the normative expectations toward the media. For instance, the assumption of a homogeneous people and the exclusion of a societal outgroup is incompatible with a pluralistic media coverage. The results of a representative survey in Germany predominantly confirmed a relation between a populist worldview and negative media attitudes. However, the three populism dimensions influenced the evaluations not in a consistent way. A systematic relation could only be found for antielite populism, which is negatively associated with all analyzed media evaluations such as media trust or satisfaction with the media’s performance. This indicates that in a populist worldview, the media are perceived as part of a detached elite that neglects the citizens’ interests. However, the results confirm the assumption of a natural ally between populism and tabloid or commercial media. Individuals with people centrist and anti-outgroup attitudes have higher trust in these media outlets.

In modern media environments, social media have fundamentally altered the way how individual opinions find their way into the public sphere. We link spiral of silence theory to exemplification research and investigate the effects of online opinions on peoples' perceptions of public opinion and willingness to speak out. In an experiment, we can show that a relatively low number of online exemplars considerably influence perceived public support for the eviction of violent immigrants. Moreover, supporters of eviction were less willing to speak out on the issue online and offline when confronted with exemplars contradicting their opinion. KeywordsExemplification, hate speech, public opinion perception, spiral of silence online, user commentsAfter an Islamist took several hostages in a cafe in Sydney in December 2014, an Australian woman placed a hashtag on Twitter (#illridewithyou) and offered to escort Muslims, who were planning to ride public busses in traditional clothing. Within a short period of time, thousands of Australians commented on the offer, most of them expressing their support for Muslim citizens and the initiative.The incident is a good example of how today individual opinions rapidly spread into the public sphere where millions can read and comment on them. Not surprisingly, this

This article investigates the impact of populist messages on issue agreement and readiness for action in 15 countries (N = 7,286). Specifically, populist communicators rely on persuasive strategies by which social group cues become more salient and affect people's judgment of and political engagement with political issues. This strategy is called 'populist identity framing' because the ordinary people as the in-group is portrayed as being threatened by various out-groups. By blaming political elites for societal or economic problems harming ordinary people, populist communicators engage in anti-elitist identity framing. Another strategy is to blame immigrants for social problems -that is, exclusionist identity framing. Finally, right-wing political actors combine both cues and depict an even more threatening situation of the ordinary people as the in-group. Based on social identity theory, an experimental study in 15 European countries shows that most notably the anti-elitist identity frame has the potential to persuade voters. Additionally, relative deprivation makes recipients more susceptible to the mobilising impact of the populist identity frames.

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Although populist communication has become pervasive throughout Europe, many important questions on its political consequences remain unanswered. First, previous research has neglected the differential effects of populist communication on the Left and Right. Second, internationally comparative studies are missing. Finally, previous research mostly studied attitudinal outcomes, neglecting behavioral effects. To address these key issues, this paper draws on a unique, extensive, and comparative experiment in sixteen European countries (N = 15,412) to test the effects of populist communication on political engagement. The findings show that anti-elitist populism has the strongest mobilizing effects, and anti-immigrant messages have the strongest demobilizing effects. Moreover, national conditions such as the level of unemployment and the electoral success of the populist Left and Right condition the impact of populist communication. These findings provide important insights into the persuasiveness of populist messages spread throughout the European continent.

Public criticism of professional media is omnipresent in many democratic societies. This debate has often been examined concerning what the audience demands from the media (expectations) or how they evaluate media performance (evaluations). Based on a representative, quota-based online survey of the German population in 2019, this study examines citizens’ expectations, evaluations, and the discrepancies between both, as well as their relationship with media trust, socio-political predispositions—particularly populist attitudes—and individual media use in high-choice media environments. Results show that citizens have high expectations of the media which they mainly do not see fulfilled and that expectation-evaluation discrepancies are related to lower media trust in the case of particularly important and/or most noticeably underperformed media functions. Both expectations and evaluations were associated with populist attitudes, but only in the case of anti-elite attitudes in such a way that increased expectations collide with negative media evaluations. For anti-outgroup attitudes, instead, the analyses show a generally negative assessment of journalistic media, both in terms of expectations and evaluations. Media use does only play a minor role.