No abstract

The Coronavirus pandemic undeniably represents a global health threat unprecedented in living memory leading to very distinct behavioral, cognitive, and psychological responses to the crisis. We argue that the different ways of responding to the pandemic are rooted in personal dispositions and provide evidence regarding the function and value of the Big Five framework in understanding the pandemic personality. Using 18 samples from the six European countries most affected at the onset of the pandemic (overall N = 18,307), we find that most of the Big Five effects vary across countries and pandemic phases. However, while neuroticism is clearly linked to pandemic threat perception and emotional responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, conscientiousness is mainly related to exposure to pandemic hazard, preferences regarding political measures, and tolerance of epidemiologically undesirable behavior. Our findings are rich in implications for public health politics, policy-makers and social cohesion.

In recent years, the concept of national identity has recaptured the imagination of public opinion research and with it individuals' conceptions of what it takes to be a “true” member of their nation. This investigation aims to add to the explanation of varying conceptions of nationhood by scrutinising their personality‐based foundations. It provides the first systematic analysis of a yet unstudied link between the Big Five personality traits and two ideal‐typical conceptions of nationhood: civic and ethnic national identity. Using 18 samples from six European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, and the United Kingdom), each containing around 1000 individuals, we uncover psychological underpinnings of attitudes towards national membership, revealing several consistent trait patterns. We find a negative relationship between openness to experience and an ethnic national identity, while conscientiousness associates positively with the civic ideal type of national identity content. The findings presented extend current understandings of how people conceptualise national belonging and provide evidence that distinct conceptions of nationhood are related to different dispositional foundations.

While conventional wisdom connects crises and external threats to increasing support for populism, several questions remain unanswered. Following insights of affective intelligence theory (AIT), we posit that anger and fear elicited by pandemic threat relate differently to populist attitudes. While such relations have already been explored in the context of other hazards (such as financial turmoil, terrorism, or immigration), our study allows us to evaluate the emotional bedrocks of populism in the context of a threat that is not apparently connected to the classical political grievances underlying populism. Expanding the literature on psychological underpinnings of populism and on the political consequences of the pandemic, our analyses of original survey data support our contentions that pandemic threat-induced anger is positively related to populist attitudes while fear is negatively linked to populist stances. This holds in particular for anti-elitism and the Manichean outlook inherent in populism. Altogether, we provide new comparative evidence to the puzzle about the emotional bedrocks of populism by illuminating a domain that has not been systematically explored before.