SYNOPSIS: This paper contributes to the deliberations on the potential consequences of requiring disclosure of the engagement partner's identity in the audit report. The PCAOB has recently suggested that this requirement will lead to enhanced audit quality due to increased engagement partner accountability and improved transparency of the audit process. The goal of our commentary is to examine this issue by considering factors that potentially affect audit quality in appearance and audit quality in fact, and applying insights from three distinct academic frameworks: source credibility, accountability, and the theory of affordances.While prior evidence from source credibility research implies that a mandatory signature will likely increase audit quality in appearance, its impact on audit quality in fact remains unclear. Academic literature suggests that increased accountability will increase audit effort but is silent on the associated increase in audit effectiveness. As a result, mandatory disclosure is likely to increase the risk of over-auditing because audit services have the essential characteristics of a credence good. As for an increase in audit quality in appearance, the question remains whether the current perception of audit quality is too low or too high. The increase in public perceptions of audit quality without an associated increase in actual quality is a desirable accomplishment only when public perception of quality is below actual audit quality. Otherwise, the measure increases the gap between delivered audit quality and public perceptions of it. We suggest specific research opportunities in this area.information users seek greater transparency about information source due to a legitimate desire to decrease uncertainty associated with information evaluation. The implication as applied to auditing is that disclosure of the engagement partner's identity will likely increase audit quality in appearance, as well as public confidence in the message content (audit report and associated financial statements). At the same time, greater transparency tempts decision makers to decrease cognitive effort and to rely mostly on the sender's attributes during information processing. The implications are that identifying the EP has the potential to increase the likelihood that investors will place unwarranted weight on the EP's characteristics and underweight the content of the audited financial statements. AccountabilityThis framework, which originated in social psychology, suggests that the positive impact of increased accountability is limited to problems caused by lack of effort rather than by lack of expertise or resources. Accountability-related studies also warn about decision makers' tendency to succumb to the audience's preferences by decreasing effort and independent data processing when reporting to an audience with known views. In an audit context, such a tendency will likely lead to more conservative risk-related judgments and expansive audit procedures, increasing audit costs, but not necessarily au...

This paper reviews the nearly 20 years of scholarly research on information technology outsourcing (ITO), with an explicit focus on developing a taxonomy for AIS academics and extracting valuable suggestions for AIS practitioners. Our taxonomy subdivides the ITO research into separate streams: (1) initial outsourcing decision and its determinants, (2) execution of the outsourcing contract and dynamics of outsourcing relationships, and (3) measurement of outsourcing results and the long-term organizational consequences of outsourcing. We consider the primary research questions addressed, summarize the major findings, and identify the theories and methods used. Finally, we highlight the limited accounting studies on ITO and discuss directions for potential synergies between accounting and IS scholars.

We examine the impact of informal cultural attributes, such as generalized trust in a society (hereafter "trust") and civic cooperation, on audit fees and Big N presence in countryspecific audit markets. The relation between trust (civic cooperation) and audit fees/Big N presence is ambiguous. On one hand, higher trust and civic cooperation are associated with lower levels of agency problems, thereby reducing the demand and price of audit services. On the other hand, higher trust (civic cooperation) societies may place more value on a strong audit function due to higher societal costs of inappropriate behavior, resulting in a relatively higher demand and cost of audit services. We find that the presence of Big N auditors is stronger in countries with higher levels of civic cooperation, and that audit fees are higher in countries with higher trust and civic cooperation. The positive impact of societal trust and civic cooperation on audit fees and Big N presence is weakened in countries with stronger levels of investor protection. These results suggest that both formal and informal institutions can act as substitutes in determining the demand and supply for audit services.

Although substantial effort has been devoted to understanding how cost issues drive Information Technology outsourcing (ITO), several researchers have proposed that this narrow focus ignores the role of more subtle factors. This paper addresses this concern by investigating internal and external influences on accounting executives' recommendations to outsource the IT infrastructure. Using resource-based and institutional theories, we hypothesize that when the chief information officer's (CIO's) skills are strong, accounting executives will more likely advise against outsourcing. But when the skills are weak, accountants are more likely to mimic the outsourcing actions of industry peers. Our findings support this expectation. These results should interest IS, accounting, and general management scholars. Strategic IT choices are a collegial decision which include contributions from multiple members of the top management team. Senior accounting executives are routinely involved in such evaluations, providing initial projections and monitoring the consequent progress. In addition, recent US regulations have made accounting executives personally responsible for the effectiveness of internal controls, including those over the IT infrastructure. The accounting executives' recommendations on ITO in this context often becomes decisive, and factors behind this recommendation should be fully explored.