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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether ownership structure affects earnings management in the banking industry of emerging markets. Design/methodology/approach The empirical study is conducted using a sample of 134 banks from 12 Middle Eastern and North African countries. Econometrically speaking, the study used a panel data regression analysis. Findings The authors found convincing evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use discretionary loan loss provisions to manage their earnings. The authors also found that state and institutional owners encourage earnings management, while family owners reduce this practice. Practical implications The findings would be valuable for investors since they should take into account ownership structure in order to reach a better investment decision. Moreover, regulatory reforms in emerging markets should push for more transparency about ownership structure, high levels of supervision, and external audit quality. Originality/value This study presents international evidence on the prominent role of owners in earnings management in emerging markets with weak shareholder rights protection.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether political connections in Tunisia give firms advantages such us easy access to external financing and tax benefits and/or force them to spend more on employment. In addition, we show if political connections affect accounting and market performance. Using a sample of listed Tunisian firms between 2006 and 2010, we apply OLS regression to identify the effect of political connections on firms' policies and performance. We find that politically connected firms gain easier access to credit with relatively high costs compared to unconnected counterparts. They are offered more government subsidies and they enjoy better tax benefits thanks to their ties with politicians. Additionally, politically connected firms outperform their unconnected counterparts and they have higher value. Hence, political relationships seem to help firms getting access to key resources which improve their accounting and market performance without contributing to the job creation process. Our results are more robust for non-financial firms.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to test the political costs hypothesis in emerging economies characterized by interventionist governments and weak protection of property rights. The paper uses executives’ political connection and state control to measure firms’ political costs. Design/methodology/approach Based on a sample of Tunisian firms, univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test whether firms’ political costs have any impact on earnings management. Findings The empirical analysis indicates that the executives’ political connection is not directly related to earnings management. However, the interaction between executives’ political connection and the state control affects the firm’s sensitivity to political pressure and its earnings management practices. More specifically, this study provides evidence that non-connected firms and state-controlled firms attempt to use accounting policies to decrease their earnings especially during periods of the former government when they had to face high political costs. This finding is robust to comparing means of political cost indicators between different groups. Indeed, private firms with political connection enjoy a significantly lower insurance right, tax and donations and grants compared to other firms. Research limitations/implications This study provides empirical evidence for the specific application of accounting theory in emerging economies. Practical implications Political influence may be an important criterion that will be used by auditors and investors to appreciate and detect specific manipulations of accounting earnings. Similarly, regulators should be aware of the political factors effect on discretionary behavior of managers to provide appropriate rules and standards. Originality/value The study is a pioneer in proving that a firm’s size is not always a suitable measure of its political cost. It extends the accounting literature on the role of political economy in the application of the political costs hypothesis. This hypothesis is confirmed in emerging economies by providing new and significantly measure of firms’ political costs