This article examines reasons for the ineffectiveness of foreign aid interventions in developing countries, using the examples of Yemen, Egypt and Jordan. It starts with a review of two contradictory theories used to explain foreign aid ineffectiveness: the public interest perspective (PIP) and the public choice perspective (PCP). On the basis of the PCP, this article shows that deficiencies are locked within a vicious circle of a poor policy and institutional environments in developing countries and donors' self-interest. The article ends by proposing a third explanation of foreign aid ineffectiveness that goes beyond the scope of the PCP.
Although important roles in peacebuilding are attributed to civil society (CS), few studies have so far analysed how CS actors fare amid ongoing war. Our empirical analysis of CS organisations in Yemen shows that their potential for peacebuilding is severely restrained not only by the security situation but also by political capture, corruption, and problems associated with foreign support. Our findings have implications for theories on CS and peacebuilding, which need to be adapted to messy realities in which boundaries between the state and non-state, civil and uncivil, and domestic and international domains are blurred. They also offer food for thought to peacebuilding donors, whose funds have inadvertently become encapsulated into a highly problematic political dynamic. However, the study shows that not all types of organisations are equally affected by political capture. Grassroots and new activist organisations, it argues, deserve more academic and policy attention as ways out of the Yemeni quagmire are sought.
The collapse of public services in Yemen due to a protracted crisis raging since 2015 has compelled some local citizen-based coalitions to initiate community-based service delivery. This preliminary study identifies Community-Based Initiatives (CBIs) as non-state actors supplying basic services ordinarily provided by governmental institutions. It offers an overview of Yemen’s humanitarian crisis while focusing on public services provision pre- and mid-conflict and highlights the role of CBIs as a response to its breakdown within a severely fragile context. As this work considers CBI a societal constituent and not simply a temporary phenomenon, it discusses the general trends of Civil Society. This article fills the gap in the literature and compares the Western perspective and application of CBIs in Yemen aiming at developing a more specific and contextual conception. The analysis lays the foundation for much needed future studies on the role of informal organizations in service provision in developing countries of the Global South.
Although humanitarian aid (HA) is desperately needed in Yemen to cope with the worst humanitarian crisis in the world, few studies have analyzed the effect of these grants. This article provides such an analysis using 34 interviews of NGO directors and staff members in Yemen. The interviews were conducted in an open format, to enable interviewees to express all their ideas on the HA situation in Yemen, not just ones that solely fit into the frame and questions of this study. Our empirical analysis indicates that the ability of local NGOs to use and deliver supplies to those suffering is severely constrained. This is mainly due to looting by conflicting factions, corruption, and the absence of the international deterrent that obliges the conflicting parties to preserve human rights. Furthermore, this study indicates that HA is being used as a weapon of war for power and financial gain, and thus is a contributing factor in the continuation of the conflict. This means it is important that international donors explore alternative solutions to effectively deliver and distribute HA in fragile states.
Yemeni tribes have traditionally used dialogues to prevent clashes. At national level this tradition has been applied to prevent civil wars. This article discusses whether national dialogues are suitable instruments for setting disputes at national level, looking at the circumstances under which these dialogues could lead to successful results. Several criteria are considered, of which building an environment of trust and ownership of external interventions seem to be the most significant. Trust-building before entering into formal negotiations is important, but it is unclear whether this should be a separate phase, or can be part of a reconciliation stage, which the literature on dialogues singles out as highly conducive for success. Local ownership is an important precondition for success in the theoretical discourse, but (direct) international and regional involvement is required, as external bodies are often the cause of internal conflicts in Yemen.
No abstract
Humanitarian aid (HA) is needed in Yemen to cope with the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. However, current practices of distributing aid in the form of food have not had the desired effect; conflict has continued, and war economies are thriving as a result. Thus, this paper proposes the idea of cash assistance as an alternative form of HA. Our empirical analysis of HA in Yemen shows that cash assistance is a more effective and efficient way of distributing aid in comparison to food aid. This is due to food aid being vulnerable to looting by the conflicting factions, enabling funds to be inadvertently captured into the highly problematic war economy dynamic. In comparison, cash assistance targets a wider scope of peoples’ necessities, in a more efficient and effective delivery approach that can be easily tracked by the donors. Cash aid can either be unrestricted, restricted, or conditional. The former allows cash transfer, the second enables vulnerable people to purchase items depending on their needs with vouchers, and the latter links the money distributed with performing a certain task. This allows communities to improve and develop, and it enables individuals to build up their skill sets and have a source of income. This is particularly important for NGOs who are unable to provide the conditions needed to bear their success. The Yemeni people have lost trust in the warring factions, as well as local and international NGOs, due to the lack of effectiveness of current methods of HA distributions due to looting and the risks associated with reaching vulnerable people. Therefore, it has become imperative to restore donor direct HA delivery by providing cash aid as a superior means of food aid in Yemen, to ensure the effectiveness of HA and to improve the lives of those who are suffering, in the long term (This article builds on previous scholarship; see Elayah, M., & Fenttiman, M. (2021). Humanitarian Aid and War Economies: The Case of Yemen. The Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 16(1). This article provides a nuanced and high-quality examination of the conduct of armed groups in Yemen. The analysis of HA in this article “supports the view that it is a significant source of funding for armed groups and consequently that it plays a huge part in allowing the war economy in Yemen to thrive”. Warring groups are often looting HA to distribute it based on partisanship and to sell it on the black market to finance the war effort. They have also attempted to block HA to try and gain control over the humanitarian campaign and receive a cut of the billions of dollars given in foreign assistance. In many cases, HA is distributed through local NGOs that were established by the groups to attract international funds. Others were pre-politicized NGOs that channeled funds to specific regions or particular groups for political and military advantage. It is clear from our analysis that the ability of NGOs to use HA effectively and deliver it to those who deserve it is very limited. NGO’s actions can end up expanding the war economy rather than reducing the effects of war on the poor. Distrust in international bodies and in local and international NGOs has become extremely high among those affected by the war” (Elayah, M., & Fenttiman, M. (2021: p 59)).
This article assembles a picture of Yemen's 2013-14 National Dialogue Conference (NDC) by collecting perspectives from local civil society organizations (CSOs), which are contrasted to the views of international commentators. Despite all efforts by internal parties as well as the international community, the dialogue failed to avert war, which broke out shortly after. Through interviews with 50 CSOs, we reconstructed the reasons for failure, as well as paying attention to the observed strengths of the dialogue. Half of the consulted organizations were directly involved in the NDC, either as an invited participant or in a brokerage role. The other half concerns outside observers. We identify aspects on which the opinion of the CSOs converge, but also highlight striking divergences depending on insider/outsider status. In contrast to the view espoused in the international literature, the CSOs overall feel that, in spite of all its procedural and substantive flaws, the NDC was a significant junction in the long road towards peace and stability and laid important groundwork for future dialogues.
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