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Self-selection of converts is an under-studied explanation of inter-religion socioeconomic status (SES) differences. Inspired by this conjecture, I trace the Coptic-Muslim SES gap in Egypt to self-selection-on-SES during Egypt’s conversion from Coptic Christianity to Islam. Selection was driven by a poll tax on non-Muslims, imposed from 641 until 1856, which induced poorer Copts to convert to Islam leading Copts to shrink into a better-off minority. Using novel data sources, I document that high-tax districts in 641–1100 had in 1848–1868 relatively fewer Copts, but greater SES differentials. Group restrictions on apprenticeships and schooling led the initial selection to perpetuate.

In 1805–1882, Egypt embarked on one of the earliest state industrialization programs. Using a new data source, the Egyptian nineteenth-century population censuses, I examine the impact of the program on the long-standing inter-religious human capital differentials, which were in favor of Christians. I find that there were inter-religious differentials in reaping the benefits (or losses) of industrialization. The first state industrialization wave was “de-skilling” among Muslims but “up-skilling” among Christians, while the second wave was “up-skilling” for both groups. I interpret the results within Lawrence F. Katz and Robert A. Margo (2013) framework of technical change.

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Public mass modern education was a major pillar of state-led development in the post-Colonial period. I examine the impact of Egypt's transformation in 1951–1953 of traditional elementary schools (kuttabs) into modern primary schools on the Christian-Muslim educational and occupational differentials, which were in favor of Christians. The reform granted kuttabs' graduates (where Muslim students were over-represented) access to higher stages of education that were previously confined to primary schools' graduates. Exploiting the variation in exposure to the reform across cohorts and districts of birth among males in 1986, I find that the reform benefited Muslims but not Christians. What Europe is suffering from is the result of generalizing education among all levels of society… they have no chance of avoiding what happened [Europe's 1848 revolutions]. So if this is an example in front of us, our duty is simply to teach them how to read and write to a certain limit in order to encourage satisfactory work and not to spread education beyond that point.Muhammad Ali Pasha, Ottoman Viceroy of Egypt (1805–1848), in a private letter to his son, Ibrahim Pasha (in Judith Cochran 1986, p. 6)Education is like the water we drink and the air we breathe.Taha Hussein, Egyptian liberal intellectual and Egypt's Minister of Education (1950–1952)The poor go to heaven, but can't they have a share on Earth too? They are willing to give up a share in heaven in exchange for a share on Earth.Gamal Abdul-Nasser, President of Egypt (1956–1970) (Excerpt from a public speech)

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Copts (Egyptian Christians), who constitute around 6 percent of Egypt's population, and the Muslim majority, is illuminating in this regard. Using a novel data source, two nationally representative individual-level samples from the 1848 and 1868 population censuses that I digitized from the original manuscripts at the National Archives of Egypt (NAE) (Saleh, 2013) and that are among the earliest pre-Colonial censuses from any non-Western country, I documented that Copts were over-represented among white-collar workers (mostly, mid-low bureaucrats) and artisans in 1848 and 1868. Among adult employed men, 50 percent of Copts were white-collar workers and artisans, compared to only 20 percent among Muslims. 3 This phenomenon is striking if we take into account that Egypt was Coptic Christian before the Arab Conquest of Egypt in 641, and since inand out-migration were limited, Egypt's "Copts" and "Muslims" are both descendants of the pre-641 "Coptic" population that either chose to remain Coptic or to convert to Islam. 4 Bearing this fact in mind, Saleh (2018) argues that Copts' conversion to Islam was characterized by selection on SES due to the tax system. Upon the Conquest, Arabs imposed an annual poll tax on every adult free Coptic male, which was enforced until 1856. As conversion freed Copts from the poll tax liability, and since the conversion incentive was decreasing in income owing to the (quasi) lump-sum feature of the tax, I hypothesize that the tax caused the conversion of poorer Copts, leading Copts to shrink into a better-off minority. Restrictions on apprenticeships and schooling imposed by each religious group led the initial selection to perpetuate thereafter.

A ruler who does not identify with a social group, whether on religious, ethnic, cultural, or socioeconomic grounds, is confronted with a trade‐off between taking advantage of the out‐group population's eagerness to maintain its identity and inducing it to “comply” (conversion, quitting, exodus, or any other way to accommodate the ruler's own identity). This paper first nests economists' extraction model, in which rulers are revenue‐maximizers, within a more general identity‐based model, in which rulers care also about inducing people to lose their identity, both in a static and an evolving environment. This paper then constructs novel data sources to test the implications of both models in the context of Egypt's conversion to Islam between 641 and 1170. The evidence supports the identity‐based model.