The Reluctant Transformation: State Industrialization, Religion, and Human Capital in Nineteenth-Century Egypt

Abstract

In 1805–1882, Egypt embarked on one of the earliest state industrialization programs. Using a new data source, the Egyptian nineteenth-century population censuses, I examine the impact of the program on the long-standing inter-religious human capital differentials, which were in favor of Christians. I find that there were inter-religious differentials in reaping the benefits (or losses) of industrialization. The first state industrialization wave was “de-skilling” among Muslims but “up-skilling” among Christians, while the second wave was “up-skilling” for both groups. I interpret the results within Lawrence F. Katz and Robert A. Margo (2013) framework of technical change.

The economy by other means: The historiography of capitalism in the modern Middle East

“…For example, Bent Hansen's comparative study of Egypt and Turkey's etatist policies and their effect on economic growth, equity, and poverty from independence in the 1920s until the 1980s is not only crucial for understanding these regimes' macroeconomic decisions but also is essential background for constructing arguments about societal choices regarding consumerism and their cultural meanings (). Comparably, Sevket Pamuk's construction of the values of economic growth in the Middle East during the 19th and early 20th centuries () and Mohamed Saleh's careful sampling and utilization of Egypt's population censuses of 1848 and 1868 (, ) are potentially indispensable for grounding qualitative historical research about the legal regulation of market practices, such as the state cooptation of guilds or the emergence of novel market‐related professions.…”

A ‘new’ economic history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region

“…Using the 1848 and 1868 population census samples, I then examined whether the occupational differences between Copts and Muslims were mitigated due to the state industrialization programme that was carried out in 1816–1882. I found that Copts were in fact more likely than Muslims to take the white‐collar jobs (e.g., accountants) in the newly established state manufactories, whereas Muslims ended up in unskilled positions such as factory workers (Saleh, ). In a different research paper (Saleh, ), I documented that the educational and occupational differences between Copts and Muslims declined in the second half of the twentieth century, partially due to the expansion of public mass modern education among the masses in 1951–1953.…”

“…Timur Kuran, a major pioneer of this line of literature, attributed MENA's underdevelopment to certain Islamic institutions such as the inheritance law that led to the fragmentation of land ownership, the religious endowment (waqf) system that hindered the development of the corporation, and the high individualism of Islamic law (Kuran, 2004(Kuran, , 2012. More recently, there has been a surge in the institutional literature on MENA (Artunç, 2015;Blaydes and Chaney, 2013;Carvalho, 2013;Chaney, 2013;Meyersson, 2014;Rubin, 2011;Saleh, 2015Saleh, , 2016a.…”

“…Pioneering scholars such as Kuran (2004Kuran ( , 2012 emphasized the role of Islamic legal institutions, such as those governing inheritance and pious trust (waqf), in explaining the relative stagnation of the region vis-a-vis Western Europe. A number of scholars expanded this area of research by examining the impact of various institutions in the MENA region (Artunç, 2015;Blaydes and Chaney, 2013;Carvalho, 2013;Chaney, 2013;Meyersson, 2014;Rubin, 2011;Saleh, 2015Saleh, , 2016a.…”

Does industrialization affect segregation? Evidence from nineteenth-century Cairo

“…3 Between 1816 and 1848, the program focused on creating state manufacturing firms (mostly, textiles, military, paper and printing industries). However, as many of Ali's firms (especially, textiles) closed down after 1848, Ali's successors in 1848-1879 switched their efforts in the program's second wave to transportation and communications firms (railways, steam navigation, and telegraph) (Saleh, 2015). Although the program did not generate a permanent shift of the labor force from the primary to the secondary sector, nor Modern Economic Growth (MEG) (i.e.…”