This paper tests the ability of the regulatory capital requirement to cover credit losses at default, as carried out by the economic (optimal) capital requirement in Tunisian banks. The common factor in borrowers that leads to a credit default is systematic risk. However, the sensitivity to these factors differs between borrowers. To this end, we derived two kinds of sensitivity to systematic risk: the first is recognised by the Basel Committee; the second is derived from an economic approach. Hence, we can observe the impact of sensitivity to systematic risk on capital requirements. Empirically, we studied a sample of 100 individual borrowers from a Tunisian deposit bank that had credit in January 2020. We estimated the default probability for each borrower and then simulated their systematic risk sensitivity using the Monte Carlo approach, and compared them with the regulatory risk sensitivity. Then, we tested their effects on the economic and regulatory capital requirements. The results indicate that regulatory capital overestimates economic capital. This is due to the overestimation of borrowers’ contagion in terms of default risk, as shown by the superiority of their regulatory sensitivity systematic risk compared to the simulated risk. This leads banks to devote more capital than is really necessary to reach the regulatory standard. Hence, there was an increase in capital costs and the possibility of an arbitrage opportunity.
This study aims to test the contagion effect of the Arab Spring revolution in the GCC countries on discrimination between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of cost efficiency, and to test how prudential factors can influence this comparison. We used the stochastic frontier of Battese and Coelli (1995) to measure the cost efficiency of both Islamic and conventional banks in the GCC countries during 2006_ 2015 (before the Arab revolution 2006-2010 and after the Arab revolution 2011-2015). Second, we used a logit model to discriminate between Islamic and conventional banks in terms of cost efficiency combined with credit risk, regulatory capital and interest margin. Third, we finally test the convergence and divergence between Islamic and Conventional banks by measuring the probability of having Islamic/conventional activities for both banks. We have shown that there is no absolute difference in terms of cost efficiency between Islamic and conventional banks. This difference can be observed through the credit risk taking but not through the interest rate margin. In addition, Islamic banks have taken advantage from the event of the Arab Spring revolution, compared to conventional ones, by being more efficient through risk mitigating due to their participatory financial product. Unlike previous research, we have used a cost efficiency measurement following Battese and Coelli’s (1995) model and we have incorporated it in a logit model, in the context of crisis. Cost efficiency is combined with a set of prudential factors to determine their effect on the convergence/divergence between Islamic and conventional bank.
Purpose Several studies have studied the points that distinguish Islamic banks from conventional ones. The corresponding conclusions are a bit contradictory. This paper aims to study the similarities between Islamic and conventional banks in the Gulf countries using a new approach, namely, the clustering method based on dynamic time warping (DTW) distance. Design/methodology/approach To study the similarities between Islamic and conventional banks, in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, this study used the DTW distance. Then, a clustering based on this distance was carried out to find out which banks are the most similar. Finally, the authors have studied the factors that explain these similarities. Findings This empirical study covered 44 Islamic banks and 46 conventional banks in GCC countries during 2006–2015. The results show that Islamic and conventional banks are included in the same cluster for Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. In contrast, Islamic and conventional banks do not share the same cluster for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This is because of the establishment of interest rates below discount rates. In this case, banks are incentivized to take more risks to compensate for interest losses, which increases efficiency and allocates Islamic and conventional banks to different clusters. Accordingly, there is no absolute discrimination because of the initial status between Islamic and conventional banks. However, the overall banks, either Islamic or conventional, are discriminated through the distance of the banking applied interest rate and the social discount rate. Originality/value DTW distance-based clustering is a very suitable method for emphasizing the similarities that may exist between conventional and Islamic banks. This technique has not previously been used in the literature in question.
Problem/Relevance: This paper deals with such market disciplinary factors as shareholder ownership, audit committee composition and Basel III prudential regulation affecting accounting manipulation measured by abnormal accruals in Tunisian banks in the event of managerial deviation from regulatory requirements Research Objective/Questions : The aim of this study is to estimate the abnormal accruals that measure the accounting manipulation, and to test the effect of disciplinary and regulatory factors accordingly to The spring Arab revolution, on accounting Manipulation. Methodology:We propose to construct abnormal accruals as an endogenous variable, using the classic Kothari model (2005), in order to explain them by means of the "difference-in-difference" estimation approach (DID), understand the significance of the evolution of the manipulation, and explain these accruals using internal and external disciplinary factors. On the other hand, we use the credit risk portfolio manipulation theory advocated by Nessim (2003) and Repullo (2007), to understand the concept of actual venture capital of Tunisian banks after the Arab Revolution.Major Findings : The results show that the situation of Tunisian banks has dramatically worsened since the Tunisian Revolution. The DID approach showed an exacerbation of abnormal accruals and a manipulation transfer from net income smoothing to credit portfolio value smoothing in order to reach a healthy financial situation. This aggravation is linked to the market discipline deterioration, the shareholders, the external auditors and the supervisory board.Implications: Before the Revolution, accounting manipulation was mainly caused by banking undercapitalization that led managers to offer more risky credit in a diluted ownership market and in an informational asymmetry situation characterized by the absence of the audit committee. After the Revolution, accounting manipulation resulted from an overcapitalization situation, which led managers to grant more risky credit. To circumvent the shareholders' supervisory power, managers manipulated credit portfolio values, offering a low level of credit risk, and circulating false beliefs for shareholders and depositors. This was done when prudential supervision was weak, leading to an information asymmetry and long-term conflict of interest between external auditors and managers through abnormal remuneration and a long relationship.
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