With the increased need for data confidentiality in various applications of our daily life, homomorphic encryption (HE) has emerged as a promising cryptographic topic. HE enables to perform computations directly on encrypted data (ciphertexts) without decryption in advance. Since the results of calculations remain encrypted and can only be decrypted by the data owner, confidentiality is guaranteed and any third party can operate on ciphertexts without access to decrypted data (plaintexts). Applying a homomorphic cryptosystem in a real-world application depends on its resource efficiency. Several works compared different HE schemes and gave the stakes of this research field. However, the existing works either do not deal with recently proposed HE schemes (such as CKKS) or focus only on one type of HE. In this paper, we conduct an extensive comparison and evaluation of homomorphic cryptosystems’ performance based on their experimental results. The study covers all three families of HE, including several notable schemes such as BFV, BGV, CKKS, RSA, El-Gamal, and Paillier, as well as their implementation specification in widely used HE libraries, namely Microsoft SEAL, PALISADE, and HElib. In addition, we also discuss the resilience of HE schemes to different kind of attacks such as Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack and integer factorization attacks on classical and quantum computers.
Abstract. In Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), clustering is the suitable topology to save the energy of sensor nodes. In this paper, we provide a secured cluster formation by proposing a new symmetric key management scheme for hierarchical WSNs. The new scheme is called EAHKM (Energy Aware Hierarchical Key Management in WSNs). EAHKM needs the pre-distribution of only three keys in each sensor node before deployment, and it ensures a secure cluster formation after deployment. EAHKM assures the establishment of a pairwise key between each sensor node and its cluster head, thus the establishment of a broadcast key in each cluster in the network. Simulation results show that EAHKM provides an energy-efficient, flexible and scalable solution to the key management problem in hierarchical WSNs, and it presents a good resilience to node compromising attacks than other hierarchical key management schemes.
With the increased need for data confidentiality in various applications of our daily life, homomorphic encryption (HE) has emerged as a promising cryptographic topic. HE enables to perform computations directly on encrypted data (ciphertexts) without decryption in advance. Since the results of calculations remain encrypted and can only be decrypted by the data owner, confidentiality is guaranteed and any third party can operate on ciphertexts without access to decrypted data (plaintexts). Applying a homomorphic cryptosystem in a real-world application depends on its resource efficiency. Several works compared different HE schemes and gave the stakes of this research field. However, the existing works either do not deal with recently proposed HE schemes (such as CKKS) or focus only on one type of HE. In this paper, we conduct an extensive comparison and evaluation of homomorphic cryptosystems’ performance based on their experimental results. The study covers all three families of HE, including several notable schemes such as BFV, BGV, CKKS, RSA, El-Gamal, and Paillier, as well as their implementation specification in widely used HE libraries, namely Microsoft SEAL, PALISADE, and HElib. In addition, we also discuss the resilience of HE schemes to different kind of attacks such as Indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack and integer factorization attacks on classical and quantum computers.
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