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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. AbstractWe express the idea of classical competition in a statistical equilibrium model, where the tendency for competition to equalize profit rates results in an exponential power (or Subbotin) distribution. The model supports and extends recent evidence on the Laplace distribution of growth rates in firm size. We also find tent-shaped distributions in the size growth rates of Forbes Global 2000 companies, which we interpret as preliminary evidence in favor of the hypothesis that classical competition is a globally operating mechanism.

In spite of numerous discussions and programs aimed at reducing public health care costs in Germany, the country has seen a massive increase in health care costs at an annual average rate of 7% since 1972. When

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Abstract:We consider the current bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. It seems that the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies are the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany's board and director network. Conditional on being a board member, it is very improbable to obtain a second membership, but multiple board membership becomes increasingly likely once this initial barrier is overcome. We also present a simple model that describes board appointment decisions as a trade-off between social capital and monitoring ability.Keywords: Board and director interlocks, network core, network formation, market capitalization JEL classification: D85, L20, M14, M51 AbstractWe consider the current bipartite graph of German corporate boards and identify a small core of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. To identify the core, we compare the actual number of board memberships to a random benchmark, focusing on deviations from the benchmark that span several orders of magnitude. It seems that the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized companies are the driving force behind the existence of a core in Germany's board and director network. Conditional on being a board member, it is very improbable to obtain a second membership, but multiple board membership becomes increasingly likely once this initial barrier is overcome. We also present a simple model that describes board appointment decisions as a trade-off between social capital and monitoring ability.

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From a statistical point of view, the prevalence of non-Gaussian distributions in financial returns and their volatilities shows that the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) often does not apply in financial markets. In this paper we take the position that the independence assumption of the CLT is violated by herding tendencies among market participants, and investigate whether a generic probabilistic herding model can reproduce non-Gaussian statistics in systems with a large number of agents. It is well-known that the presence of a herding mechanism in the model is not sufficient for non-Gaussian properties, which crucially depend on the details of the communication network among agents. The main contribution of this paper is to show that certain hierarchical networks, which portray the institutional structure of fund investment, warrant non-Gaussian properties for any system size and even lead to an increase in system-wide volatility. Viewed from this perspective, the mere existence of financial institutions with socially interacting managers contributes considerably to financial volatility.