Graphene‐substrate‐promoted human neural stem cell adhesion and its differentiation into neurons is reported. Microarray studies were performed to explore plausible explanation for this effect. Further, an electrical stimulation on differentiated cells via graphene electrodes is demonstrated.

Background. The largest outbreak of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) outside the Middle East occurred in South Korea in 2015 and resulted in 186 laboratory-confirmed infections, including 36 (19%) deaths. Some hospitals were considered epicenters of infection and voluntarily shut down most of their operations after nearly half of all transmissions occurred in hospital settings. However, the ways that MERS-CoV is transmitted in healthcare settings are not well defined.Methods. We explored the possible contribution of contaminated hospital air and surfaces to MERS transmission by collecting air and swabbing environmental surfaces in 2 hospitals treating MERS-CoV patients. The samples were tested by viral culture with reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and immunofluorescence assay (IFA) using MERS-CoV Spike antibody, and electron microscopy (EM).Results. The presence of MERS-CoV was confirmed by RT-PCR of viral cultures of 4 of 7 air samples from 2 patients' rooms, 1 patient's restroom, and 1 common corridor. In addition, MERS-CoV was detected in 15 of 68 surface swabs by viral cultures. IFA on the cultures of the air and swab samples revealed the presence of MERS-CoV. EM images also revealed intact particles of MERS-CoV in viral cultures of the air and swab samples.Conclusions. These data provide experimental evidence for extensive viable MERS-CoV contamination of the air and surrounding materials in MERS outbreak units. Thus, our findings call for epidemiologic investigation of the possible scenarios for contact and airborne transmission, and raise concern regarding the adequacy of current infection control procedures.

As the coronavirus disease 2019 outbreak is ongoing, the number of individuals to be tested for COVID-19 is rapidly increasing. For safe and efficient screening for COVID-19, drive-through (DT) screening centers have been designed and implemented in Korea. Herein, we present the overall concept, advantages, and limitations of the COVID-19 DT screening centers. The steps of the DT centers include registration, examination, specimen collection, and instructions. The entire service takes about 10 minutes for one testee without leaving his or her cars. Increased testing capacity over 100 tests per day and prevention of cross-infection between testees in the waiting space are the major advantages, while protection of staff from the outdoor atmosphere is challenging. It could be implemented in other countries to cope with the global COVID-19 outbreak and transformed according to their own situations.A pandemic of an emerging infectious disease has similarity with bioterrorism in that both are disasters caused by infectious diseases and require safe and efficient use of resources. As of March 2020, the outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), is progressing to pandemic level despite global effort for containment, involving 101 countries with more than 100,000 confirmed cases. 1 With an increasing number of suspected and/or symptomatic individuals to be tested for COVID-19, 2 there has been a need for a safe and efficient screening system. For this purpose, drive-through (DT) screening centers have been designed and implemented in Korea, based on the previous concepts of point of dispensing for bioterrorism and DT clinic for pandemic influenza. 3,4 Herein, we introduce DT screening centers for COVID-19 and share our experience with healthcare authorities and providers all over the world.

ARDS = acute respiratory distress syndrome; ND = not detected; SARS-CoV-2 = severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus 2. * Transferred from the other hospital.

Infections caused by the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) are a serious health issue due to their prevalence and associated mortality. However, the transmission routes of the virus remain unclear, and thus, the current recommended control strategies are not evidence based. In this study, we investigated the transmission routes of MERS-CoV during the first nosocomial outbreak in the Republic of Korea in May 2015 using a multi-agent modeling framework. We identified seven hypothesized transmission modes based on the three main transmission routes (longrange airborne, close contact, and fomite). The infection risks for each hypothesis were estimated using the multi-agent modeling framework. Least-squares fitting was conducted to compare the distribution of the predicted infection risk in the various scenarios with that of the reported attack rates and to identify the hypotheses with the best fit. In the scenarios in which the index patient was a super-spreader, our model simulations suggested that MERS-CoV probably spread via the long-range airborne route. However, it is possible that the index patient shed an average viral load comparable to the loads reported in the literature, and that transmission occurred via a combined long-range airborne and close contact route. K E Y W O R D Sclose contact, Fomite, long-range airborne, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, multi-agent modeling, multi-route transmission

Carbon nanotube (CNT) network-based sensors have been often considered unsuitable for practical applications due to their unpredictable characteristics. Herein, we report the study of universal parameters which can be used to characterize CNT network-based sensors and make their response predictable. A theoretical model is proposed to explain these parameters, and sensing experiments for mercury (Hg(2+)) and ammonium (NH(4)(+)) ions using CNT network-based sensors were performed to confirm the validity of our model.

Background: Data on the filtration efficacies of various masks against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) are limited. We thus evaluate the effectiveness of the surgical mask, the N95 respirator mask, and its equivalent (KF94 mask) in filtering SARS-CoV-2. Methods: Patients hospitalised with SARS-CoV-2 infection were instructed to cough five times each while wearing (1) no mask, (2) surgical mask, (3) KF94 mask, and (4) N95 mask. The coughs were separated by 20-second intervals, and the patients were rested for at least 5 min between each setting. SARS-CoV-2 viral loads in patient samples (i.e. nasopharyngeal swabs and saliva), petri dishes placed in front of the patients during coughing, and swabs from the outer and inner surfaces of the masks were analysed with PCR. Results: A total of 7 patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection participated in the mask test. SARS-CoV-2 was detected on the petri dishes after coughing in 3 out of 7 cases with the surgical mask or no mask. Viral particles were not found in the petri dishes after coughing while wearing the N95 mask or the KF94 mask. While viral particles were detected in both the inner and outer surfaces of the surgical masks, those were detected only in the inner surfaces of the N95 and K94 masks. Conclusion: Surgical masks were less effective in filtering viral particles from coughing patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection. N95 masks and its equivalents efficiently blocked SARS-CoV-2 particles from coughing patients.

OBJECTIVES:This study investigated the epidemiologic features of the confirmed cases of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in Pyeongtaek St. Mary’s Hospital, where the outbreak first began, in order to identify lessons relevant for the prevention and control of future outbreaks.METHODS:The patients’ clinical symptoms and test results were collected from their medical records. The caregivers of patients were identified by phone calls.RESULTS:After patient zero (case #1) was admitted to Pyeongtaek St. Mary’s Hospital (May 15-May 17), an outbreak occurred, with 36 cases between May 18 and June 4, 2015. Six patients died (fatality rate, 16.7%). Twenty-six cases occurred in the first-generation, and 10 in the second-generation. The median incubation period was five days, while the median period from symptom onset to death was 12.5 days. While the total attack rate was 3.9%, the attack rate among inpatients was 7.6%, and the inpatients on the eighth floor, where patient zero was hospitalized, had an 18.6% attack rate. In contrast, caregivers and medical staff showed attack rates of 3.3% and 1.1%, respectively.CONCLUSIONS:The attack rates were higher than those of the previous outbreaks in other countries. The outbreak spread beyond Pyeongtaek St. Mary’s Hospital when four of the patients were moved to other hospitals without appropriate quarantine. The best method of preventing future outbreaks is to overcome the vulnerabilities observed in this outbreak, such as ward crowding, patient migration without appropriate data sharing, and the lack of an initial broad quarantine.