Objective The present studies test the hypothesis that the overlap between collective narcissism and positive in‐group identification conceals the opposite relationships these variables have with out‐group derogation. Method Five surveys were conducted in different cultural and national contexts, using different samples and different intergroup contexts (Study 1, Polish student sample, N = 85; Study 2, British student sample, N = 81; Study 3, Polish representative sample, N = 979; Study 3, Polish student sample, N = 267 and Study 5, British student sample, N = 241). Results The results of suppression analyses systematically indicate that when the positive relationship between collective narcissism and in‐group positivity is controlled for, the non‐narcissistic in‐group positivity predicts less out‐group negativity, whereas collective narcissism predicts more out‐group derogation. Conclusions The results advance our understanding of constructive and destructive forms of in‐group positivity and their different consequences for intergroup attitudes.

Citation for published item:f inD ul qF nd wilfontD i no vF nd u shim D oshihis nd filewi zD wi h l nd horonD quy nd q r rsd¡ ottirD gn fF nd qouvei D ldiney F nd qu nD njun nd toh nssonD v rsEylof nd squ liD g rlot nd gorr lE erdugoD i tor nd er gonesD tu n sgn io nd tsugiD ekir nd hem rqueD ghristophe nd yttoD iegm r nd rkD toonh nd ol ndD w rtin nd tegD vind nd qonz¡ lezD o erto nd ve edev D x dezhd nd w dsenD yle t o nd gnerD gl ire nd ekoti D gh rity F nd uurzD im nd izD tos¡ e vF nd hultzD F esley nd iin rsd¡ ottirD qr¡ o nd violidisD xin wF @PHITA 9goE ene(ts of ddressing lim te h nge n motiv te tion round the worldF9D x ture lim te h ngeFD T @PAF ppF ISREISUF Further information on publisher's website:httpXGGdxFdoiForgGIHFIHQVGn lim tePVIR Publisher's copyright statement:Additional information: Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. It is traditionally thought that the public must be convinced of the reality and importance of anthropogenic climate change in order to take personal and political action.However, convincing the broad public involves overcoming powerful ideological obstacles 1-4 , and in many places climate change is slipping in public importance 5,6 . Here we examined whether beliefs about the "co-benefits" of mitigating climate change 7 can avoid these obstacles by motivating behavior in both those who accept climate change and those who are unconvinced or unconcerned. We describe an integrative framework for assessing cobenefits 8 , distinguishing sociological dimensions (e.g., pollution, disease, economic development), and community character (e.g., benevolence, competence). Data from all inhabited continents (24 countries; N=6059), showed that two types of co-benefits, Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and caring community), rivalled climate change importance in the strength of their relationships with motivations to act. These co-benefits showed effects independent of climate change importance beliefs, and showed similar effects for both climate change believers and skeptics. Communicating these co-benefits of addressing climate change can help motivate action on climate change where traditional approaches have stalled.Those trying to motivate widespread public action on climate change face two hurdles.The first is to convince enough people that climate change is real and important. The second is to move people from accepting its reality and importance to taking action, both in their own lives and in convincing their governments to act. A sing...

Guided by the early findings of social scientists, practitioners have long advocated for greater contact between groups to reduce prejudice and increase social cohesion. Recent work, however, suggests that intergroup contact can undermine support for social change towards greater equality, especially among disadvantaged group members. Using a large and heterogeneous dataset (12,997 individuals from 69 countries), we demonstrate that intergroup contact and support for social change towards greater equality are positively associated among members of advantaged groups (ethnic majorities and cis-heterosexuals) but negatively associated among disadvantaged groups (ethnic minorities and sexual and gender minorities). Specification curve analysis revealed important variation in the size-and at times, direction-of correlations, depending on how contact and support for social change were measured. This allowed us to identify one type of support for change-willingness to work in solidaritythat is positively associated with intergroup contact among both advantaged and disadvantaged group members.

Objective: We examined the effects of control motivation on in-group positivity. Past research suggests that people compensate for low personal control by increasing support for social in-groups. We predicted that the effect of personal control on ingroup positivity would depend on the type of in-group positivity. Low personal control should increase compensatory, narcissistic in-group positivity, whereas high personal control should increase secure, non-narcissistic in-group positivity.Method: These hypotheses were tested in a cross-sectional survey (Study 1 N 5 1,083, 54% female, M age 5 47.68), two experiments (Study 2 N 5 105, 50% female, M age 5 32.05; Study 3 N 5 154, 40% female, M age 5 29.93), and a longitudinal survey (Study 4 N 5 398, 51% female, M age 5 32.05).Results: In all studies, personal control was negatively associated with narcissistic in-group positivity but positively associated with non-narcissistic in-group positivity. The longitudinal survey additionally showed that the positive relationship between personal control and non-narcissistic in-group positivity was reciprocal. Moreover, both types of in-group positivity differentially mediated between personal control and out-group attitudes: Narcissistic in-group positivity predicted negative attitudes, and non-narcissistic positivity predicted positive attitudes.Conclusions: These findings highlight the role of individual motivation in fostering different types of in-group positivity and intergroup outcomes.

We examined the associations between the need for personal control, different types of ingroup commitment, and group‐related outcomes: (1) defensive responses to ingroup criticism, (2) ingroup disloyalty, and (3) outgroup attitudes. We assumed that collective narcissism (i.e., a belief in ingroup’s greatness which is contingent on external validation and stems from frustrated individual needs) should be concerned with defending the ingroup image and derogating outgroups, but not necessarily with being loyal to the ingroup. Secure ingroup identification (i.e., a confidently held ingroup evaluation, which stems from satisfied needs), in contrast, should predict greater ingroup loyalty and positive outgroup attitudes. We expected these effects to be especially strong once we account for the overlap between collective narcissism and group‐level self‐investment – a key component of ingroup identification. In a nationally representative sample of Polish adults (n = 1,007), collective narcissism (net of group‐level self‐investment) mediated between low personal control and ingroup image defense, lower group loyalty, and less positive outgroup attitudes. Secure ingroup identification (group‐level self‐investment net of collective narcissism) mediated between high personal control and ingroup loyalty and positive outgroup attitudes. It was not associated with ingroup image defense. Implications for understanding the role of identification in inter‐ and intra‐group relations are discussed.

In the wake of major events, whether these be terrorist attacks 1 , global pandemics such as the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak 2,3 or presidential elections 4 , conspiracy theories predictably surge across the Internet. Conspiracy theories, defined as beliefs that a group of actors are colluding in secret to reach a malevolent goal 5,6 , are common across times, cultures and populations 7,8 . Accumulating research has revealed that a reliable predictor of belief in one conspiracy theory is belief in another conspiracy theory 1,[9][10][11] . It therefore appears that people differ in their predisposition to explain events as conspiracies, which is sometimes referred to as 'conspiracy mentality' or the 'conspiracy mindset' [12][13][14] . The conspiracy mindset is closely associated with belief in a wide range of existing specific conspiracy theories, as well as the endorsement of conspiracy theories created by researchers for experimental purposes 15 . It differs from concrete conspiracy beliefs in that it taps into the general propensity to suspect that conspiracies are at play, uncontaminated by concrete events, actors or contexts.The political realm in particular is one key area where conspiracy beliefs are salient and thriving 16 . For instance, conspiracy theories are intrinsically connected to the rhetoric of populist political leaders who arguably exploit conspiracy theories for strategic reasons 17,18 . Importantly, citizens' belief in conspiracy theories predicts voting behaviour and intentions 19,20 and non-normative political action 21,22 . Traditionally, conspiracy beliefs have been associated with authoritarian worldviews 23,24 , as exemplified by positive relations between conspiracy beliefs and right-wing authoritarianism [25][26][27] . Stripping a politically right-wing stance from the surplus meaning of authoritarianism (and its strong connection to traditions and authorities), many studies have found a linear relationship between self-reported political orientation and conspiracy endorsement 16,28,29 , suggesting that conspiracy beliefs are more common at the political right than at the political left [30][31][32][33] .However, in contrast to this simple, linear relation, numerous findings point to a curvilinear relation between political orientation

The harmfulness of anti‐Semitic beliefs is widely discussed in current political and legal debates (e.g., Cutler v. Dorn). At the same time, empirical studies of the psychological consequences of such beliefs are scarce. The present research is an attempt to explore the structure of contemporary anti‐Semitic beliefs in Poland—and to evaluate their predictive role in discriminatory intentions and behavior targeting Jews. Another aim was to determine dispositional, situational, and identity correlates of different forms of anti‐Semitic beliefs and behavior. Study 1, performed on a nation‐wide representative sample of Polish adults (N = 979), suggests a three‐factorial structure of anti‐Semitic beliefs, consisting of: (1) belief in Jewish conspiracy, (2) traditional religious anti‐Judaic beliefs, and (3) secondary anti‐Semitic beliefs, focusing on Holocaust commemoration. Of these three beliefs, belief in Jewish conspiracy was the closest antecedent of anti‐Semitic behavioral intentions. Study 2 (N = 600 Internet users in Poland) confirmed the three‐factor structure of anti‐Semitic beliefs and proved that these beliefs explain actual behavior toward Jews in monetary donations. Both studies show that anti‐Semitic beliefs are related to authoritarian personality characteristics, victimhood‐based social identity, and relative deprivation.

In three studies (two representative nationwide surveys, N = 1,007, N = 682; and one experimental, N = 76) we explored the effects of exposure to hate speech on outgroup prejudice. Following the General Aggression Model, we suggest that frequent and repetitive exposure to hate speech leads to desensitization to this form of verbal violence and subsequently to lower evaluations of the victims and greater distancing, thus increasing outgroup prejudice. In the first survey study, we found that lower sensitivity to hate speech was a positive mediator of the relationship between frequent exposure to hate speech and outgroup prejudice. In the second study, we obtained a crucial confirmation of these effects. After desensitization training individuals were less sensitive to hate speech and more prejudiced toward hate speech victims than their counterparts in the control condition. In the final study, we replicated several previous effects and additionally found that the effects of exposure to hate speech on prejudice were mediated by a lower sensitivity to hate speech, and not by lower sensitivity to social norms. Altogether, our studies are the first to elucidate the effects of exposure to hate speech on outgroup prejudice.