An inattentional blindness paradigm was adapted to measure ERPs elicited by visual contour patterns that were or were not consciously perceived. In the first phase of the experiment, subjects performed an attentionally demanding task while task-irrelevant line segments formed square-shaped patterns or random configurations. After the square patterns had been presented 240 times, subjects' awareness of these patterns was assessed. More than half of all subjects, when queried, failed to notice the square patterns and were thus considered inattentionally blind during this first phase. In the second phase of the experiment, the task and stimuli were the same, but following this phase, all of the subjects reported having seen the patterns. ERPs recorded over the occipital pole differed in amplitude from 220 to 260 msec for the pattern stimuli compared with the random arrays regardless of whether subjects were aware of the patterns. At subsequent latencies (300-340 msec) however, ERPs over bilateral occipital-parietal areas differed between patterns and random arrays only when subjects were aware of the patterns. Finally, in a third phase of the experiment, subjects viewed the same stimuli, but the task was altered so that the patterns became task relevant. Here, the same two difference components were evident but were followed by a series of additional components that were absent in the first two phases of the experiment. We hypothesize that the ERP difference at 220-260 msec reflects neural activity associated with automatic contour integration whereas the difference at 300-340 msec reflects visual awareness, both of which are dissociable from task-related postperceptual processing.

To isolate neural correlates of conscious perception (NCCs), a standard approach has been to contrast neural activity elicited by identical stimuli of which subjects are aware vs. unaware. Because conscious experience is private, determining whether a stimulus was consciously perceived requires subjective report: e.g., button-presses indicating detection, visibility ratings, verbal reports, etc. This reporting requirement introduces a methodological confound when attempting to isolate NCCs: The neural processes responsible for accessing and reporting one's percept are difficult to distinguish from those underlying the conscious percept itself. Here, we review recent attempts to circumvent this issue via a modified inattentional blindness paradigm (Pitts et al., 2012) and present new data from a backward masking experiment in which task-relevance and visual awareness were manipulated in a 2 × 2 crossed design. In agreement with our previous inattentional blindness results, stimuli that were consciously perceived yet not immediately accessed for report (aware, task-irrelevant condition) elicited a mid-latency posterior ERP negativity (~200–240 ms), while stimuli that were accessed for report (aware, task-relevant condition) elicited additional components including a robust P3b (~380–480 ms) subsequent to the mid-latency negativity. Overall, these results suggest that some of the NCCs identified in previous studies may be more closely linked with accessing and maintaining perceptual information for reporting purposes than with encoding the conscious percept itself. An open question is whether the remaining NCC candidate (the ERP negativity at 200–240 ms) reflects visual awareness or object-based attention.

A primary goal in cognitive neuroscience is to identify neural correlates of conscious perception (NCC). By contrasting conditions in which subjects are aware versus unaware of identical visual stimuli, a number of candidate NCCs have emerged, among them induced gamma band activity in the EEG and the P3 event-related potential. In most previous studies, however, the critical stimuli were always directly relevant to the subjects’ task, such that aware versus unaware contrasts may well have included differences in post-perceptual processing in addition to differences in conscious perception per se. Here, in a series of EEG experiments, visual awareness and task relevance were manipulated independently. Induced gamma activity and the P3 were absent for task-irrelevant stimuli regardless of whether subjects were aware of such stimuli. For task-relevant stimuli, gamma and the P3 were robust and dissociable, indicating that each reflects distinct post-perceptual processes necessary for carrying-out the task but not for consciously perceiving the stimuli. Overall, this pattern of results challenges a number of previous proposals linking gamma band activity and the P3 to conscious perception.

Previous studies suggest that early stages of face-specific processing are performed preattentively and unconsciously, whereas conscious perception emerges with late-stage (Ͼ300 ms) neuronal activity. A conflicting view, however, posits that attention is necessary for face-specific processing and that early-to-mid latency neural responses (ϳ100 -300 ms) correspond more closely with perceptual awareness. The current study capitalized on a recently developed method for manipulating attention and conscious perception during EEG recording (modified inattentional blindness paradigm) and used face stimuli that elicit a well known marker of early face processing, the N170 event-related potential (ERP). In Phase 1 of the experiment, subjects performed a demanding distracter task while line drawings of faces and matched control stimuli were presented in the center of their view. When queried, half of the subjects reported no awareness of the faces and were deemed inattentionally blind. In Phase 2, subjects performed the same distracter task, but now consciously perceived the face stimuli due to the intervening questioning. In Phase 3, subjects performed a discrimination task on the faces. Two primary contrasts were made: aware versus unaware (equally task irrelevant) and task-relevant versus task-irrelevant (equally aware). The N170 and a subsequent ERP component, the visual awareness negativity (ϳ260 -300 ms), were absent during inattentional blindness and present in the aware conditions. The P3b (Ͼ300 ms) was absent for task-irrelevant faces, even when consciously perceived, and present only when the faces were task relevant. These results inform contemporary theories of conscious face perception in particular and visual attention and perceptual awareness in general.

Championing open science, an adversarial collaboration aims to unravel the footprints of consciousness

To identify the neural correlates of perceptual awareness, researchers often compare the differences in neural activation between conditions in which an observer is or is not aware of a stimulus. While intuitive, this approach often contains a critical limitation: to link brain activity with perceptual awareness, observers traditionally report the contents of their perceptual experience. However, relying on observers' reports is problematic because it is difficult to know whether the neural responses being measured are associated with conscious perception or with postperceptual processes involved in the reporting task (e.g., working memory, decision-making). To address this issue, we combined a standard visual masking paradigm with a recently developed "no-report" paradigm in male/female human participants. In the visual masking paradigm, observers saw images of animals and objects that were visible or invisible, depending on their proximity to masks. Meanwhile, on half of the trials, observers reported the contents of their perceptual experience (i.e., report condition), while on the other half of trials they refrained from reporting about their experiences (i.e., no-report condition). We used electroencephalography to examine how visibility interacts with reporting by measuring the P3b event-related potential, one of the proposed canonical "signatures" of conscious processing. Overall, we found a robust P3b in the report condition, but no P3b whatsoever in the no-report condition. This finding suggests that the P3b itself is not a neural signature of conscious processing and highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing the neural correlates of perceptual awareness from postperceptual processing.

We investigated perceptual reversals for intermittently presented stimuli during binocular rivalry and physical alternation while the ongoing EEG was recorded from 64 channels. EEG topographies immediately preceding stimulus-onset were analyzed and two topographies doubly dissociated perceptual reversals from non-reversals. The estimated intracranial generators associated with these topographies were stronger in right inferior parietal cortex and weaker bilaterally in the ventral stream before perceptual reversals. No such differences were found for physical alternation of the same stimuli. These results replicate and extend findings from a previous study with the Necker cube and suggest common neural mechanisms associated with perceptual reversals during binocular rivalry and ambiguous figure perception. For both types of multi-stable stimuli, the dorsal stream is more active preceding perceptual reversals. Activity in the ventral stream, however, differed for binocular rivalry compared to ambiguous figures. The results from the two studies suggest a causal role for the right inferior parietal cortex in generating perceptual reversals regardless of the type of multi-stable stimulus, while activity in the ventral stream appears to depend on the particular type of stimulus.

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