Gamma band activity and the P3 reflect post-perceptual processes, not visual awareness

Pitts, Michael; Padwal, Jennifer; Fennelly, Daniel; Martı́nez, Antı́gona; Hillyard, Steven A.

doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.07.024

Cited by 195 publications

(194 citation statements)

References 73 publications

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“…One inconsistent set of findings in the literature are a number of impressive studies that ascribe a post-perceptual locus for the P3 (Pitts, Padwal, Fennelly, Martínez, & Hillyard, 2014;Shafto & Pitts, 2015;Squires, Hillyard, & Lindsay, 1973). Our experiment though has a number of differences to these previous studies, which presumably explain the difference in findings.…”

Section: Erp Datacontrasting

confidence: 71%

“…2) The elegant demonstration by Pitts and colleagues (Pitts, et al, 2014;Shafto & Pitts, 2015) that the P3 in their experiment was modulated by task set, does not naturally carry over to our setting. This is because task set, certainly in respect of instruction, is constant throughout our experiment.…”

Section: Erp Datamentioning

confidence: 91%

“…3) Pitts et al (2014) highlighted a number of confounds associated with studies of conscious experience that mean that post-perceptual processes are not equated across conditions. These confounds are, at least to a large extent, resolved in our experiment.…”

Section: Erp Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink

Pincham

Bowman

Szűcs

2016

Cortex

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The attentional blink (AB) represents a cognitive deficit in reporting the second of two targets (T2), when that second target appears 200-600msec after the first (T1). However, it is unclear how this paradigm impacts the subjective visibility (that is, the conscious perception) of T2, and whether the temporal profile of T2 report accuracy matches the temporal profile of subjective visibility. In order to compare report accuracy and subjective visibility, we asked participants to identify T1 and T2, and to rate the subjective visibility of T2 across two experiments. Event-related potentials were also measured. The results revealed different profiles for the report of T2 versus the subjective visibility of T2, particularly when T1 and T2 appeared within 200msec of one another. Specifically, T2 report accuracy was high but T2 visibility was low when the two targets appeared in close temporal succession, suggesting what we call the Experiential Blink is different from the classic AB. Electrophysiologically, at lag-1, the P3 component was modulated more by subjective visibility than by report accuracy. Collectively, the data indicate that the deficit in accurately reporting T2 is not the same as the deficit in subjectively experiencing T2. This suggests that traditional understandings of the AB may require adjustment and that, consistent with other findings, working memory encoding and conscious perception may not be synonymous.

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Section: Erp Datacontrasting

confidence: 71%

Section: Erp Datamentioning

confidence: 91%

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The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink

Pincham

Bowman

Szűcs

2016

Cortex

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“…For one thing, magnetic stimulation of prefrontal cortex affects the voluntary control of bistable stimuli, but not passively experienced bistable stimuli [9,37]. Additionally, most frontal activity disappears when no report on sensory experience is required [38][39][40][41]. The interpretation of these data is somewhat controversial, with one group arguing that "a few null findings" should not falsify prefrontal theories of consciousness [42].…”

Section: Prefrontal Activitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness Is a Thing, Not a Process

Pockett

2017

Applied Sciences

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Featured Application: If the theory outlined here is correct, the construction of artificial consciousness will certainly be possible, but a fundamentally different approach from that currently used in work on artificial intelligence will be necessary. Abstract:The central dogma of cognitive psychology is 'consciousness is a process, not a thing'. Hence, the main task of cognitive neuroscientists is generally seen as working out what kinds of neural processing are conscious and what kinds are not. I argue here that the central dogma is simply wrong. All neural processing is unconscious. The illusion that some of it is conscious results largely from a failure to separate consciousness per se from a number of unconscious processes that normally accompany it-most particularly focal attention. Conscious sensory experiences are not processes at all. They are things: specifically, spatial electromagnetic (EM) patterns, which are presently generated only by ongoing unconscious processing at certain times and places in the mammalian brain, but which in principle could be generated by hardware rather than wetware. The neurophysiological mechanisms by which putatively conscious EM patterns are generated, the features that may distinguish conscious from unconscious patterns, the general principles that distinguish the conscious patterns of different sensory modalities and the general features that distinguish the conscious patterns of different experiences within any given sensory modality are all described. Suggestions for further development of this paradigm are provided.

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“…A number of ERP studies have found enhanced P3 amplitude in relation to performing active task as opposed to passive stimulus processing (Polich, 2007). In a recent study Pitts et al, (2014) have studied P3 in relation to task relevance and visual awareness. The authors suggest that P3 reflects specific post-perceptual processes required for the execution of certain active task but not uniquely for consciously perceiving the visual stimuli.…”

Section: Theoretical Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preference Inferences from Eye-Related Cues in Sales-Consumer Settings: ERP Timing and Localization in Relation to Inferring Performance and Oxytocin Receptor (OXTR) Gene Polymorphisms

Verbeke¹,

Pozharliev²

2016

IJMS

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Past physiological evidence, indicates that inferences on the mind of another person (i.e., goals, intentions, beliefs), is a well-defined brain process characterized by specific temporal and spatial properties. This study investigated brain responses during passive viewing (consumers' role) of branded products (i.e., chocolates, chips, non alcoholic beverages) and preference inferences (sales consultants' role) from eye-related information. Using EEG methods, event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded while participants passively viewed pictures of branded products versus when they tried to infer others' product preferences from eye-related information. ERP amplitudes were examined in two time windows, corresponding to the P3 component and the late positive potential (LPP). Dissimilar brain responses were found for preference inferences compared to passive viewing for the P3 and LPP components. P3 and LPP amplitudes were greater for preference inferences compared to passive viewing. In addition, enhanced P3 and LPP amplitudes were found for preference inferences compared to passive viewing for the High Inferring Performance (HI) as opposed to the Low Inferring Performance (LI) group. Finally, enhanced posterior P3 and LPP amplitudes were found for preference inferences compared to passive viewing for the GG as opposed to the A-allele carrier individuals of oxytocin receptor (OXTR) gene. Taken together, the results suggest that posterior P3 and LPP amplitude during preference inferences from eye-related cues as opposed to passive viewing of branded products reflects increased socially motivated attention allocation required for the social inferring task, for the GG compared to A-allele carrier individuals.

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Gamma band activity and the P3 reflect post-perceptual processes, not visual awareness

Cited by 195 publications

References 73 publications

The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink

The experiential blink: Mapping the cost of working memory encoding onto conscious perception in the attentional blink

Consciousness Is a Thing, Not a Process

Preference Inferences from Eye-Related Cues in Sales-Consumer Settings: ERP Timing and Localization in Relation to Inferring Performance and Oxytocin Receptor (OXTR) Gene Polymorphisms

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