By charting the activities of Ottoman experts in Afghanistan from 1908–23, this article demonstrates how their arrival precipitated a series of state-building practices rooted in the particular historical experience of Ottoman reform projects. The country thus became the object of an Ottomanmission civilisatriceand the beneficiary, in the eyes of certain figures within the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, of an avowedly Ottoman-Turkish modernity. Sharing this conviction were members of the Afghan royal family and its chief ministers, especially Maḥmūd Ṭarzī, who first invited the Ottoman advisers to Kabul. The provision of Ottoman technical assistance took a variety of forms, but is most evident in military, educational, and public health reforms enacted in Kabul in this period. Through the study of previously unexamined Ottoman, Afghan, and British sources, the aim here is to incorporate these events into discussions of Ottoman informal empire, Afghan developmentalism, and pan-Islam.

This article analyses the Ottoman government’s attempt to encourage Indian Muslims to purchase its treasury bonds during the Balkan Wars in 1912–13. It contrasts this largely unsuccessful scheme with the enormous contributions of Indian Muslims to the parallel campaign to raise relief funds for Ottoman soldiers and refugees. While this latter movement involved the intermittent dispatch of remittances to the Ottoman Ministry of Finance and Red Crescent, the bond drive demanded a multi-year commitment and conjured up a variety of financial and religious dilemmas for Indian Muslim constituencies. To better contextualise these divergent outcomes, this article first examines the infrastructures of Indian Muslim religious and financial exchange with the Ottoman Empire from the mid-nineteenth century. It then charts the charitable campaigns organised by Indian Muslims between 1877 and 1912, before turning to the Balkan Wars. The foundering of the bond drive stemmed from problems on both the supply and demand side, namely, International Financial Control (IFC) in the Ottoman context, informational asymmetries, fears of Ottoman insolvency and an aversion by some to accepting interest. Nevertheless, Indian Muslim capital enjoyed a freer degree of circulation than in the post-Ottoman environment, where new powers sought to curtail or control it in an age of financial de-globalisation.

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Using sources in Arabic, Gujarati, Ottoman, Persian and Urdu, this article examines the foundation of Bohra and Khoja pilgrimage institutions straddling western India and Iraq's Shīʿī shrine cities between 1897 and 1932. As manifestations of ‘locative piety’, these institutions were an outgrowth of the commercial capital Bohra and Khoja merchants had acquired in Indian Ocean trade over the previous half century, and the distinct caste and sectarian identities this wealth augmented. The Bohra and Khoja (both Twelver and Ismāʿīlī) mercantile and religious elites supplied their constituents with a well-ordered pilgrimage to Iraq, certainly by the standards of contemporary Hajj. To achieve this, community-run institutional nodes in Karachi, Bombay and the Shīʿī shrine cities were integrated into wider transport, administrative, and financial infrastructures connecting India and Iraq. Yet at a time when Najaf and Karbala's economic and religious fortunes were plagued by sectarianism, political upheavals and divisions among the mujtahids, the growing presence of western Indian Shīʿīs in the shrine cities was fiercely condemned by some Twelver Shīʿī clerics. One of their number, Muḥammad Karīm Khurāsānī, published a substantial polemic against the Bohras and Khojas in 1932, signalling how these pilgrimage infrastructures worked to exacerbate intra-Shīʿī disputes.

This article examines the Saudi government’s refusal to introduce paper currency until 1956 against the backdrop of two developments: First, the composition of a number of treatises written by Muslim scholars in the late Ottoman and early Saudi Hijaz and Najd permitting use of the medium; second, the unsuccessful effort by several Muslim entrepreneurs to create formal banking facilities in the Hijaz between the 1920s and 1950s. Throughout these decades, as the Saudi regime repeatedly claimed that paper currency violated Islamic orthodoxy because it was a bearer of interest, these scholars argued forcefully for the medium’s legitimacy by mobilizing the legal sources of their particular school of law (madhhab). This contrast reflects how the religious politics of the kingdom departed from both Ottoman precedents and other contemporary Islamic contexts in which paper currency was widely assimilated via the assent of Muslim legal scholars. The regime’s tepid support for, or outright obstruction of, the creation of formal banking facilities that issued paper currency further exacerbated this divergence. In the end, because of such inconsistency it required technocratic institutions like the IMF and ARAMCO to introduce paper currency and a formal banking system into the kingdom from the mid-1950s.