This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr1309Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. iii Preface This is the final report of a RAND Arroyo Center study for the U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to perform a comparative historical analysis of the four Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) conducted since the first QDR in 1997-including QDR reports in September 2001to identify larger trends, as well as implications and recommendations for the Army to shape the conduct of and thereby improve future reviews. 1 The purpose of this document is to report the results of our analysis to Army and Department of Defense senior leaders and planners well enough in advance that measures can be taken to improve the organization, processes, and analytics associated with the next Defense Strategy Review. 2 Therefore, this report may be of interest to defense planners in the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff, as well as students of defense planning in the scholarly community.This research was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146687. The study reported here systematically compares these most-recent four QDRs by examining them in the following categories: organization and process, strategy development, force planning, modernization and transformation, resources, defense reform and infrastructure, risk assessment, and reception. This report also details between-QDR changes in each dimension of defense planning, so that readers can better understand and appre...

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr1309z1Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. iii PrefaceThe RAND Arroyo Center conducted a study for the U.S. Army titled Defense Planning in a Decade of Conflict. The purpose of the project was to perform a comparative historical review of the four Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) conducted since the first QDR in 1997-including QDR reports in , and March 2014-to identify larger trends, as well as implications and recommendations for the Army to shape the conduct of and thereby improve future reviews. 1 The main product of that project was a report-Defense AcknowledgmentsWe would like to thank Daniel Klippstein, deputy director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-35 SS, for sponsoring our study, as well as COL Jeff Hannon, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-35 SSP, who served as action officer for the study. We also wish to thank Tim Muchmore, Headquarters, Department of the Army G-8, QDR, for his support of our study.Achieving the study's goals required an in-depth understanding of the four Quadrennial Defense Reviews from the perspective of participants in the reviews. Accordingly, the authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the many defense professionals who agreed to participate in structured conversations about their participation in and perspectives on the conduct of the Quadrennial Defense Reviews. As they were promised anonymity, these individuals must remain nameless.We wish to express our gratitude to RAND colleagues Richard Darilek and Burgess Laird and to our external reviewer, GEN Walter L. Sharp, U.S. Army (Ret.), for their very helpful reviews.We also would like to thank RAND colleagues Michael Johnson for his early advice and other assistance on this project, Josh Klimas for his assistance with da...