Defense Planning in a Time of Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the 2001–2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and Implications for the Army

Abstract

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html.The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/rr1309Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND CorporationR® is a registered trademark.Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. iii Preface This is the final report of a RAND Arroyo Center study for the U.S. Army. The purpose of the project was to perform a comparative historical analysis of the four Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) conducted since the first QDR in 1997-including QDR reports in September 2001to identify larger trends, as well as implications and recommendations for the Army to shape the conduct of and thereby improve future reviews. 1 The purpose of this document is to report the results of our analysis to Army and Department of Defense senior leaders and planners well enough in advance that measures can be taken to improve the organization, processes, and analytics associated with the next Defense Strategy Review. 2 Therefore, this report may be of interest to defense planners in the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff, as well as students of defense planning in the scholarly community.This research was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project that produced this document is HQD146687. The study reported here systematically compares these most-recent four QDRs by examining them in the following categories: organization and process, strategy development, force planning, modernization and transformation, resources, defense reform and infrastructure, risk assessment, and reception. This report also details between-QDR changes in each dimension of defense planning, so that readers can better understand and appre...

Force Planning Scenarios, 1945–2016: Their Origins and Use in Defense Strategic Planning

“…43-46. 36 According to structured conversations held for Larson et al, 2018, only one of the two major combat operations scenarios included an important role for Army ground forces while the other stressed air and naval forces. 37 See DoD, "Support for Strategic Analysis," DoD Instruction 8260.01, January 11, 2007.…”

“…48 Stanley, 2010, p. 10. 49 Structured conversations from Larson et al, 2018. In addition, there was a feeling at the O-6 level in the Army that "the goal posts had been moved" in the sense that the Army was to provide forces for one war rather than two, with a requirement to provide some support in the second war; there reportedly were no ground scenarios in the Middle East-Europe region at this time. Finally, there reportedly was a disconnect between the military and civilian leadership regarding the likelihood of the scenarios; civilians reportedly assumed "we'll never execute that second campaign" while the military assumed "that is the strategy we've been told to prepare to execute."…”

“…81 The principal strategy foundation for the QDR, 78 DoD, 2014c, p. 3. 79 DoD, 2014c According to interviews held for Larson et al, 2018, the main threats considered in the QDR were proliferation, Iran, North Korea, and China, and more attention was paid to the requirements of homeland security missions as well. however, was the 2012 DSG, which provided priorities and advanced an updated strategic framework emphasizing three pillars:…”

Defense Planning in a Time of Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the 2001–2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and Implications for the Army — Executive Summary

“…The analysis yielded a final report-Defense Planning in a Time of Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the [2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013][2014] Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and Implications for the Army. 9 This document represents a stand-alone Executive Summary of the larger report.…”

“…If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of-or impose unacceptable costs on-another aggressor in another region. 9 With a more aggressive Russia, a more assertive China, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, a still-active al-Qa'ida network, the requirement to leave a residual force of perhaps 10,000 personnel in Afghanistan to train Afghan security forces and keep the Taliban at bay, capability shortfalls for combating WMD, and such emerging challenges as cyber threats, achievement of U.S. national objectives in the current strategic environment almost certainly appears more demanding than the environment the nation faced prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001. 10 In the 2014 QDR, the Army was directed to provide 440,000-450,000 activeduty personnel, 195,000 U.S. Army Reserve personnel, and 335,000 Army National Guard personnel.…”