The development of a neutral, professional bureaucracy has been a profound concern for emerging democracies. International and domestic actors have expended significant resources to encourage the development of the rule of law, yet many postcommunist societies remain mired in corruption. When corrupt behaviors are integrated with a core function of democratic states, such as the implementation of free and fair elections, the implications of failures to professionalize bureaucrats are enhanced. This article empirically evaluates how professionalization and corruption interact in election administration, using unique survey data from Ukraine. We assess the results of pre‐ and postelection surveys of administrators conducted across Ukraine during the 2014 parliamentary elections. Our results suggest that aspects of a professionalized bureaucracy coexist with corruption and that mitigating incentives for state capture is a major challenge for democratization.

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The 3-credit course model provides faculty the time to cover content breadth or specialization. This model focuses on drawing students based on content, commonly majors. Interested outside majors might not think they have the prerequisite knowledge to succeed hindering the student’s ability to learn and other students’ ability to gain diverse perspectives. This research examines 1-credit experiential classes that helps recruit students for both the content and method of delivery. Such courses use a range of pedagogical approaches that provide a more engaging experience than the traditional classroom. The 1-credit model that focuses on method of delivery reduces the content burden and barrier to entry for outside majors. These courses can also help general retention trends as students earn credit for more engaging courses. This paper uses student surveys in a topically similar 3-credit and 1-credit course to better understand the positive impact of 1-credit courses.

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As the American president's use of executive orders continues gain prominence in the policy process, it is important that their use and limitations are fully understood. This research provides new insights to executive order use by addressing three questions. It asks how are executive orders used, when are executive orders used, and how does the judiciary respond to that use? I examine executive orders as bureaucratic controls, meant to alter agency behavior. I develop a framework based on the amount of discretion and authority the president grants executive agencies allowing for the identification four types of executive orders-routine, hortatory, coercive, and catalytic. Routine orders are used to accomplish common administrative tasks and have low grants of discretion and authority. Hortatory orders have high levels of discretion but low levels of authority and are used to investigate issue areas or coordinate information and advise the president. Coercive orders have high levels of authority and low levels of discretion and are used delegate specific authority and articulate specific tasks that need to be accomplished. Catalytic orders have high levels of discretion and authority, allowing the bureaucracy to both interpret and implement the executive order. When the president issues a specific type of executive order depends largely on the institutional context. There is a greater likelihood the president will issue a catalytic executive order in an attempt to circumvent Congress when he has low levels of partisan support. Finally, the U.S. Courts Appeals serves as a final check on the president's use of executive orders. While the courts rarely nullify an executive order, they do define the limits of their use by adding procedural limitations or constricting the reach an executive order has. These limitations develop a framework that presidents must work within when issuing future executive orders. This research advances the scholarly understanding of executive orders by examining them as bureaucratic controls that can be used in multiple ways. It moves away from dichotomous categorizations that limit explanatory value. Although executive orders are a strong presidential tool, this research shows there are checks on the exercise of that power by the judiciary.