No abstract

Following the collapse of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, constitutional designers codified rules establishing independent judiciaries. To what degree do these constitutional and statutory guarantees of independence reflect the actual behavior of courts? Our analysis demonstrates that official judicial power does not predict expressions of judicial reviewoverturning legislation in whole or in part. Rather, exogenous factors, including economic conditions, executive power, identity of the litigants and legal issues, influence the likelihood that courts will nullify laws. Our findings should caution both scholars and institutional designers. Both formal and informal factors create the parameters in which courts operate. Although courts have become more powerful institutions in the post-communist era, they face a diverse set of constraints on independent action.Although independent judiciaries are important actors in democratic consolidation, how expressions of judicial independence evolve in transitional societies remains unclear. Ideally, courts review legislation and government decisions under the rubric of constitutionality. That is, the judiciary is able to declare laws and actions unconstitutional and serve as a check against excesses by other branches of government. A strong judiciary in newly independent countries helps the state break with its authoritarian past and develop a constitutional culture that teaches state actors that the legal system cannot be transgressed for political gain (Brewer-Carias 1989;Larkins 1996). However, the development of an independent judiciary can be constrained by a weak institutional legacy, limited training and support for judges, and the strength of other political actors. If the judiciary does not have the authority to make independent decisions, democratic progress

Intra-state regional differences are a central topic in the study of European and Eurasian politics. In Ukraine, regional differences have proven to be powerful predictors of mass attitudes and political behavior. But what does the “regional factor” in Ukrainian politics represent? Is it simply the result of compositional effects, or are the regional differences more than just a sum of other demographic factors correlated with geographic divisions? When analyzing regional divisions as an explanatory variable, what are the implications of employing different regional frameworks? In this article, we demonstrate how geographic divisions in the country hold up even when others factors—such as ethnicity and language use—are controlled for. As part of this inquiry, we compare the results of three competing regional frameworks for Ukraine: one with two regions, one with four regions and one with eight regions. While the eight-region framework is uncommon in studies of Ukraine, the decision to examine eight regions is supported by historical, economic and demographic arguments, as well as by the results of the statistical analyses presented in this article. Scholars who have focused on fewer regions in Ukraine may have underestimated the effects of regional differences and missed interesting stories about intra-state variation in Ukrainian attitudes and voting behavior. The results of this study carry important implications not only for the study of Ukraine but also for those interested in intra-state regional divisions across Europe and Eurasia.

Recent studies on strategic voting and entry in elections that combine plurality or majority and proportional representation (PR) have found candidate placement in single-member district (SMD) races to improve a party's PR performance. The primary implication of the existence of "contamination effects" is that parties have an incentive to nominate candidates in as many single-member districts as possible. Pre-electoral coordination in the majoritarian component of mixed electoral systems, however, is far from uncommon. In this article, we identify a number of institutional incentives that induce political parties to form pre-electoral alliances in spite of contamination effects. By identifying institutions that favor and hamper coordination, we seek to advance the understanding of PR-SMD interactions and to assess their implications for the design, classification, and empirical analysis of mixed electoral rules. Our statistical tests evaluate strategic entry in a diverse sample of countries.

This article addresses how mixed‐member systems that combine proportional representation (PR) and single‐member districts (SMD) into a single election can influence legislators' voting behavior. Scholars have generally extended standard expectations of behavior to mixed‐member systems by assuming that legislators occupying PR seats in mixed‐member parliaments should be more cohesive than those occupying SMD seats. I argue that controlling for seat type alone does not take into account the interaction between PR and SMD in mixed‐member systems. Using voting data from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada, I show that controlling for dual candidacy and the “safety” of the deputy's district or list position increases our understanding of the factors motivating legislative cohesion.