Electoral Influences on Legislative Behavior in Mixed-Member Systems: Evidence from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada

Herron, Erik S.

doi:10.3162/036298002x200639

Cited by 27 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Smith and Remington (2001) find some evidence of a mandate divide in the Russian Duma; however, the appearance of the divide often varies depending on the issue. Others find little evidence of a mandate divide (Herron, 2002;Ishiyama, 2000).…”

Section: Distinguishing MMM and Mmp Systemsmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Cox & Schoppa, 2002;Ferrara, 2004;Gschwend, Johnston, & Pattie, 2003;Ferrara & Herron, 2005;Herron & Nishikawa, 2001;Moser, 1999Moser, , 2001Moser & Scheiner, 2004;Reed, 2001). In a similar manner, another group of scholars focuses specifically on the legislative effects of such systems, seeking to determine if the mixing of electoral incentives affects overall patterns of legislative behavior (e.g., Bawn & Thies, 2003;Haspel, Remington, & Smith, 1998;Herron, 2002;Lancaster & Patterson, 1990;Stratmann & Baur, 2002;Thames, 2001).…”

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confidence: 96%

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Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

Thames¹,

Edwards

2006

Comparative Political Studies

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The increasing use of mixed-member electoral systems has led to an explosion of research attempting to specify their effects. Yet there has been no work on the economic policy effects of such systems, even though this has been a significant subject of debate for scholars analyzing other electoral systems. An analysis of mixed-member system policy effects is problematic, given the wide variation in institutional rules among different systems. This article attempts to determine whether the institutional differences between mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems lead to differences in policy outputs. The political economy literature finds that government expenditures are positively correlated with electoral system proportionality. Our statistical analysis of government expenditures in 17 mixedmember systems between 1990 and 2000 shows that MMP systems, which are more proportional than MMM systems, are correlated with higher levels of government spending. Thus the MMM-MMP distinction produces significant policy differences.

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Section: Distinguishing MMM and Mmp Systemsmentioning

confidence: 95%

mentioning

confidence: 96%

Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

Thames¹,

Edwards

2006

Comparative Political Studies

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“…Another possibility is that the expected impact of SMD vs. PR rules has been complicated by mitigating factors in Ukraine's mixed electoral system. In a study of legislative cohesion in the Ukrainian Rada, Herron (2002) finds that the relationship between electoral seat type and legislative voting behaviour is not as clear-cut as the extant research would predict. Rather, he argues that the complexity of Ukraine's mixed-member system -which includes the possibility that an MP may run as a 'dual candidate' in both PR and SMD elections -has had the unintended consequence of 'severing the direct link between electoral factors and legislative voting' in Ukraine (Herron 2002, p. 378).…”

Section: Constituent Representationmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…It adopted the main legislative acts, which led to profound changes in Ukraine's political regime. At the same time, the legislature has been embroiled in a series of protracted conflicts with the executive branch over the distribution and exercise of government powers, making the effectiveness of legislative oversight a particularly important and topical issue in Ukraine (Pigenko et al 2002, Herron 2002, Protsyk 2003, Brown and Wise 2004, Christensen et al 2005.…”

Section: Setting the Scene: Committee Oversight In The Ukrainian Radamentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative Oversight in the UkrainianRada: Assessing the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees

Khmelko

Beers²

2011

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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This study analyses factors associated with the perceived effectiveness of committee oversight in the Ukrainian Rada. Based on two waves of original survey data, it attempts to discern whether Ukrainian MPs view the committee oversight process primarily as an extension of partisan politics, a forum for constituency representation and resource distribution, or a politically independent process of information acquisition and regulation. The findings of the analysis suggest that partisan political considerations do not play a significant role in shaping MP attitudes towards committee oversight. Rather, deputy evaluations of the oversight process are influenced mainly by distributional and informational factors, suggesting that committee oversight is one area in which legislative institutionalisation appears to be taking root in post-communist Ukraine.

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“…4 Given these incomplete research designs it is not surprising that the findings regarding the connection between legislative behavior and electoral institutions have remained inconclusive. 8 Haspel, Remington, andHerron 2002;Thames 2005. 6 The findings from the MMS studies are also mixed.…”

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confidence: 99%

Legislative Effects of Electoral Mandates

Olivella¹,

Tavits²

2013

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Data has been taken from the Hungarian National Assembly, where the mandate type (single member district (SMD) vs. party list or proportional representation (PR)) changes for a number of legislators each term, to explore whether and how such changes lead to changes in legislators' voting behavior. When the electoral system under which a legislator was elected changes from PR to SMD, then the rate at which the legislator defects against the party line of voting increases significantly. Contrary to expectations, when the electoral system changes from SMD to PR, there is no significant change in the voting behavior of legislators. Additional robustness tests confirm these results. The lasting influence of reputations and habits may account for the asymmetric results. * Washington University in St. Louis (emails: olivella@wustl.edu, tavits@wustl.edu). We would like to thank Thames 2005. Another possibility is to compare different legislative chambers in the same country if these chambers employ different electoral rules (see, for example, Desposato 2006). However, these situations are rare, and, therefore, MMS has become a more commonly used setting for studying the causal connection at hand.

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Electoral Influences on Legislative Behavior in Mixed-Member Systems: Evidence from Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada

Cited by 27 publications

References 10 publications

Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

Differentiating Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

Legislative Oversight in the UkrainianRada: Assessing the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees

Legislative Effects of Electoral Mandates

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