This review organizes a variety of phenomena related to emotional self-report. In doing so, the authors offer an accessibility model that specifies the types of factors that contribute to emotional self-reports under different reporting conditions. One important distinction is between emotion, which is episodic, experiential, and contextual, and beliefs about emotion, which are semantic, conceptual, and decontextualized. This distinction is important in understanding the discrepancies that often occur when people are asked to report on feelings they are currently experiencing versus those that they are not currently experiencing. The accessibility model provides an organizing framework for understanding self-reports of emotion and suggests some new directions for research.

A consensual, componential model of emotions conceptualises them as experiential, physiological, and behavioural responses to personally meaningful stimuli. The present review examines this model in terms of whether different types of emotion-evocative stimuli are associated with discrete and invariant patterns of responding in each response system, how such responses are structured, and if such responses converge across different response systems. Across response systems, the bulk of the available evidence favours the idea that measures of emotional responding reflect dimensions rather than discrete states. In addition, experiential, physiological, and behavioural response systems are associated with unique sources of variance, which in turn limits the magnitude of convergence across measures. Accordingly, the authors suggest that there is no "gold standard" measure of emotional responding. Rather, experiential, physiological, and behavioural measures are all relevant to understanding emotion and cannot be assumed to be interchangeable. KeywordsEmotion; Measurement; Self-report; Autonomic nervous system; Startle modulation; Central nervous system; Behaviour; Specificity From an intuitive layperson perspective, it should be easy to determine whether someone is experiencing a particular emotion. However, scientific evidence suggests that measuring a person's emotional state is one of the most vexing problems in affective science. To organise our review of research relevant to this question, we take as our starting point a consensual, componential model of emotion (see Figure 1). In this model, an emotional response begins with appraisal of the personal significance of an event (Lazarus, 1991;Scherer, 1984;Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), which in turn gives rise to an emotional response involving subjective experience, physiology, and behaviour (Frijda, 1988;Gross, 2007;Larsen & Prizmic-Larsen, 2006) The present review examines whether emotion-evocative stimuli are associated with discrete patterns of responding in each system, how such responses seem to be structured, and if such responses converge (i.e., are co-ordinated or correlated) with one another.Because the literatures that are relevant to the questions examined here are extensive, the present review must be selective. In our review, we concentrate on studies involving nonclinical human adult samples rather than children, animals, or clinical populations. We focus on the response components depicted in Figure 1 rather than on cognitive antecedents and correlates of emotion. To further constrain the scope of our review, we focus on emotional Correspondence should be addressed to: Iris B. Mauss,

Three studies involving 3 participant samples (Ns = 39, 55, and 53) tested the hypothesis that people retrieve episodic emotion knowledge when reporting on their emotions over short (e.g., last few hours) time frames, but that they retrieve semantic emotion knowledge when reporting on their emotions over long (e.g., last few months) time frames. Support for 2 distinct judgment strategies was based on judgment latencies (Studies 1 and 2) and priming paradigms (Studies 2 and 3). The authors suggest that self-reports of emotion over short versus long time frames assess qualitatively different sources of self-knowledge.

Metaphors linking spatial location and affect (e.g., feeling up or down) may have subtle, but pervasive, effects on evaluation. In three studies, participants evaluated words presented on a computer. In Study 1, evaluations of positive words were faster when words were in the up rather than the down position, whereas evaluations of negative words were faster when words were in the down rather than the up position. In Study 2, positive evaluations activated higher areas of visual space, whereas negative evaluations activated lower areas of visual space. Study 3 revealed that, although evaluations activate areas of visual space, spatial positions do not activate evaluations. The studies suggest that affect has a surprisingly physical basis.

In this target article, we argue that personality processes, personality structure, and personality development have to be understood and investigated in integrated ways in order to provide comprehensive responses to the key questions of personality psychology. The psychological processes and mechanisms that explain concrete behaviour in concrete situations should provide explanation for patterns of variation across situations and individuals, for development over time as well as for structures observed in intra-individual and inter-individual differences. Personality structures, defined as patterns of covariation in behaviour, including thoughts and feelings, are results of those processes in transaction with situational affordances and regularities. It cannot be presupposed that processes are organized in ways that directly correspond to the observed structure. Rather, it is an empirical question whether shared sets of processes are uniquely involved in shaping correlated behaviours, but not uncorrelated behaviours (what we term 'correspondence' throughout this paper), or whether more complex interactions of processes give rise to population-level patterns of covariation (termed 'emergence'). The paper is organized in three parts, with part I providing the main arguments, part II reviewing some of the past approaches at (partial) integration, and part III outlining conclusions of how future personality psychology should progress towards complete integration. Working definitions for the central terms are provided in the appendix.