Although the concept of psychological mindedness (PM) originated in the psychoanalytic literature, its use has been expanding beyond the realm of assessing suitability for, or psychic change following, psychotherapy or psychoanalysis. For example, since PM bespeaks a capacity to tolerate psychological conflict and stress intrapsychically rather than by regressive means of conflict management or resolution such as somatization, its role, like that of alexithymia, in the genesis of psychosomatic illness is becoming evident. The Psychological Mindedness Scale (PMS), a 45-item self-report instrument intended to measure PM, was administered to a non-clinical sample of 397 undergraduates to assess the stability of its previously reported item-factor loadings and factor structure. Two main factors emerged, viz. Belief in the benefits of discussing one's problems and Access to feelings. Lower-order factors were Willingness to discuss problems with others, Interest in meaning and motivation of own and others' behaviour and Openness to change. Convergent validity of the PMS was also demonstrated by the negative correlations obtained between its total and factor/subscale scores with those of the Toronto Alexithymia Scale. The PMS needs further development to increase the congruence between its factor structure and the concept of PM. Females were also found to be more psychologically minded than males. The implications of these findings and the potential uses of this scale are discussed.

This study examines the use of excerpted Rorschach responses for rating object relations. This assessment of object relations focuses on a dimension defined as Mutuality of Autonomy. A Rorschach Scale for Mutuality of autonomy is presented. Its application to excerpted Rorschach data is described. Raters did not apply the Mutuality of Autonomy Scale to the entire protocol as had been done previously (Urist, 1977). Instead, in an attempt to argue that Rorschach ratings in fact reflected Mutuality of Autonomy and not extraneous factors, ratings were based exclusively on excerpted responses. Reliability for the excerpting was at a high level of agreement, and the Rorschach Mutuality of Autonomy Scores based on these excerpts correlated significantly with independent clinical ratings of Mutuality of Autonomy.

Recent contributions to the psychoanalytic literature propose new ways of understanding analytic neutrality, anonymity, abstinence, and self-disclosure. They advocate elective self-disclosure by the analyst as an antidote to the allegedly game-playing quality of transference and resistance analysis. The analytic relationship, they assert, becomes unreal when attempts are made to observe the principles of neutrality and abstinence. Both are seen as ill-conceived because of the irreducible subjectivity and unwarranted authority of the analyst. These relational and interactional views are criticized because (1) they ignore the fact that transference and resistance analysis have from Freud onward been accepted as minimal criteria qualifying a clinical process as psychoanalytic; (2) elective self-disclosure carries metapsychological implications dismissing not only Freud's theory of motivation but motivation as a basic feature of human personality; (3) they do not recognize interpersonal relations as mental events and so do not consider the ego's ability to create intrapsychic representations of object relations; (4) elective self-disclosures within the empathic parameters of the analytic situation are themselves unreal compared to the reality of the patient's experience with other objects. Abstinence and neutrality as ideals facilitate maintenance of an internal holding environment or container for the analyst's countertransference.

Freud equivocated between 2 notions of defense: defense as directed against unpleasure and defense as the blocking of the energy or cathectic potential of the drive. This preserved the quantitative-energic-biological model of anxiety in defense in the 2nd theory of anxiety, rather than developing fully the experiential-qualitative-psychological model of anxiety introduced by the structural theory. The pleasure principle and not anxiety supplies the motive for defense. Signal anxiety, as the epitome of unpleasure, is the basic goal of defense and not the drives, ideas, other affects, or the superego. Defending against these is the means of accomplishing that goal. Signal anxiety is an ego function with appraisal, alarm, and defensive phases. There are metapsychological and technical implications of this approach.In the discussion of her book The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, Anna Freud says, "I only wonder if we can take it for granted that the defense is always directed against the impulse or wish. One could also say that the defense is really directed against the anxiety or unpleasure aroused by the wish" (Sandler, 1985, p. 58). Sandler replies, "Yes, but does not the ego defend against the anxiety by operating against the content of the wish?" (p. 58).Anna Freud is suggesting that the object of defense is unpleasure, and Sandler then counters that defense operates against the content of the wish. There is a tension and basic contradiction between these two views and their implications, which these authors do not

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