Reward programs, a promotional tool to develop customer loyalty, offer incentives to consumers on the basis of cumulative purchases of a given product or service from a firm. Reward programs have become increasingly common in many industries. The best-known examples include frequent-flier programs offered by airlines, frequent-guest programs offered by hotels, and frequent-shopper programs offered by supermarkets. Despite the widespread business practice of reward programs, research efforts on reward programs, particularly in marketing, have been scarce. Our paper takes an important step towards understanding the design of reward programs and its implications on pricing strategies. We study a market that consists of two segments: heavy- and light-user segments. The key distinction between the two segments is that the heavy-user segment purchases in each period and thus is a candidate for the reward programs. In contrast, the light-user segment exits the market after one purchase and is not in a position to exploit reward programs. An important feature of our model is that we allow for different price sensitivity between heavy-user and light-user segments. Our model closely examines the type of rewards. A reward worth a dollar to the consumer might have different cost implications for the offering firm, depending on the type of reward. For example, cash rewards have higher unit reward cost () for the firm than a free product of the firm, such as an airline ticket or long-distance minutes (). Specifically, we examine an interesting puzzle observed in the marketplace. Several firms offer a cash reward or a product made by the firm, such as jackets, electronic items, etc. These firms could offer their own product as rewards and significantly lower their cost. We examine whether there is any reason for such a seemingly suboptimal practice. Our analysis shows that reward programs weaken price competition. By offering the incentives for repeat purchases, reward programs increase a firm's cost to attract competing firms' current customers. Because firms gain less from undercutting their prices, equilibrium prices go up. Moreover, as consumers become unwilling to switch because of potential rewards, the firm with a larger market share in the heavy-user segment charges higher prices. Therefore, a low price in the first period, which leads to a larger market share in the heavy-user segment, will always be followed by a high price in the second period. In our model, consumers are rational and can correctly anticipate firms' incentive to offer lower prices initially to enroll them into the reward programs. Our paper offers an explanation as to why the type and amount of reward may vary across the programs. We identify two determining factors for the selection of rewards: size and relative price sensitivity of the heavy-user segment. We find that in a market with a small heavy-user segment that is also much more price sensitive than the light-user segment, it is optimal for firms to offer the rewards. The intuition is based on...
This paper studies the optimal product and pricing decisions in a crowdfunding mechanism by which a project between a creator and many buyers will be realized only if the total funds committed by the buyers reach a specified goal. When the buyers are sufficiently heterogeneous in their product valuations, the creator should offer a line of products with different levels of product quality. Compared to the traditional situation where orders are placed and fulfilled individually, with the crowdfunding mechanism, a product line is more likely than a single product to be optimal and the quality gap between products is smaller. This paper also shows the effect of the crowdfunding mechanism on pricing dynamics over time. Together, these results underscore the substantial influence of the emerging crowdfunding mechanisms on common marketing decisions.
Sales contests are commonly used by firms as a short-term motivational device to increase salespeople's efforts. Conceptually, sales contests and piece-rate schemes, such as salary, commission, or quotas, differ in that in sales contests payment to salespeople is based on relative rather than absolute sales levels. Using the agency theoretic framework where the firm is risk neutral and the salespeople are risk averse, we examine how a firm should design an optimal contest to maximize its profit through stimulating salespeople's efforts. Specifically, we investigate how many salespeople should be given awards and how the reward should be allocated between the winners. Three commonly used sales contest formats are studied. In the first format, termed as Rank-Order Tournament, there are many winners and the amount of reward is based on relative rank achieved, with larger amounts awarded to higher ranks. We also examine two special cases of Rank-Ordered Tournament: a Multiple-Winners format, where the reward is shared equally, and a Winner-Take-All format, where a single winner gets the entire reward. We model salespeople's behavior by considering utility of the reward from achieving one of the winning ranks in the contest and assessing incremental chances of winning by exerting more effort. The analysis was done for two situations based on whether the total reward is large enough for salespeople to participate in the effort-maximizing sales contest or not. The analysis shows that factors impacting contest design include the salespeople's degree of risk aversion, number of salespeople competing in the contest, and degree of sales uncertainty (which reflects strength of the sales-effort relationship). The results show that salespeople exert lower effort when there are larger numbers of participants or when sales uncertainty is high. We find that the Rank-Order Tournament is superior to the Multiple-Winners contest format. In a Multiple-Winners format, the salesperson whose performance is just sufficient to win is better off than any of the other winners as he exerts the least effort to win but obtains as high a reward as any other winners. Specific recommendations on contest designs are obtained assuming that sales follow either a logistic or uniform distribution. Assuming that sales outcome is logistically distributed and the contest budget is high enough to ensure participation, our analysis shows that the total number of winners in a sales contest should not exceed half the number of the contestants. This result is due to the symmetric nature of the logistic distribution. Our analysis also indicates that the total number of winners should be increased and the spread decreased when salespeople are more risk averse. When salespeople are more risk averse, their marginal values for higher rewards become smaller. The spread should increase with ranks when rate of risk tolerance is high and decrease with ranks when the rate of risk tolerance is lower. In the extreme case of risk-neutral salespeople, the optimal design is...
In this paper we study how a reduction of consumer switching costs may affect market competition in the wireless telecommunication industry. The reduction of switching costs can be achieved through the implementation of a regulatory policy called Wireless Number Portability (WNP) that allows consumers to retain the same phone numbers when they switch service providers. By r educing consumers' switching costs, WNP was intended to intensify price competition and facilitate the growth of new service providers. However, our analysis shows that, when networks incur interconnection costs, a reduction of switching costs may accelerate the process of market concentration. With positive interconnection costs, the networks charge lower usage fees for the calls within the same networks than for calls between the networks. Such network-based price discounts provide the large network with a competitive advantage because its subscribers are more likely to enjoy price discounts than the subscribers to a small network. Consequently, subscription to the large network can become more attractive even though the large network charges higher fees to exploit the consumers' switching costs. We relate our analytical results to the empirical evidence from the Hong Kong market where WNP was adopted in March of 1999.
Brands often form alliances to enhance their brand equities. In this paper, we examine the alliances between professional athletes (athlete brands) and sports teams (team brands) in the National Basketball Association (NBA). Athletes and teams match to maximize the total added value created by the brand alliance. To understand this total value, we estimate a structural two-sided matching model using a maximum score method. Using data on the free-agency contracts signed in the NBA during the four-year period from 1994 to 1997, we find that both older players and players with higher performance are more likely to match with teams with more wins. However, controlling for performance, we find that brand alliances between high brand equity players (defined as receiving enough votes to be an all-star starter) and medium brand equity teams (defined by stadium and broadcast revenues) generate the highest value. This suggests that top brands are not necessarily best off matching with other top brands. We also provide suggestive evidence that the maximum salary policy implemented in 1998 influenced matches based on brand equity spillovers more than matches based on performance complementarities.branding, brand alliances, sports marketing, matching model
We consider the case of a first-time interaction between a buyer and a supplier who is unreliable in delivery. The supplier declares her estimate of the ability to meet the order obligations, but the buyer may have a different estimate, which may be higher or lower than the supplier's estimate. We derive the Nash bargaining solution and discuss the role of using a down-payment or nondelivery penalty in the contract. For the case of buyer overtrust, the down-payment contract maximizes channel profits when the supplier's estimate is public information. If the supplier's estimate is private information, a nonsymmetric contract is shown to be efficient and incentive compatible. For the case of buyer undertrust, the contract structure is quite different as both players choose not to include down-payments in the contract. When delivery estimates are public information, a nondelivery penalty contract is able to maximize channel profits if the buyer uses the supplier's estimate in making the ordering decision. If estimates are private information, channel profits are maximized only if the true estimates of both players are not far part. We also discuss the effect of different risk profiles on the nature of the bargaining solution. In three extensions of the model, we consider the following variants of the basic problem. First, we analyze the effect of early versus late negotiation on the bargaining solution. Then, we study the case of endogenous supply reliability, and finally, for the case of repeated interactions, we discuss the impact of updating delivery estimates on the order quantity and negotiated prices of future orders.supply contracts, bargaining, asymmetric beliefs, supply reliability
In goal--oriented services, consumers want to get transported from one well--defined state (start) to another (destination) state without much concern for intermediate states. A cost--based evaluation of such services should depend on the total cost associated with the service---i.e., the price and the amount of time taken for completion. In this paper, we demonstrate that the characteristics of the path to the final destination also influence evaluation and choice. Specifically, we show that segments of idle time and travel away from the final destination are seen as obstacles in the progress towards the destination, and hence lower the choice likelihood of the path. Further, we show that the earlier such obstacles occur during the service, the lower is the choice likelihood. We present an analytical model of consumer choice and test its predictions in a series of experiments. Our results show that in choosing between two services that cover the same displacement in the same time (i.e., identical average progress), consumer choice is driven by the perception of progress towards the goal (i.e., by virtual progress). In a final experiment, we show that the effects of virtual progress may outweigh the effects of actual average progress.Goal--Oriented Services, Behavioral Decision Making, Progress, Choice, Path Characteristics, Transportation
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.