Humble leadership is attracting increased scholarly attention, but little is known about its effects when used in conjunction with less humble leadership behaviors that rely on a perception of the leader as confident and charismatic. This study contrasts the effects on top management team (TMT) potency and organizational performance of a more humble (feedback seeking) and a less humble (vision) CEO leader behavior. We hypothesize that CEO feedback seeking increases TMT potency and firm performance by communicating to TMT members that the organization values their input and encouraging their own feedback seeking, whereas CEO vision articulation influences these outcomes by fostering greater clarity about the firm's direction, and an enhanced ability to coordinate efforts within the TMT. CEOs who have not developed a vision can achieve a similar positive impact on TMT potency and firm performance by seeking feedback. In a sample of CEOs and TMT members from 65 firms, both CEO feedback seeking and vision articulation exhibit positive direct relationships with firm performance. However, only feedback seeking displays an indirect effect on performance via TMT potency. Finally, CEO feedback seeking has its strongest effects on firm performance and TMT potency for CEOs who are not seen as having a vision.
This study investigates the concept of HR Operational Autonomy, i.e., the freedom a franchisor offers to franchisees throughout the system with regards to their creation of HR practices. It is shown to have a significant positive moderating effect on the EO-performance link among UK franchise systems, explaining over 20 percent of the variance in performance outcomes. Implications and future research directions are discussed.
Franchising is an important form of entrepreneurial wealth creation in many retailing and service industries. Since Human Resource Management (HRM) is a critical factor in such industries, it is important to understand how franchisees-as semi-autonomous entrepreneurs-deal with HRM in their units and how this ultimately affects performance at the unit level. However, the very few studies linking franchisee HRM behaviors to performance have not included multi-unit franchising (MUF) as a type of unit ownership. Given the ever-increasing popularity of MUF and the unique characteristics of MUFs, this represents an important knowledge gap. We aim to fill this gap by building a theoretical framework on how the type of unit ownership affects unit HR performance within franchise systems. Building on agency, resource and entrepreneurship perspectives, we propose that units owned by single-unit franchisees (SUFs) and small MUFs (i.e., franchisees with a very small number of units) adopt a 'best fit' system regarding HRM, whereas company-owned units (COs) and units owned by larger MUFs (i.e., franchisees with a large number of units) typically adopt a 'best practice' system. Each system has its own advantages and disadvantages, which results in two contrasting propositions regarding their effects on unit performance. Moreover, we expect the units owned by medium-size MUFs to have the lowest performance since they are 'stuck in the middle' regarding their HRM system.
This paper suggests that motives for engaging in affiliative‐promotive “helping” extra‐role behavior is related to cross‐cultural differences. The cultural dimensions of in‐group collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, performance orientation, and humane orientation, and their differential effect on helping extra‐role behavior in a diverse workforce are examined. Theoretical implications provide guidance for future empirical research in this area, and provide managers with more realistic expectations of employee performance in the workplace.
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