Researchers are sharply divided regarding whether irrelevant abrupt onsets capture spatial attention. Numerous studies report that they do and a roughly equal number report that they do not. This puzzle has inspired numerous attempts at reconciliation, none gaining general acceptance. We propose that abrupt onsets routinely capture attention, but the size of observed capture effects depends critically on how long attention dwells on distractor items which, in turn, depends critically on search difficulty. In a series of spatial cuing experiments, we show that irrelevant abrupt onsets produce robust capture effects when visual search is difficult, but not when search is easy. Critically, this effect occurs even when search difficulty varies randomly across trials, preventing any strategic adjustments of the attentional set that could modulate probability of capture by the onset cue. We argue that easy visual search provides an insensitive test for stimulus-driven capture by abrupt onsets: even though onsets truly capture attention, the effects of capture can be latent. This observation helps to explain previous failures to find capture by onsets, nearly all of which employed an easy visual search.

In studies of human information processing, the processing stages of stimulus identification and response initiation are typically distinguished from a central processing stage that is often called response selection. Issues regarding response selection have been investigated thoroughly in two areas of research, stimulus-response compatibility(SRC) and psychologicalrefractory period (PRP) effects. Fitts and Seeger (1953) were the first to demonstrate SRC effects, showing that performance depends not only on the individual properties of the stimuli and responses but also on their relation. A large empirical base regarding SRC effects exists, along with relatively sophisticated theoretical accounts of how response selection in single-task performance is affected by compatibility relations. Telford (1931) was the first to demonstrate the PRP effect, in which, when two tasks must be performed on successive stimuli, the response to the second stimulus is delayed when the interval between stimulus onsets is short. As for SRC effects, substantial empirical and theoretical work on the PRP effect has been conducted on how response selection for one task is affected by response selection for another.Although considerable research has been conducted on the SRC and PRP effects individually, few experiments have examined the two effects jointly. A reason for the lack of studies manipulating SRC in the PRP paradigm may lie in the belief that response selection for each task occurs the same way as it does in a single-task context. However, as Duncan (1979) pointed out, "In any PRP situation, the response sets of two single tasks have been combined to give a larger total set. It is perhaps unreasonable to suppose that this leaves unaffected the complexity of response choice" (p. 225). Moreover, Hommel (1998) demonstrated that considerable interaction occurs between the two tasks. The implication is that one cannot assume that response selection for each task in dual-task contexts is performed in the same manner as when each task is performed alone. Systematic examination of SRC effects in the PRP paradigm is necessary to provide a more complete understanding of the response-selection mechanism.The purpose of the present paper, therefore, was to review SRC and PRP in the literature as they relate to issues of response selection and, most importantly, to examine in detail those studies that have looked at SRC effects in the PRP paradigm for any additional insights into the nature of response selection that they afford. We begin by reviewing SRC effects and the models developed to account for them. Such effects have been obtained for relevant and irWe thank Bernhard Hommel, Hal Pashler, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on a previous version of this manuscript. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to M.-C. Lien, Mail Stop 262-4, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA 94035 or to R. W. Proctor, Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN 47907 (e-mail: ...

Theories of attentional control are divided over whether the capture of spatial attention depends primarily on stimulus salience or is contingent on attentional control settings induced by task demands. The authors addressed this issue using the N2-posterior-contralateral (N2pc) effect, a component of the event-related brain potential thought to reflect attentional allocation. They presented a cue display followed by a target display of 4 letters. Each display contained a green item and a red item. Some participants responded to the red letter and others to the green letter. Converging lines of evidence indicated that attention was captured by the cues with the same color as the target. First, these target-color cues produced a cuing validity effect on behavioral measures. Second, distractors appearing in the cued location produced larger compatibility effects. Third, the target-color cue produced a robust N2pc effect, similar in magnitude to the N2pc effect to the target itself. Furthermore, the target-color cue elicited a similar N2pc effect regardless of whether it competed with a simultaneous abrupt onset. The findings provide converging evidence for attentional capture contingent on top-down control settings.

Three dual-task experiments were conducted to examine whether the underadditive interaction of the Simon effect and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on Task 2 performance is due to decay. The experiments tested whether the reverse Simon effect obtained with an incompatible stimulus-response (S-R) mapping would show an overadditive interaction with SOA, as predicted by R. De Jong, C.-C. Liang, and E. Lauber's (1994) dual-process model. Tone or letter identification tasks with vocal or keypress responses were used as Task 1. Task 2 was keypresses to arrow direction (or letter identity in Experiment 1). For all experiments, the normal Simon effect showed an underadditive interaction with SOA, but the reverse Simon effect did not show an overadditive interaction. The results imply that the dual-process model is not applicable to the dual-task context. Multiple correspondence effects across tasks implicate an explanation in terms of automatic S-R translation.

This study investigated the nature of advance preparation for a task switch, testing 2 key assumptions of R. De Jong's (2000) failure-to-engage theory: (a) Task-switch preparation is all-or-none, and (b) preparation failures stem from nonutilization of available control capabilities. In 3 experiments, switch costs varied dramatically across individual stimulus-response (S-R) pairs of the tasks-virtually absent for 1 pair but large for others. These findings indicate that, across trials, task preparation was not all-or-none but, rather, consistently partial (full preparation for some S-R pairs but not others). In other words, people do not prepare all of the task some of the time, they prepare some of the task all of the time. Experiments 2 and 3 produced substantial switch costs even though time deadlines provided strong incentives for optimal advance preparation. Thus, there was no evidence that people have a latent capability to fully prepare for a task switch.

Four experiments examined whether the psychological refractory period (PRP) effect can be eliminated with ideomotor compatible (IM) but not stimulus-response compatible (SR) tasks, as reported by A. G. Greenwald and H. G. Shulman (1973). Their tasks were used: a left or right movement to a left-or right-pointing arrow (IM) or to the word left or right (SR) for Task 1; saying "A" or "B" (IM) or "1" or "2" (SR) to an auditory A or B for Task 2. The stimulus onset asynchronies were 0, 100, 200, 300, 500, and 1,000 ms in Experiment 1, and only 0, 100, 200, and 1,000 ms in Experiments 2-4. The arrow was in the center of the screen in Experiments 1-3 and to the left or right in Experiment 4. As in Greenwald and Shulman's Experiment 2, the instructions stated that most often the 2 stimuli would be presented simultaneously. A PRP effect was obtained in all conditions, most likely because response-selection decisions are required even for IM tasks.

The classic theory of spatial attention hypothesized 2 modes, voluntary and involuntary. Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) reported that even involuntary attention capture by stimuli requires a match between stimulus properties and what the observer is looking for. This surprising conclusion has been confirmed by many subsequent studies. In these studies, however, the observer typically looks for the same property throughout an entire session. Real-world behavior, in contrast, often requires frequent shifts in attentional set. The present study examined whether such shifts weaken attentional settings, allowing task-irrelevant objects to capture attention. Surprisingly, fluctuating control settings did not increase vulnerability to capture by salient stimuli (color singletons and abrupt onsets). We conclude that the attention control system is remarkably flexible, able to rapidly and fully adopt new settings and abandon old settings.

Three experiments examined the effects of task switching and response correspondence in a psychological refractory period paradigm. A letter task (vowel-consonant) and a digit task (odd-even) were combined to form 4 possible dual-task pairs in each trial: letter-letter, letter-digit, digit-digit, and digit-letter. Foreknowledge of task transition (repeat or switch) and task identity (letter or digit) was varied across experiments: no foreknowledge in Experiment 1, partial foreknowledge (task transition only) in Experiment 2, and full foreknowledge in Experiment 3. For all experiments, the switch cost for Task 2 was additive with stimulus onset asynchrony, and the response-correspondence effect for Task 2 was numerically smaller in the switch condition than in the repeat condition. These outcomes suggest that reconfiguration for Task 2 takes place after the central processing of Task 1 and that the crosstalk correspondence effect is due to response activation by way of stimulus-response associations.