Recent scholarship holds that unfulfilled definite descriptions do not play a role in motivating Russell's theory of descriptions. In this paper, I make use of Gustav Bergmann's ideal language method to develop an interpretation that restores the puzzle raised by 'the King of France' to the central place it once occupied in discussions of the theory of descriptions. In restoring 'the King of France', I show that Russell's discussion of the problem it raises provides a decisive argument against Fregean senses, a claim that also runs counter to most recent work on the theory of descriptions.The King of France was once central to discussions of Russell's theory of descriptions. Russell, it was held, was controlled by his conviction that an expression's meaning is its referent. Unable to free himself of that conviction, he found a way to free himself of the troubling objects to which it gives rise by eliminating the expressions that seem to require them. On this reading -whose most famous proponents are Quine and Strawson -a more direct way of achieving the same result is to recognize that an expression's meaning is not its referent. The theory of descriptions, although ingenious, is unnecessary.The Quine-Strawson view no longer finds much favor in the literature. More recent work holds that unfulfilled definite descriptions play no role in motivating the theory of descriptions. In Principles of Mathematics, it is argued, Russell distinguishes between the denoting concept expressed by a definite description and the object referred to by it. 'The King of France' expresses a denoting concept, which provides its meaning. 1 Principles has the resources to avoid granting
This paper presents a detailed exegesis of Russell’s “Gray’s Elegy Argument” (GEA). It holds that the GEA mounts a successful attack on Frege—a thesis that has been widely controverted in the literature. The point of departure for my interpretation is Russell’s charge that it is impossible to speak about Sinne, or “meanings” as Russell calls them. I argue that the charge concerns the construction of an “ideal language.” For Russell, an ideal language is an artificial schema designed to represent the truth-makers for sentences occurring in natural language. Its signs stand for the entities that are constituents of those truth-makers. Russell’s charge can thus be expressed more clearly and completely as follows: an ideal language designed to express Frege’s ontology requires signs for meanings (Sinne); however, the signs introduced for that purpose cannot be correlated with the entities they are supposed to represent. Thus, the requirement cannot be met.
In this article I construe Russell's definite description notation as a fragment of an "ideal language" -a language in which, as Russell puts it in the "Logical Atomism" lectures, "the words in a proposition correspond one by one with the components of the corresponding fact." Russell's notation -containing as it does variables, quantifiers and the identity sign -commits him to an ontology that is lavish indeed. It thus conflicts with the spirit of the theory of descriptions, which is developed in the service of ontological frugality (the elimination of denoting concepts, senses and non-existent objects). I make use of arguments derived from the Tractatus to show that an ideal language need not contain logical signs. I thus defend the spirit of the theory of descriptions while departing from its letter.
In this paper I argue that Russell's "On Denoting" is a work in ontology, not the philosophy of language or logic. Specifically, I claim that it addresses two ontological problems: (1) What is the proper analysis of the truth-makers for sentences containing definite descriptions? (2) What is the proper analysis of the connection between those sentences and their truth-makers?
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