Recent scholarship holds that unfulfilled definite descriptions do not play a role in motivating Russell's theory of descriptions. In this paper, I make use of Gustav Bergmann's ideal language method to develop an interpretation that restores the puzzle raised by 'the King of France' to the central place it once occupied in discussions of the theory of descriptions. In restoring 'the King of France', I show that Russell's discussion of the problem it raises provides a decisive argument against Fregean senses, a claim that also runs counter to most recent work on the theory of descriptions.The King of France was once central to discussions of Russell's theory of descriptions. Russell, it was held, was controlled by his conviction that an expression's meaning is its referent. Unable to free himself of that conviction, he found a way to free himself of the troubling objects to which it gives rise by eliminating the expressions that seem to require them. On this reading -whose most famous proponents are Quine and Strawson -a more direct way of achieving the same result is to recognize that an expression's meaning is not its referent. The theory of descriptions, although ingenious, is unnecessary.The Quine-Strawson view no longer finds much favor in the literature. More recent work holds that unfulfilled definite descriptions play no role in motivating the theory of descriptions. In Principles of Mathematics, it is argued, Russell distinguishes between the denoting concept expressed by a definite description and the object referred to by it. 'The King of France' expresses a denoting concept, which provides its meaning. 1 Principles has the resources to avoid granting