2005
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00218.x
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The Ontological Motivations for the Theory of Descriptions

Abstract: In this paper I argue that Russell's "On Denoting" is a work in ontology, not the philosophy of language or logic. Specifically, I claim that it addresses two ontological problems: (1) What is the proper analysis of the truth-makers for sentences containing definite descriptions? (2) What is the proper analysis of the connection between those sentences and their truth-makers?

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“… I have made the case for an ontological interpretation of the theory of descriptions in Rosenkrantz (2005), and have argued in Rosenkrantz (2007) that Russell's definite description notation is a fragment of an ideal language. Scott Soames also sees Russell's definite description notation as part of an ideal language but does not see the problems the ideal language is designed to address as I do.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… I have made the case for an ontological interpretation of the theory of descriptions in Rosenkrantz (2005), and have argued in Rosenkrantz (2007) that Russell's definite description notation is a fragment of an ideal language. Scott Soames also sees Russell's definite description notation as part of an ideal language but does not see the problems the ideal language is designed to address as I do.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%