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This article elaborates on the possible interrelations between the technical and institutional coordination of infrastructures. There is indeed a need for coherence between both in order to safeguard a satisfactory functioning in terms of economic performance, guarantee of public values and technical system integrity. It is argued that the ongoing discussion on the liberalization of various infrastructures focuses very much on institutional changes, including market restructuring towards competition and privatization. The technical repercussions of these institutional changes are often neglected. On the other hand, technological change might also have very fundamental consequences for organizations and institutions. Building on the idea of a co-evolution between institutions and technologies, we define very simplified technical and institutional coordination mechanisms. By comparing both, we are able to determine their coherence and relate this to infrastructure performance. In this way, we provide a novel attempt to relate institutional arrangements to the technical network-specificities of infrastructures. This offers a different perspective on the organization of these sectors and a new explanation of their performance. We illustrate our arguments by way of cases from the electricity and air transport sectors. Implications for theory and policy conclude this article.

Liberalization and the introduction of sector-specific regulators has caused the position of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) of network industries to change not only within national economies, but also vis-à-vis their respective States. In response, many SOEs are pursuing ambiguous strategies, simultaneously seeking autonomy and State protection. In turn, States, particularly in their roles as owners and regulators, have to rethink their relationships with SOEs. In French, German, and Swiss cases, both States and SOEs have motives to simultaneously maintain a close ('yes') and a distant ('no') relationship with one another. SOEs favour a close relationship to secure subsidization for the provision of public services, reduce financial risks, and build trust within collaboration. However, a distant relationship is more suitable for entrepreneurial autonomy and getting rid of the universal service obligation. From the State's perspective, a close relationship is desirable to ensure the stable provision of universal services, control politically and strategically important sectors and critical infrastructures, implement policy objectives, meet geopolitical objectives, and receive dividends as return on investment. A distant relationship is required to avoid bearing risk and to ensure freedom in regulating the public sector.

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