Curiosity pervades all aspects of human behaviour and decision-making. Recent research indicates that the value of information is determined by its propensity to reduce uncertainty, and the hedonic value of the outcomes it predicts. Previous findings also indicate a preference for options that are freely chosen, compared to equivalently valued alternatives that are externally assigned. Here, we asked whether the value of information also varies as a function of self- or externally-imposed choices. Participants rated their preference for information that followed either a self-chosen decision, or an externally imposed condition. Our results showed that choosing a lottery significantly increased the subjective value of information about the outcome. Computational modelling indicated that this change in information-seeking behaviour was not due to changes in the subjective probability of winning, but instead reflected an independent effect of choosing on the value of resolving uncertainty. These results demonstrate that agency over a prospect is an important source of information value.

How we exert control over our decision making has been investigated using conflict tasks, which involve stimuli containing elements that are either congruent or incongruent. In these tasks, participants adapt their decision making strategies following exposure to incongruent stimuli. According to conflict monitoring accounts, conflicting stimulus features are detected in medial frontal cortex, and the extent of experienced conflict scales with response time (RT) and frontal theta--band activity in the electroencephalogram (EEG). However, the consequent adjustments to decision processes following response conflict are not well--specified. To characterise these adjustments and their neural implementation we recorded EEG during a Flanker task. We traced the time--courses of performance monitoring processes (frontal theta) and multiple processes related to perceptual decision making. In each trial participants judged which of two overlaid gratings forming a plaid stimulus (termed the S1 target) was of higher contrast. The stimulus was divided into two sections, which each contained higher contrast gratings in either congruent or incongruent directions. Shortly after responding to the S1 target, an additional S2 target was presented, which was always congruent. Our EEG results suggest enhanced sensory evidence representations in visual cortex and reduced evidence accumulation rates for S2 targets following incongruent S1 stimuli. Frontal theta amplitudes positively correlated with RT following S1 targets (in line with conflict monitoring accounts). Following S2 targets there was no such correlation, and theta amplitude profiles instead resembled decision evidence accumulation trajectories. Based on these differing amplitude profiles across S1 and S2 we formulated a novel theory of frontal theta and performance monitoring, which accounts for differing theta amplitude profiles previously observed across tasks that do and do not involve conflict. We propose that frontal theta does not actually index conflict detection but instead reflects a more general performance monitoring process related to decision confidence and rapid error detection.

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Humans and other animals value information that reduces uncertainty or leads to pleasurable anticipation, even if it cannot be used to gain tangible rewards or change outcomes. In exchange, they are willing to incur significant costs, sacrifice rewards or invest effort. We investigated whether human participants were also willing to endure pain—a highly salient and aversive cost—to obtain such information. Forty participants performed a computer-based task. On each trial, they observed a coin flip, with each side associated with different monetary rewards of varying magnitude. Participants could choose to endure a painful stimulus (low, moderate or high pain) to learn the outcome of the coin flip immediately. Importantly, regardless of their choice, winnings were always earned, rendering this information non-instrumental. Results showed that agents were willing to endure pain in exchange for information, with a lower likelihood of doing so as pain levels increased. Both higher average rewards and a larger variance between the two possible rewards independently increased the willingness to accept pain. Our results show that the intrinsic value of escaping uncertainty through non-instrumental information is sufficient to offset pain experiences, suggesting a shared mechanism through which these can be directly compared.

Confirmation bias in information-search contributes to the formation of polarized echo-chambers of beliefs. However, the role of valence on information source selection remains poorly understood. In Experiment 1, participants won financial rewards depending on the outcomes of a set of lotteries. They were not shown these outcomes, but instead could choose to view a prediction of each lottery outcome made by one of two sources. Before choosing their favoured source, participants were first shown a series of example predictions made by each. The sources systematically varied in the accuracy and positivity (i.e., how often they predicted a win) of their predictions. Hierarchical Bayesian modeling indicated that both source accuracy and positivity impacted participants’ choices. Importantly, those that viewed more positively-biased information believed that they had won more often and had higher confidence in those beliefs. In Experiment 2, we directly assessed the effect of positivity on the perceived credibility of a source. In each trial, participants watched a single source making a series of predictions of lottery outcomes and rated the strength of their beliefs in each source. Interestingly, positively-biased sources were not seen as more credible. Together, these findings suggest that positively-biased information is sought partly due to the desirable emotional state it induces rather than having enhanced perceived credibility. Information sought on this basis nevertheless produced consequential biased beliefs about the world-state, highlighting a potentially key role for hedonic preferences in information selection and subsequent belief formation.

Selection bias in information-search contributes to the formation of polarized echo-chambers of beliefs. However, the role of valence in information source selection remains poorly understood. In Experiment 1, participants won financial rewards depending on the outcomes of a set of lotteries. They were not shown these outcomes, but instead could choose to view a prediction of each lottery outcome made by one of two sources. Before choosing their favoured source, participants were first shown a series of example predictions made by each. The sources systematically varied in the accuracy and positivity (i.e., how often they predicted a win) of their predictions. Hierarchical Bayesian modeling indicated that both source accuracy and positivity impacted participants’ choices. Importantly, those seeking more positively-biased information believed that they had won more often and had higher confidence in those beliefs. In Experiment 2, we directly assessed the effect of positivity on the perceived credibility of a source. In each trial, participants watched a single source making a series of predictions of lottery outcomes and rated the strength of their beliefs in each source. Interestingly, positively-biased sources were not seen as more credible. Together, these findings suggest that positively-biased information is sought partly due to the desirable emotional state it induces rather than having enhanced perceived credibility. Information sought on this basis nevertheless produced consequential biased beliefs about the world-state, highlighting a potentially key role for hedonic preferences in information selection and subsequent belief formation.