jected tests. Our interpretation is that researchers might be tempted to inflate the value of those just-rejected tests by choosing a "significant" specification. We propose a method to measure this residual and describe how it varies by article and author characteristics.

Journals favor rejection of the null hypothesis. This selection upon tests may distort the behavior of researchers. Using 50, 000 tests published between 2005 and 2011 in the AER, JPE, and QJE, we identify a residual in the distribution of tests that cannot be explained by selection. The distribution of p-values exhibits a two humped camel shape with abundant p-values above 0.25, a valley between 0.25 and 0.10, and a bump slightly below 0.05. The missing tests (with p-values between 0.25 and 0.10) can be retrieved just after the 0.05 threshold and represent 10% to 20% of marginally rejected tests. Our interpretation is that researchers might be tempted to inflate the value of those just-rejected tests by choosing a "significant" specification. We propose a method to measure this residual and describe how it varies by article and author characteristics.

jected tests. Our interpretation is that researchers might be tempted to inflate the value of those just-rejected tests by choosing a "significant" specification. We propose a method to measure this residual and describe how it varies by article and author characteristics.

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We measure the impact of bank capital requirements on corporate borrowing and investment using loanE level data. The Basel II regulatory framework makes capital requirements vary across both banks and across firms, which allows us to control for firmE level credit demand shocks and bankE level credit supply shocks. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in capital requirements reduces lending by 10%. Firms can attenuate this reduction by substituting borrowing across banks, but only partially. The resulting reduction in borrowing capacity impacts investment, but not working capital: Fixed assets are reduced by 2.6%, but lending to customers is unaffected.

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for valuable comments as well as seminar participants at the Paris School of Economics, the Banque de France, the ADRES conference, the 7th Financial Risk Forum, the 3rd MoFiR workshop and the 2014 SoFiE conference on "systemic risks and financial regulation".

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