Artículo de publicación ISIDemand-responsive transport (DRT) systems provide
flexible transport services for passengers who request
door-to-door rides in shared-ride mode without fixed routes and
schedules. DRT systems face interesting coordination challenges.
For example, one has to design cost-sharing mechanisms for offering
fare quotes to potential passengers so that all passengers are
treated fairly. Themain issue is how the operating costs of the DRT
system should be shared among the passengers (given that different
passengers cause different amounts of inconvenience to the
other passengers), taking into account that DRT systems should
provide fare quotes instantaneously without knowing future ride
request submissions. We determine properties of cost-sharing
mechanisms that make DRT systems attractive to both the transport
providers and passengers, namely online fairness, immediate
response, individual rationality, budget balance, and ex-post incentive
compatibility.We propose a novel cost-sharing mechanism,
which is called Proportional Online Cost Sharing (POCS), which
provides passengers with upper bounds on their fares immediately
after their ride request submissions despite missing knowledge
of future ride request submissions, allowing them to accept their
fare quotes or drop out. We examine how POCS satisfies these
properties in theory and computational experiments
This paper addresses a problem in supply chain management that how scarce resources can be efficiently allocated among competing interests. We present a formal model of allocation mechanisms for such settings that a supplier with limited production capacity allocates its products to a set of competitive retailers. In contrary to the existing allocation mechanisms in which retailers are local monopolists, the new model exhibits much more complicated market behaviors. We show that the widely-used proportional allocation mechanism is no longer necessarily Pareto optimal, even if all retailers are in a symmetric situation. A necessary and sufficient condition for the proportional allocation to be Pareto optimal is given. We propose a truthinducing allocation mechanism based on our capacity allocation model, which is more intuitive and applicable than the existing truth-inducing mechanisms.
Abstract. In this paper, we introduce an experimental approach to the design, analysis and implementation of market mechanisms based on double auction. We define a formal market model that specifies the market policies in a double auction market. Based on this model, we introduce a set of criteria for the evaluation of market mechanisms. We design and implement a set of market policies and test them with different experimental settings. The results of experiments provide us a better understanding of the interrelationship among market policies and also show that an experimental approach can greatly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of market mechanism design.
Studies on mechanism design mostly focus on a single market where sellers and buyers trade. This paper examines the problem of mechanism design for capacity allocation in two connected markets where a supplier allocates products to a set of retailers and the retailers resale the products to end-users in price competition. We consider the problems of how allocation mechanisms in the upstream market determine the behaviors of markets in the downstream market and how pricing policy in the downstream market influences the properties of allocation mechanisms. We classify an effective range of capacity that influences pricing strategies in the downstream market according to allocated quantities. Within the effective capacity range, we show that the retailers tend to inflate orders under proportional allocation, but submit truthful orders under uniform allocation. We observe that heterogeneous allocations results in greater total retailer profit which is a unique phenomenon in our model. The results would be applied to the design and analysis of Business-to-Business (B2B) marketplaces and supply chain management.
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