When organizations pay inadequate attention to unusual events, the possibility of breaching a safety barrier increases. With hindsight it often appears that full advantage is not taken of what is known. Part of the reason organizations neglect apparent warnings is because of limited resources and the way resources are allocated. Drawing on concepts from the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, this paper examines situations where resource availability and use can compromise safety by initiating drift. Empirical evidence from the nuclear power industry is reviewed to demonstrate the relationship between resources, resource deployment, and drift. Drift is influenced by error signals, feedback loops, and imperfect watchfulness. Resource availability and use can initiate drift, but they do not necessarily yield catastrophe. Should organizations fall into a threatened position, they can enlist characteristics, behaviors, and capabilities to stabilize the situation, avoid breaching the safety border, and achieve greater security. Through an in-depth study of two plants with contrasting reputations for safety, this paper identifies the characteristics, behaviors, and capabilities that organizations on the edge exhibit. The characteristics, behaviors, and capabilities of the plant with the stronger safety reputation changed after a significant reduction of resources. Resource reduction led to movement toward the safety border, which in turn led to change. Evidence shows that organizations operating closer to the border of safety respond to warnings from unusual events in a resilient rather than anticipatory way. To overcome unexpected problems and limitations, they rely on after-the-fact intervention rather than preparation, foresight, and the provision of countermeasures. Once they recognize they have problems, they explore for novel approaches, typically seeking new knowledge and skills by dismissing old staff and hiring new people, buying advice from outside experts or consultants, and modeling, benchmarking, and copying other organizations' best practices. Organizations on the edge initiate change in response to external demands for change often only after painful public incidents. These organizations emphasize hierarchy and powerful headquarters staff, and their leaders tend to act as commanders and controllers rather than as catalysts and facilitators. The focus of this paper is not on the occurrence of accidents per se, nor on highly reliable operations, but on the precursors and consequences of drift within a safety border. Operating on the edge of the border extends beyond safety to other performance measures and beyond nuclear power to other industries. In settings as diverse as U.S. banks, hospitals, and universities, Israeli kibbutzim, Japanese kereitsu, and Korean chaebol, operating on the edge has become more common.

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This article reviews a program of research on how groups reason about moral dilemmas, and presents data from two studies. In the first study, discussions of 21 four-member groups were tape recorded, coded, and analyzed to identify the factors that affected group performance. The data indicated that a group's moral reasoning level (as measured by Rest's Defining Issues Test) seemed to depend on whether more principled reasoning members took a task leadership role. The second study attempted to manipulate the leadership variable by assigning the task leadership role to individuals who reasoned at more vs. less principled levels. Results indicated that the reasoning level of the assigned leader impacted group performance while individual performance overall on a subsequent moral reasoning task benefitted from the group experience. The extent of the individual change was influenced by subjects' initial reasoning level. Implications for management are discussed.

Managers need to make sense of emerging strategic issues that could significantly impact their businesses. While models of this sensemaking process suggest that information gathering affects interpretations (which affect action and performance), researchers have argued that our understanding of the role of information in changing interpretations is underdeveloped. This paper investigates the role of the time managers spend searching for information and the diversity of the information they find in changing managers' perceptions that an equivocal, strategic issue represents a threat and opportunity for their businesses. The methodology involves a longitudinal research design in which managers recorded multiple, process-oriented measures of their information gathering activity. Results suggest that time spent searching for information leads to changes towards seeing the issue as more of a threat, while the diversity of information found leads to changes towards seeing it as less of a threat. We found no effect of information gathering on opportunity perceptions. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2007.