ObjectiveTo measure the implementation of WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Article 5.3 at country level using a new Tobacco Industry Interference Index and to report initial results using this index in seven Southeast Asian countries.MethodsScore sheet based on WHO FCTC Article 5.3 Guidelines sent to correspondents in seven Southeast Asian countries, using a scoring system designed with the help of tobacco control experts and validated through focused group discussions.ResultsThe seven countries ranked from the lowest level of interference to the highest are Brunei, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Countries that face high levels of unnecessary interaction with the tobacco industry also face high levels of tobacco industry influence in policy development. Most governments do not allow any tobacco industry representatives on their delegation to sessions of the Conference of the Parties or its subsidiary bodies nor accept their sponsorship for delegates, but most governments still accept or endorse offers of assistance from the tobacco industry in implementing tobacco control policies. Most governments also receive tobacco industry contributions (monetary or in kind) or endorse industry corporate social responsibility activities. Governments do not have a procedure for disclosing interactions with the tobacco industry, but Lao PDR, Philippines and Thailand have instituted measures to prevent or reduce industry interference.ConclusionsThis Tobacco Industry Interference Index, based on the WHO FCTC Article 5.3 Guidelines, is a useful advocacy tool for identifying both progress and gaps in national efforts at implementing WHO FCTC Article 5.3.

Internet and social media channels are key to Sampoerna's marketing strategy in Indonesia. Internet-based marketing run alongside conventional advertising likely increases Indonesian youth exposure to cigarette marketing. This case study also provides evidence that Sampoerna evaded current tobacco advertising regulations. Subnational governments can play a stronger role in restricting tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship by more effectively enforcing current regulation.

Objective: To review how tobacco transnational companies conducted their business in the hostile environment of Singapore, attempting to counter some of the government's tobacco control measures; to compare the Malaysian and the Singaporean governments' stance on tobacco control and the direct bearing of this on the way the tobacco companies conduct their business. Methods: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private internal industry documents. Results: The comprehensive prohibition on advertising did not prevent the companies from advertising cigarettes to Singaporeans. Both British American Tobacco and Philip Morris used Malaysian television to advertise into Singapore. To launch a new brand of cigarettes, Alpine, Philip Morris used a non-tobacco product, the Alpine wine cooler. Other creative strategies such as innovative packaging and display units at retailers were explored to overcome the restrictions. Philip Morris experimented with developing a prototype cigarette using aroma and sweetened tipping paper to target the young and health conscious. The industry sought to weaken the strong pack warnings. The industry distributed anti-smoking posters for youth to retailers but privately salivated over their market potential.

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Objective: To review tobacco company strategies of using youth smoking prevention programmes to counteract the Malaysian government's tobacco control legislation and efforts in conducting research on youth to market to them. Methods: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private internal industry documents. Search terms included Malay, cmtm, jaycees, YAS, and direct marketing; 195 relevant documents were identified for this paper. Results: Industry internal documents reveal that youth anti-smoking programmes were launched to offset the government's tobacco control legislation. The programme was seen as a strategy to lobby key politicians and bureaucrats for support in preventing the passage of legislation. However, the industry continued to conduct research on youth, targeted them in marketing, and considered the teenage market vital for its survival. Promotional activities targeting youth were also carried out such as sports, notably football and motor racing, and entertainment events and cash prizes. Small, affordable packs of cigarettes were crucial to reach new smokers. Conclusion: The tobacco industry in Malaysia engaged in duplicitous conduct in regard to youth. By buying into the youth smoking issue it sought to move higher on the moral playing field and strengthen its relationship with government, while at the same time continuing to market to youth. There is no evidence that industry youth smoking prevention programmes were effective in reducing smoking; however, they were effective in diluting the government's tobacco control legislation.

Background: Indonesia shoulders a significant tobacco burden, with almost two million cases of tobacco-related illnesses and more than two hundred thousand tobacco-related deaths annually. Indonesian tobacco control is progressing but lags behind other countries. Our study evaluates factors that contribute to the slow progress of tobacco policy change in Indonesia from the perspective of tobacco control experts (TCEs). Method: We conducted qualitative interviews with four international and ten national TCEs, who have been active in tobacco control for at least 5 years. Our interview guideline included questions on the current tobacco control situation in Indonesia and explored reasons why tobacco control is progressing so slowly. The interviews were conducted either in English or Bahasa Indonesia, recorded and then transcribed verbatim. We conducted a thematic analysis based on five core causal factors for policy adoption: institutions, networks, socioeconomic factors, agendas and ideas. Results: The multistage delay of tobacco policy adoption is principally due to political structures and policy hierarchy, complex bureaucracy, unclear roles and responsibilities, and a high degree of corruption. The low bargaining position and lack of respect for the Ministry of Health also contributes. There are contrasting frames of tobacco as a strategic economic asset and tobacco control as a sovereignty threat. There is an imbalance of power and influence between well entrenched and resourced tobacco industry networks compared to relatively young and less established tobacco control networks. The policy agenda is likely influenced by the privileged position of tobacco in Indonesia as a socially acceptable product with high consumption. There are constraints on transferring ideas and evidence to successful policy adoption. Conclusion: Tobacco companies have substantially influenced both policy decisions and public perceptions, signifying a power imbalance within the government system and broader networks. Acceding to and enforcing the World Health Organization-Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO-FCTC) would enable the Indonesian government to shift the power imbalance towards public health stakeholders. Tobacco control advocates must enhance their network cohesion and embrace other community groups to improve engagement and communication with policymakers.

Objective: To describe tobacco industry efforts in Malaysia to thwart government efforts to regulate tobacco promotion and health warnings. Methods: Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private tobacco industry internal documents made available through the Master Settlement Agreement and secondary websites; relevant information from news articles and financial reports. Results: Commencing in the 1970s, the industry began to systematically thwart government tobacco control. Guidelines were successfully promoted in the place of legislation for over two decades. Even when the government succeeded in implementing regulations such as health warnings and advertising bans they were compromised and acted effectively to retard further progress for years to come. Conclusion: Counter-measures to delay or thwart government efforts to regulate tobacco were initiated by the industry. Though not unique to Malaysia, the main difference lies in the degree to which strategies were used to successfully counter stringent tobacco control measures between 1970 and 1995.

Study objective:To review the tobacco industry’s Asian environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) consultants programme, focusing on three key nations: China, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.Methods:Systematic keyword and opportunistic website searches of formerly private internal industry documents.Main results:The release of the 1986 US Surgeon General’s report on second hand smoke provoked tobacco companies to prepare for a major threat to their industry. Asian programme activities included conducting national/international symposiums, consultant “road shows” and extensive lobbying and media activities. The industry exploited confounding factors said to be unique to Asian societies such as diet, culture and urban pollution to downplay the health risks of ETS. The industry consultants were said to be “…prepared to do the kinds of things they were recruited to do”.Conclusions:The programme was successful in blurring the science on ETS and keeping the controversy alive both nationally and internationally. For the duration of the project, it also successfully dissuaded national policy makers from instituting comprehensive bans on smoking in public places.